The Rich Have Peers, the Poor Have Patrons: Engaging the State in a South Indian City[1]

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Research on democracy has shed much light on two kinds of democratic politics: patterns of voting and patterns of associational or movement politics. But there is growing recognition that in order to better understand the quality or depth of democracy, we need to move beyond this dualistic focus to better understand the everyday practices through which citizens can effectively wield their rights; these practices often diverge from the formal equality enshrined in laws and constitutions. We study this question through a large, unique sample survey carried out in a South Indian city. We find that effective citizenship is refracted through the institutional specificities of urban India and that, as a result, the poor access the state through political participation and the rich through particularistic connections to persons of influence. But unlike the conventional celebration of participation as a citizenship-deepening activity, we also find that a substantial part of participation is associated with forms of brokerage that compromise democratic citizenship.

INTRODUCTION

In this article we pose a simple question: How do citizens engage the state? It is generally believed that a more active citizenry anchors the procedural

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legitimacy of electoral democracy (Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995), ensures accountability between elections (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992), and can also help secure social rights (Ambedkar [1936] 2004; Marshall 1950; Jayal 2013). Yet as central as the idea of an active citizenry, or the concept of citizenship, has become to our thinking about democracy, not enough empirical work has focused specifically on understanding where and how citizenship is actually exercised. Although actual practices of citizenship fall short of citizenship ideals in richer democracies too (Smith 1997; Somers 2008; Glenn 2010), this problem is especially acute in postcolonial democracies, where legacies of the colonial state and the social and institutional conditions of democratization have produced very uneven forms of citizenship. Legal equality of citizenry often coexists with a high degree of actual inequality, as some find it hard to exercise their citizenship rights while others are not so handicapped (O'Donnell 1993; Fox 1994; Mamdani 1996; Dagnino 1998; Mahajan 1999). This article addresses this empirical gap by presenting findings from a study that was specifically designed to tackle, in a very focused manner, questions of how citizens access the state. Drawing on a large and unique household survey from the South Indian city of Bengaluru (formerly Bangalore), we develop specific measures to paint a picture of how, in contrast to its equal legal provision, citizenship is actually practiced (as measured by how citizens access basic services) and how this varies across social categories.

Our principal argument is that while social or structural positions—caste, religion, class—do matter, their impact on citizen engagement with the state is shaped by political participation and particularistic connections to persons of influence, which in turn reflect how households navigate the institutions of urban India. In particular, we empirically identify two types of citizenship practices: low-income groups, which use political participation, and richer citizens, who rely on particularistic connections to persons of influence to engage the state.

Before we proceed further, we should highlight a larger point about our argument. On the whole, democratic theory has focused on two aspects of politics: electoral politics and movement/associational politics. It has been less concerned with the practices of citizen-state interaction. One could legitimately argue that another key question for democratic theory should be whether citizens not only enjoy legal equality, but also have free, equal,

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and direct access to the state in practice, especially in securing the public services they need? If the access is very unequal or mediated through brokers, what does that do to the idea of citizen equality vis-à-vis the state in a democracy? Recognizing this deficit, a rising literature on clientelism and patronage (Chandra 2007; Chatterjee 2006; Stokes et al. 2013; Kruks-Wisner 2018; Bussell 2019) has explored the dynamics of how citizens make direct claims on the state. If democratic theory has shed much light on the patterns of voting and associational or movement politics, or what might be called mobilizational politics, the literature on citizenship has more closely examined the everyday practices through which citizens can effectively wield their rights. But we need to connect this brand of research on the functioning of *democracy* to the literature on *citizenship*. Democratic theory and citizenship theory should be linked, which this article attempts to do.

We begin with some theoretical considerations about citizenship and democracy, with a special focus on how these might apply to India. We then introduce our data and turn to the empirical analysis, which is divided in three parts: which social groups access the state, how they access the state, and with what effects.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Localizing Democracy and Citizenship

Relational sociologists have long made the argument that citizenship is not simply a bundle of rights but a set of relations (Somers 1993; Emirbayer and Sheller 1999; Paschel 2016). Seen this way, citizenship is the ability to utilize what formal rights one is granted by law, and the use of rights is a function of the set of relations one has to other actors and to the institutions through which rights are made usable. Citizenship, as Somers has argued, is an "instituted process" that has to be examined in the context of "institutional and relational clusters in which people, power, and organizations are positioned and connected" (Somers 1993, p. 595).

These relations can be divided along two basic axes. The Tocquevillian dimension refers to the horizontal relations between social actors. Tocqueville (2004) famously argued that citizenship requires mutual recognition of others as rights-bearing citizens in a polity and the ability to act accordingly. In this sense, birth-based hierarchy is an anathema to citizenship, an argument powerfully reflected in India's foundational constitutional debates, especially in the scathing critique of the deeply hierarchical Hindu caste system by B. R. Ambedkar, a key architect of India's Constitution (Khosla 2020).

But there is also a Weberian or vertical dimension to citizenship, namely how individuals interact with the state. Following Weber's famous writings

on bureaucracy (Weber 1946), mass democracy is not possible without mass bureaucracy and, specifically, formal state institutions and processes must deal with citizens in keeping with rule bound criteria and "without regard for persons" (p. 215; i.e., particularistic characteristics). All citizens are equal in the eyes of the law and entitled to equal treatment according to predefined criteria. In its ideal-type, as Weber so emphatically underscored, bureaucracy "abhors privilege" (p. 224).

Sociology has long been founded on the recognition that there is a gap between legal equality and factual inequality, and that gap, at least in democracies where individuals are endowed with basic civil and political rights, can in large part be characterized in terms of the uneven distribution of effective citizenship. Citizenship may be legally available to all in equal measure, but what is legal may be less than fully operational—and sometimes, or for some groups, entirely absent in reality.

Work on inequality has generally focused on inequalities of material assets and status, but in complex, institutionally differentiated societies, how individuals access state institutions can also be an important source of inequality, one that cannot be reduced to material or status inequalities, even if they are often interrelated (Dagnino 1998; Chatterjee 2006; Massey 2007; Tilly 1998; Glenn 2010). Institutional inequalities, and more specifically inequalities in effective citizenship, need to be assessed on their own terms. Indeed, Tilly (2004) has specifically argued that the measure of the success of a democracy can be characterized by the degree to which actual democratic practices of voting, as well as engagement with the state on a day-to-day basis, are predicated on delinking status and material wealth from the exercise of rights. This is the logic behind Tilly's relational conceptualization of citizenship: "Citizenship consists, in this context, of mutual rights and obligations binding governmental agents to whole categories of people who are subject to the government's authority, those categories being defined chiefly or exclusively by relations to the government *rather than by reference to particular connections with rulers or to membership in categories based on imputed durable traits such race, ethnicity, gender, or religion*" (Tilly 2004, p. 128; italics added).

If much of the literature on citizenship has focused on the national level, an increasing body of work has begun to examine local arenas of governance for two reasons. First, whether it is revealed in studies of racialized inequality in US cities (Massey and Denton 1993; Van Cleve 2016), differentiated citizenship in Brazilian or South African cities (Mamdani 1996; Munro 2001; Holston 2008) or the growing literature on local practices of citizenship in India, discussed in detail below, there is mounting recognition that one of the weakest links in the instantiation of citizenship is at the local level, where conferred rights and democratic legality are subverted by entrenched local power and the weakness of local state institutions.

Relatedly, whereas global urban studies in sociology have been dominated by highly structuralist accounts (the global cities and neoliberalism literature) that focus on the effects of global capitalism in shaping urban inequality, more recent postcolonial work (Parnell and Robinson 2012; Go 2016; Ren 2018; Garrido 2021) has called for provincializing theory and emphasized the importance of explaining patterns of inequality in cities of the global south in terms of their own specific historical, political, and sociocultural dynamics.[2]

Second, as Glenn (2010) has remarked, sociology's contributions to the study of citizenship "lie in its focus on the social processes by which citizenship and its boundaries are formed," highlighting in particular the "place-specific practices that occur within larger structural contexts" (p. 2). The local, in other words, becomes a strategic research site where we can move beyond the *formal* rights endowed by constitutions and electoral systems and unpack and examine the *actual* relational dynamics and power asymmetries of citizenship. We agree that the local turn in the study of citizenship is vital for understanding the practice of citizenship, and that is where our article is squarely anchored.

India and the Paradox of Urban Citizenship

India represents a particularly important case for exploring the sociology of citizenship. It is the second oldest constitutionally based universal-suffrage democracy in the postcolonial world.[3] Indeed, when India became independent, it granted basic civic and political rights to all citizens, breaking sharply with the pattern of incremental extension of basic democratic rights that had been the norm for democracies in Western Europe and North America (Keyssar 2000; Ramanathan and Ramanathan 2017; Ziblatt 2017). Since the rise of Narendra Modi to national power in 2014, a great deal of concern about the health of Indian democracy has legitimately been expressed (Varshney 2022*a*).[4] But if we speak in longer historical terms, then aside from a short authoritarian interlude in 1975–77 and the very recent

[2] The "provincializing" way of arguing comes close to what Chakrabarty (2000), in his famous claim about universalism vs. particularism in European social sciences, calls the "hermeneutic tradition," which he distinguishes from the "analytic tradition." Whether one agrees with the terminology, the basic point is that the latter claims universalism, whereas the former shows a "loving grasp" of local specificities. In this article, following Chakrabarty, we try to bring the two traditions into "some kind of conversation with each other."

[3] The first was Sri Lanka. It got universal franchise in 1931—during colonial rule.

[4] In 2021, one of the most widely read annual assessments of democracies worldwide demoted India's democracy from "free" to "partly free" status (Freedom House 2021).

democratic backsliding (as opposed to democratic collapse; see Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018; Varshney 2022*b*), India has generally preserved its core democratic constitutional protections and, for most of its life after independence, has routinely earned high marks for all the standard indicators of democratic rights.[5]

On the other hand, India's democracy has been built against a backdrop of deep, long-lasting and widespread inequalities of gender, caste, ethnicity and religion (Dahl 1989; Mahajan 1999; Jayal 2013; Ambedkar 2004; Khosla 2020). Indeed, if Indian democracy has historically been so vibrant, marked not only by high rates of political participation, but also a diverse, noisy, and contentious civil society and social movement sector, it is precisely because its democracy created spaces for subordinate groups. Having said this, for all the many cases in which subordinate groups in India have organized, mobilized, and even secured significant social gains, India in the aggregate remains a very important case of the gap between legal equality and factual inequality (Dreze and Sen 2013; Yengde 2019). Some of this inequality can be tied directly to material or status differences, but as we will show, much of it is also a result of the uneven distribution of effective citizenship.

The problem of uneven political participation as the source of unequal social outcomes has received extensive treatment in the democracy literature (Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992; Verba et al. 1995). But the conventional demand-side drivers—electoral participation or contentious politics—provide limited analytical traction in the Indian case. Let us explain why we need to go beyond the standard elections- or participation-based scholarship.

Overall India's political system is highly competitive and has accommodated countless parties (and movements) from subordinate groups and voters have been highly active and aggressive in throwing out incumbents (Varshney 2013). Indeed, not only do Indians vote in large numbers, but in a pattern contrary to the norm in the United States, the poor and the lower castes for several decades have voted at least as much as, and often more than, the rich and the upper castes (Yadav and Palshikar 2009; Yadav 2020). Thus, when it comes to voting, citizenship in practice is, if anything, by now skewed in favor of the less privileged in India.

Citizens can also press claims on the state through the full range of repertoires that constitute contentious politics (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). This is an area of research that has produced rich results for India (Basu 1992; Katzenstein and Ray 2005; Agarwala 2013; Ahuja 2019). Subordinate

[5] In different ways, this is recognized by leading theorists of democracy: e.g., Dahl 1998, 159–63; Przeworski et al. 2000, p. 87; Przeworski 2019, p. 30.

groups in India often engage in contentious politics, making mobilization from below a vital part of Indian democracy. Here again, if anything, the overall effect has, from the point of view of active citizenship, not been skewed against the less privileged.[6]

This then leads to an important puzzle. On the eve of India's independence, in his last speech to the Constituent Assembly, B. R. Ambedkar, the head of India's constitution drafting committee and a preeminent Dalit leader,[7] declared that, in a society marked by "graded hierarchy," the question of social rights was indispensable to the definition of democracy. He went on to warn that "we must remove this contradiction [denying equality in our social and economic life] at the earliest possible moment or else those who suffer from inequality will blow up the structure of political democracy which this Assembly has so laboriously built up."[8] In the more than seven decades that have passed, the "social question" has remained at the center of Indian politics. Robust electoral participation and contentious politics have given voice to the subaltern who have exerted significant pressure on the state, yet social equality has remained elusive, especially in policy arenas in which democratic states elsewhere have historically played a proactive role, such as in delivering basic services and public goods.[9]

The question of how robust civic and political rights can be leveraged into social rights is one that has drawn a lot of attention in the world's largest democracy (Mahajan 1999; Heller 2000; Jayal 2013). We do not claim to be able to answer it fully in this article, but we do propose to excavate and explore what we believe is an important part of the puzzle. Moving beyond the traditional focus on claim making through elections or contention, we argue that one of the key elements of making citizenship effective is the capacity to engage the state on a *routine basis*. As noted above, citizenship "institutionalizes regular, categorical relations between subjects and their governments" (Tilly 2004, p. 128). Beyond electoral participation and contentious

[6] On Dalit mobilization, see Ahuja (2019); on Adivasi (tribal) mobilization, Shah (2019); on peasant mobilization, Varshney (1995); on mobilization of informal workers, Heller (1999) and Agarwala (2013).

[7] Dalit is the political term preferred by the former "untouchables" to express their identity today. In legal and constitutional discourse, the same community is known as the Scheduled Castes (SCs).

[8] B. R. Ambedkar's speech to the Constituent Assembly, November 25, 1949. See also Nehru (1942, p. 528) for a similar foundational statement linking universal franchise to the recognition that "each person should be treated as having equal political and social value."

[9] The literature here is massive, but among the most influential comparative assessments are Dreze and Sen (2013), who show that in terms of basic social indicators, India, despite a far better economic performance (until recently) has nonetheless fallen behind its less democratic neighbor, Bangladesh. Also see Mehta (2003) and Varshney (2000) for their focus on caste inequalities in a vigorous democracy.

politics, what then might the capacity to engage the state on a routine basis look like and how might it vary across citizens?

In the more recent literature on democratic politics that is focused on citizenship practices, as opposed to elections and collective action,[10] it has become clear that the standard Marshallian sequential logic drawn from the specific history of England—namely, civil and political rights translating over time into social rights—is deeply problematic and clearly teleological. The literature on Latin America has pointed to a different sequencing with social rights often predating political rights (Yashar 2005), and more broadly, a rich vein of field-based and ethnographic research has shown that even when civil and political rights are formally and legally provided, and even when subordinate groups avail themselves of those rights in the electoral arena and in civil society (as in India), acting on those rights when engaging the state on a routine basis often requires a range of intermediations, a phenomenon variously described as brokerage or clientelism.[11] A whole range of citizens do not directly interact with the state; they go through patrons or brokers, making it analytically necessary to think about the interests of the latter in citizen-state interactions. This literature, based at the local levels of the polity, has raised three larger questions about democratic citizenship that directly frame our investigation.

First, the "ideal-type" of citizenship described by Tilly is best treated as what has been described as a "regulative ideal" (Mansbridge et al. 2010, p. 65)—that is, an aspirational ideal which in many places often shapes the contours of democratic struggles. As Robins, Cornwall, and Von Lieres (2008) note in their critical review of the citizenship literature, "The main question for democratic citizenship is not how to eliminate power, but how to constitute forms of power that are compatible with democratic and participatory practices" (p. 1073). Second, rather than treating clientelism as undermining citizenship—in that it impedes the direct engagement of citizens with the state—the recent literature has explicitly recognized that these forms of intermediation are more often than not responses to a weak or inefficient state that repeatedly fails to answer to its citizens (Auyero 2000; Berenschot 2010; Krishna, Rains, and Wibbles 2020). Thus, clientelism can paradoxically give voice to those who would not otherwise be heard.

[10] For Europe, see Garcia (2006); for Brazil see Baiocchi, Heller, and Silva (2011) and Scheper-Hughes (1992); for Mexico, Houtzager and Acharya (2010) and Fox (1994); for Indonesia, Berenschot (2018); and for the Philippines, Garrido (2019). The US literature has been less attentive to this question, in part because modernization assumptions treat US democracy as largely institutionalized and the central question as being one of contentious or competitive politics. But the marginalization of Blacks and other historically disadvantaged groups has drawn new attention to day-to-day practices in local government (Pacewicz 2016), courts (Van Cleave 2016), schools (Lewis and Diamond 2015), and housing (Desmond 2012; Wacquant 2008).

[11] For a systematic review of the uses of brokerage in sociology, see Stovel and Shaw (2012).

Third, brokerage and clientelism need to be carefully contextualized. At one extreme of the spectrum, clientelism is based on a quid pro quo (goods or services in exchange for votes or political support) that is predicated on a relationship that is so asymmetrical that it undermines the freedom of the client and thereby ultimately compromises democracy (Simmel 1950; Scheper-Hughes 1992; Fox 1994; Berenschot 2010). As Stovel and Shaw note, "Because such brokers can act as gatekeepers, they can easily extort resources from the dependent parties, often demanding bribes in return for political support or protection" (2012, p. 149). In such a situation, patrons are simply too powerful to allow clients any agency. In the middle of the spectrum exists a situation where clients can in fact be strategic (Auyero 2000; Auerbach and Tachil 2018), using competing patrons to get what they need while preserving to some extent their autonomy to disown patrons who fail to deliver. And finally, when the brokerage function is not based on a discrete quid pro quo and is instead geared to benefiting the community, we can speak of what Simmel called the impartial broker (Stovel and Shaw 2012) or what political scientists have customarily called constituency service (Fenno 1978; Auerbach 2019; Bussell 2019). Clearly then, whether brokerage is (a) highly dependence-inducing and autonomy-eroding (classic clientelism), (b) asymmetrical but strategic and competitive, or in fact (c) approximates constituency service is not only highly contextual, but also has very different implications for democratic citizenship. As the world's most socially and geographically diverse democracy, India offers a particularly critical and revealing empirical site for making sense of how these practices are actually distributed and what they mean for democratic citizenship.

To the extent that the most in-depth investigation of rights in postcolonial India has characterized citizenship as "thin" (Jayal 2013, p. 3),[12] the problem is not in the nature of electoral democracy or collective action in the political arena. Rather, we argue that deficits of citizenship have more to do with day-to-day encounters with the state, and specifically with the ability of citizens to make effective routine demands on the state.

Citizen-state interaction in India ranges from the more or less fully routinized and rule-bound to fully discretionary and transacted. At the broadest level, Chandra (2007) has famously characterized India as a patronage democracy, writing that every election "is a covert auction in which basic services, which should in principle be available to every citizen, are sold instead to the highest bidder" (p. 292). In terms of day-to-day practices, researchers have pointed to the "ordinary spaces of negotiation" to characterize how hawkers occupy spaces in the city by paying bribes (Anjaria 2011), "pressure work" by communities to secure water (Anand 2011), how slum dwellers navigate "everyday state spaces" to restore electricity (Ghertner

[12] See O'Donnell (1993) for an expanded discussion of "thin citizenship" in Latin America.

2017) or "negotiate informality" via middlemen when seeking property titles (Krishna et al. 2020). The identity of brokers ranges from "social workers" in Mumbai (Björkman 2014), "pradhans" in Delhi's slums (Jha, Rao, and Woolcock 2007), the "everyday mediations" provided by elected representatives to most constituents (Bussell 2019), the role of party workers in "demanding development" in the slums of Jaipur and Bhopal (Auerbach 2019) and how civil society activists negotiate with the state for extra-legal compensation for women victimized by sexual violence (Roychowdhury 2020).

What this literature and our own field experience has made clear (Bertorelli et al. 2017) is that while the capacity to translate legal rights into effective citizenship is in part a function of social position (caste, religious identity, class, gender)—and this is what most of the literature has focused on—it also reflects the specific institutional properties of urban India (hereafter "institutional setting"). Before providing a full elaboration of the urban institutional setting, we situate our motivation for this analytic focus by drawing attention to two phenomena. The first has to do with developments in India's democratization going back to the early 1990s; the other is driven by an emerging literature that has documented extraordinary unevenness of the institutional terrain of democracy in India.

The limits of effective citizenship in India have been emphasized in the literature but have also been the object of specific political and social struggles as well as reformist government interventions over the past two decades. As already indicated, unlike earlier democracies that extended the franchise incrementally and often over a period of a century or more as in the United States, India extended the franchise and the full slate of civil rights to all citizens upon its foundation as an independent state. This brought a highly centralized and hierarchical colonial state power into direct and immediate confrontation with a constitutionally empowered citizenry (Chandhoke 2003). The immediate effect was however buffered by the fact that the transition to democracy was driven by the urban and mostly professional elites that dominated the independence movement and then largely monopolized politics in the immediate postindependence period. India's democratic beginnings were elite driven and elite dominated (Kohli 2001; Khosla 2020; Varshney 2022*a*). Thus, while the principle of rights was consecrated, the practice remained far behind. From independence through the 1970s, India's elite-dominated democracy was characterized by limited popular participation. With some subnational exceptions,[13] political parties and state

[13] The subnational exceptions are telling. In the two South Indian states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu, the nationalist movement encompassed lower classes and castes, and both have developed local democracies that are more participatory, rights based, and socially inclusive. The differences in substantive outcomes have been widely documented (Heller 2000; Singh 2014; Kalaiyarasan and Vijayabaskar 2021).

institutions were dominated by the propertied classes (Bardhan 1983) and/or upper castes (Frankel and Rao 1989).

What has been famously labeled "the second democratic upsurge" (Yadav 2000) witnessed the rise of lower classes and castes, especially in the 1980s and after. Mobilizing on their own terms and pressing their own demands, this "upsurge" invigorated party competition, including the rise of new, more pro–lower caste political formations. This electoral deepening was also accompanied by an invigoration of rights-based civil society organizations that demanded social rights (right to work, food, education, health) and institutional reforms to make bureaucracies more transparent and more accountable (Jayal 2013).

Two dramatic waves of democratic reforms are noteworthy. The first set came in 1993 in the form of the 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments, which for the first time mandated elections at the local level (rural governments and urban municipalities) and devolved "such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as institutions of self-government" (74th Amendment, article 243W(a)).

As Mamdani (1996) has argued for Africa, one of the most debilitating legacies of colonialism has been what he coined "decentralized despotism." The colonial city created a hard binary between citizens (the colonists) and subjects (the "natives"). Independence barely corrected for this imbalance at the local level, as India's constitution did not specifically empower the third tier of government. In the classic words of E. M. S. Namboodiripad (the first chief minister in the state of Kerala), "if at the level of state-centre relations the constitution gave us democracy, at the level of state-panchayat (local government) relations the constitution gave us bureaucracy—the Indian constitution gave democracy between the center and the states and bureaucracy between the states and local governments" (Heller, Harilal, and Chaudhuri 2007, p. 628). The architects of the 1993 local government reforms recognized this massive democratic deficit.[14] Though implementation has been highly uneven, there is little doubt that the third tier of government, formerly bureaucratic, has become significantly more democratic.

The second set of reforms came during the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) governments of 2004–14, when civil society organizations played a direct role in pushing through a series of rights-based reforms, including the right to information (RTI), widely seen as one of the most muscular transparency reforms anywhere in the world (Roy 2018), and a series of welfare reforms in education, child nutrition, and the right to work that taken

[14] Both the Congress Party leader who oversaw the reforms, Mani Shankar Aiyar (2002), and the central government senior bureaucrat charged with formulating the amendments, K. C. Sivaramakrishnan (2014), have written extensively about the need to make the local state more directly responsive to citizen demands.

together constituted the beginnings of a welfare state. The most ambitious and ultimately impactful of these reforms—the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGA)—the largest antipoverty program in Indian history, was specifically designed to be a "postclientelist program" relying on more direct forms of citizenship engagement, transparency and local-level accountability to prevent diversion of resources to patronage connections (Chiriyankandath et al. 2020, p. 36).

Both sets of reforms—elected local governments and expanding social rights—which de facto expanded the surface area of the state, have spawned new research into the nature of local democracy and citizenship. In the world's largest democracy with 28 federal states, each with its own party system, and over half a million local governments, including 53 million-plus cities (Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India 2011), this new body of work has already generated two key themes.

First, there is tremendous geographical unevenness in the nature of the local democratic state. In the well-documented case of the state of Kerala, a concerted effort to decentralize and to promote citizen participation has significantly democratized local government and been accompanied by a dramatic expansion of the social welfare state (Isaac and Franke 2002). Though decentralization has been much more shallow in other parts of the country, the expansion of the national welfare state, especially the right to work in rural India, has been widely documented (Jenkins and Manor 2017). Second, in full defiance of what modernization theories, the development literature and much of urban studies might have anticipated, the democratizing effects of the "upsurge" and of the accompanying reforms have been more marked in rural areas than in cities. A wide range of studies across many Indian states point to the increased vigor with which India's rural populations have come to engage the local state (Krishna 2002; Heller et al. 2007; Kruks-Wisner 2018; Chhotray et al. 2020; Veeraraghavan 2021). In contrast much of the urban literature continues to point to the many challenges urban citizens face in engaging the state, and in particular how dependent they are on intermediaries and brokers (Appadurai 2001; Anand 2011; Weinstein 2014; Krishna et al. 2020).

In the first systematic effort to comparatively assess "the institutional features that set the stage for such divergent patterns of citizen-state engagement," Auerbach and Kruks-Wisner (2020, p. 1119) find that compared to those in the countryside, the urban poor are four times *less* likely to believe they will get a response if they directly contact an official (politicians and bureaucrats). Slum residents are, moreover, two times more likely to report they use political brokers, and 85% of slum residents believe public officials will simply ignore them (p. 1122). Auerbach and Kruks-Wisner also argue that the rural-urban difference can be attributed to the fact that rural decentralization has been more substantive, rural governments are better funded

and are responsible to fewer people per constituency, and that rural welfare reforms have had a bigger impact. As a result, the rural poor can interact directly with the local state, whereas the urban poor end up going through brokers.[15]

In broad terms we find Auerbach and Kruks-Wisner's claim compelling, but it does nonetheless call for much further investigation and for a greater unpacking of the "institutional features that mediate state-citizenship engagement." From our own fieldwork in various Indian cities as well as extensive interviews and site visits in preparing for the survey we conducted in Bengaluru, we specifically identified three characteristics of the urban institutional setting that are critical to shaping this engagement.

First, in Indian megacities in particular, the local state is literally quite distant. Unlike settlement patterns in many other urban areas in the world, Indian cities have been defined by sprawl and in geometric terms have grown very rapidly in the past two decades. Government agencies and bureaucracies have tended to remain clustered in the center, and by all accounts ordinary citizens struggle to find the state (Heller et al. 2015). Second, even after the passage of the 74th Amendment, Indian cities enjoy limited governance autonomy, and a number of critical government functions such as planning, land development, health, education, and policing are run by a bewildering mix of state-level agencies, parastatals, and sometimes even central government agencies. The result is an institutional setting marked by multilevel governance, overlapping jurisdictions and bureaucratic fragmentation. This varies across cities but is very much a problem in Bengaluru (Nair 2004; Ranganathan 2014). Third, while municipal councilors have come to play a much more important role in representing urban citizens since the 74th Amendment, the ratio of representation still remains absurdly high. In Bengaluru, for example, the average councilor has approximately 50,000 constituents. The extent of these challenges for finding and transacting with the state are reflected in the existing literature that has highlighted the extent to which urban citizens rely heavily on a very complex and variegated assemblage of brokers, intermediaries, "social workers," and local leaders to engage the state.

The complexity of this urban institutional setting presents us with two empirical challenges. First, while the ethnographic literature on brokers is rich and has generated some powerful insights into how state-citizen relations are mediated, there have been only a handful of quantitative studies (Heller et al. 2007; Jha et al. 2007; Kruks-Wisner 2018; Bussell 2019; Auerbach and Thachil 2020). Moreover, most studies have concentrated on rural India (see Krishna 2002; Corbridge et al. 2005; Gupta 2012; Jenkins

[15] Also see Post (2018) and Garrido (2021) for a larger discussion of cities in the developing world.

and Manor 2017; Kruks-Wisner 2018, Veeraraghavan 2021), where two-thirds of the citizenry still lived at the time of the last census (i.e., 2011). Second, the existing quantitative works on urban India that do exist have been specifically focused on slums and the slum-state intermediation (Jha et al. 2007; Auerbach 2019; Krishna et al. 2020). We still have little sense of the full range of modes of engagement with the state—including those that are direct and not mediated—and how they vary across neighborhood types, class, caste, religion, and migrant status. In short, our research focuses on cities, not villages, and we cover the entire range of urban citizenry, not simply the slums.

We do so by drawing on an original household survey that we specifically designed to tackle these challenges. As detailed below, our survey design was "stratified random" to generate representative samples of all relevant social categories, exploring a wide range of engagement based on actual reported interactions with the state in specific problem-oriented situations. The survey also collected data on other variables such as measures of political and civic participation, civic knowledge, and particularistic connections that we hypothesized would be important in shaping the engagement and its effects. With this survey data, we seek to identify the practices and processes that refract different social positions of citizens into variable capacities to engage the local state. Because of its sheer size, low levels of representation and complexity and fragmentation of bureaucratic agencies, we believe that the institutional setting in urban India produces a high degree of refraction. In the ideal configuration presented by the democracy literature and embraced by social movement as well as key government reforms in India (as listed above), citizens use their rights to engage the local state as bearers of rights, not as subjects, clients or supplicants or members of specific social categories. But, as we have already said, unlike the right of voting and organizing which are direct and quite robust in India, making specific demands on the state requires going through and navigating the complex set of bureaucratic and political institutions that characterize urban India.

We start by noting that the urban institutional setting in India is a constellation of power in which different actors mobilize different resources and capabilities to achieve their objectives. As in field theory (Bourdieu 1994; Martin 2003; Fligstein and McAdam 2012) we specifically conceptualize the agency process (navigating the institutions) as one of refraction rather than simple translation. In other words, the institutional setting interacts with social factors to produce and distribute actual capacities. How this plays out and how it is translated into uneven citizenship operates both on the horizontal (Tocquevillian) and the vertical (Weberian) axes. On the horizontal side are the basic categorical inequalities that mark Indian society, including those of class, caste, gender, ethnicity, and religion. Different categories have different capabilities, most importantly education but also

cultural and social capital. These categories do not simply translate into differential outcomes. They are instead generated by an interaction with the properties of the urban institutional settling. These properties can reproduce or amplify basic categorical inequalities, but sometimes they can also abate them, as when institutions or specific practices are designed to compensate for or even affirmatively dismantle accumulated social disadvantages. Extensive reservations for the underprivileged groups in India, roughly equal to affirmative action in the United States, are a case in point (Deshpande 2016).

Having identified the institutional setting as central to understanding effective citizenship in urban India, we can now turn to our empirical strategy. Many studies of citizenship that are focused on day-to-day engagement of the state focus on workings of courts and the legal system (e.g., Van Cleve 2016; Roychowdhury 2020) or on access to health and education (Hammer, Aiyar, and Samji 2007; Mangla 2015). In the Indian context, so few Indians actually engage the judiciary that looking at courts would provide only a limited picture of effective citizenship.[16] Instead, in order to have a more tractable (and measurable) sense of citizenship, we focus on access to basic services.

There are three reasons why we think this focus is a particularly good measure for understanding citizenship at an operational level. First, either by law or by basic political pressure, all Indian cities are compelled to provide a modicum of basic services (water, sanitation, identity cards, electricity, and roads). In contrast to health and education, which are provided through a multiplicity of government agencies at different levels (local, state, central) and through different programs and allocations (e.g., specified subsidies or programs for specific groups), basic public services are generally provided by a single agency (municipal or state) and *in principle* on a universal basis. Second, access to basic services is critical to enhancing basic capabilities (Sen 1999). Having clean and reliable water and sanitation, good transportation and decent housing are not only supportive of better health and even education at times, but they also allow urban citizens to make the most of the economic opportunities of living in cities.[17] Third, compared to other social rights, basic services are relatively easy to measure.

[16] For instance, representative surveys—such as The State of the Nation of 2009 and Politics and Society between Elections survey of 2017 show that between 4.7% and 6% of respondents approach a court to resolve a matter (Azim Premji University and Lokniti 2017).

[17] In 2011, a high-level government expert committee that fundamentally shifted the investment emphasis of the central government in urban India found that "if the state of urban service delivery is any criterion, the high degree of 'urban service deprivation' would suggest that 'poverty' [as measured in income data] does not fully reflect the poor state of affairs in urban India" (GOI, High Powered Expert Committee 2011, p. 17).

What basic services one gets and how one addresses problems with services can be reliably measured through a survey instrument. Unlike education and health, where definitions of quality are extremely difficult to capture as self-reported data, citizens have a very good idea of how much water, sanitation, or electricity they get. And as our data show, they can report in detail how they engage the state to address problems with these services. Our earlier work moreover has revealed both that basic services are highly unevenly delivered and that how citizens use their rights to demand services makes a difference (Bertorelli et al. 2017).

TOWARD HYPOTHESES

First, any set of institutions, however codified, requires interpretation. Actors must understand, both cognitively and strategically, how engaging the state works, what the points of access and leverage are, and how and where to activate them. This is all the more so in Indian cities where not only is the institutional surface area of the state limited (the state is literally hard to find), but overlapping jurisdictions, multilevel governance, bureaucratic fragmentation, and the proliferation of official and nonofficial intermediaries make for an especially complex institutional setting.[18] Here, not only formal knowledge but also cultural capital, including what Bourdieu (1994) would call "practical sense," are critical to navigating the city. Hence, engaging the state and state actors requires the knowledge of who runs the state, how the state works, where the state can be accessed and what state agencies are responsible for providing which services. We argue that electoral and civic knowledge—knowing who has responsibility, who has authority—represent critical aspects of knowledge characterizing the institutional setting.

HYPOTHESIS 1.—*The knowledge hypothesis states that households with higher levels of electoral and civic knowledge are more likely to engage the state relative to those with lower levels of electoral and civic knowledge.*

Second, insofar as engagement with the state is less than fully institutionalized and rule bound or involves fairly high transaction costs, engaging the state might depend on specific forms of political and civic participation. There is a long-standing claim in sociology and political science that participation begets more participation (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993; Woolcock 1998; Baiocchi et al. 2011). A large body of research cutting across all types of democracy has also documented the substantive impact of this

[18] Krishna et al. (2020), e.g., document the existence of 18 different types of property documents that slum dwellers have accessed in Bangalore in their efforts to formalize their property rights.

demand side of citizenship, linking more politically and civically engaged citizens with higher levels of welfare (Esping-Anderson 1990; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; Putnam 1993; Baiocchi et al. 2011).

Hypothesis 2.—*The participation hypothesis states that households that participate in political and civic life are more likely to engage the state compared to those who do not participate in political and civic life.*

Third, engaging the state requires resources beyond knowledge and participation that may be unevenly distributed. Particularistic connections to persons of influence (used interchangeably with the term *connections*) can vary across social categories. Where institutions function in ways that fall short of the democratic norm of rights-based engagement, particularistic connections provide privileged points of access and become the key to getting things done. More specifically, particularistic ties to influential people such as government officials and political leaders substitute for institutionalized engagement.

Hypothesis 3.—*The particularistic connections hypothesis proposes that households with connections to persons of influence are more likely to engage the state compared to those without such connections.*

One of the empirical challenges of making sense of urban India is the recognition that there are many forms and modalities of engaging the state. We designate as "direct engagement" all instances in which a citizen sought to resolve a service delivery problem by directly approaching the designated official or office (Houtzager and Acharya 2010). Other engagements are mediated by political links or by transactional dynamics such as clientelism or bribery. We refer to the latter set as "brokered engagement," which can be of two general types. The first is paying a bribe to get something done. There is a large literature on India that documents pervasive retail corruption, especially for accessing nominally public services (Banerjee and Somanathan 2007). The second is by getting things done through an intermediary. This includes a range of brokerage services performed by what are variously called "social workers," fixers, or *pradhans* (leaders) on one hand and elected political representatives, such as municipal corporators, MLAs (members of state legislative assemblies) and MPs (members of parliament) and their agents (political workers), on the other. Some of this takes the form of patrons assisting clients in exchange for support (Berenschot 2010; Chandra 2007; Jha al. 2007) and is based on asymmetrical power relations (Auyero 2000; Scheper-Hughes 1992). In other instances, especially when political representatives get involved on behalf of citizens regardless of partisanship and community, brokerage acquires the form of constituency service that entails no quid pro quos and is not contingent on support (Auerbach and Thachil 2018; Bussell 2019). In India, given that the poor participate more in politics and the rich have particularistic connections that they can leverage, we anticipate that brokered engagement for the poor arises through

political participation and for the rich through particularistic connections to persons of influence (Benjamin and Bhuvaneswari 2006; Berenschot 2010). For instance, a wealthier citizen may have studied in the same school or university with a senior bureaucrat in the administrative service or may be neighbors with a senior police officer or may be a member of the same social club and so on, resulting in particularistic connections. Such particularistic connections to persons of influence are likely to be used by the upper classes to engage the state to secure public services as well as procurement of documents and permissions. This, then, leads to the following hypothesis.

HYPOTHESIS 4.—*The brokered engagement hypothesis proposes that the effects of political participation and connections on brokered engagement are conditional on class*.

Political participation increases the likelihood of brokered engagement for those living in slum and informal housing. Conversely, political participation does not have an association with a higher likelihood of brokered engagement for the higher classes. Particularistic connections to persons of influence increase the likelihood of brokered engagement for the non-slum-dwelling, more privileged classes. And such particularistic connections are not associated with a higher likelihood of brokered engagement for those in informal and slum housing.

Finally, given the institutional weaknesses of the Indian city, those who are skilled at playing the institutions are more likely to be successful in getting their issue resolved. More specifically, we hypothesize that brokered engagement increases the likelihood that an issue is resolved successfully.

HYPOTHESIS 5.—*The issue resolution hypothesis states that brokered engagement is positively associated with issue resolution; that is, households that engage the state through brokered forms of engagements are more likely to get the issue resolved relative to those that engage directly*.

DATA, MEASUREMENT, AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY

Data

The data used in this study draws on a sample of 4,093 households in Bengaluru surveyed December 2013–January 2014. To our knowledge, a sample of this size is the largest single-city sample for the study of citizenship practices worldwide and allows for an in-depth exploration of citizen-state interaction in the format of survey research. We adopted a multistage, stratified, systematic random sampling method to select wards (20) and polling parts (10 from each selected ward). In urban India, wards are the lowest urban administrative units of the government. Wards are composed of polling parts that do not possess administrative powers, instead representing electoral subdivisions within administrative wards. Each

polling part has approximately 7–14 streets and 1,500–2,500 individuals above the age of 18. Wards were selected to ensure geographical representation within the city (inner and outer regions). The sample also captures sufficient respondents of smaller social groups (Dalits, Adivasis, and Muslims).[19]

Following the selection of polling parts, we mapped and counted all households within them. From the complete listing of households that forms our sampling frame, we first selected households and then selected individuals, both randomly. Data for the household and individual characteristics are collected from the randomly selected individual using a questionnaire available in three different languages (English, Kannada, and Hindi). The questionnaire was based on focus group interviews with community residents, key person interviews, and two pilot surveys in two wards. The entire process was conducted in collaboration with Janaagraha, a leading Indian research-oriented urban NGO, headquartered in Bengaluru. In the appendix, figure A1 presents a sampled ward and its location in Bengaluru, and figure A2 presents a listing of all the households within a polling part of that ward.

Measures

Citizen engagement.—As already noted, we measure the impact of citizenship using a simple but important form of engagement: how citizens engage the state to secure basic services, such as water, electricity, sanitation, and identity cards. These basic services are critical to the lives of urban citizens. Moreover, they are unevenly distributed across socioeconomic categories and across space. It is important to note that by engagement we mean actual contact with the state, which is distinct from citizenship practices (discussed below), which refer to the substantive and relational resources that a citizen relies on in making claims.

Our measure of engagement is a simple binary, coded 1 if the respondent engages the state and 0 otherwise. In our survey, we pose a series of questions that seek to identify whether the respondent approached a state agency to resolve a household problem related to a basic service. The agencies include those that provide water and sanitation, electricity, the public distribution system (i.e., ration shops) as well as those agencies that issue various

[19] We ensured representation of Scheduled Castes (the official designation for Dalits) and Scheduled Tribes (the official designation for indigenous people) by stratifying wards into high and low SC/ST using census 2011 data and then drawing a random sample. Since religious identification is not possible at the ward level, we identified a 500-meter radius around geocoded mosques and graveyards in Bengaluru and classified the associated wards as high and low Muslim neighborhoods.

identification cards that are critical for securing government subsidies (the BPL, or below poverty line card, a caste certificate, and ration cards).[20] We also include other services that might require citizens to engage the state, such as obtaining a driver's license. In the case of services such as water and electricity, the time period of engagement was the previous year, while in the case of acquiring cards the time period was a 10-year span. If a household approached state agencies providing any one of these services to address a problem, we code them as having engaged the state.[21]

We find that across all the services 76% of our sampled households reported dealing with the state. Given the overall poor quality of basic services in India and well-documented problems in securing government documents, it is quite remarkable that one-fourth of households never engaged the state, especially since our threshold is very low (i.e., one reported engagement across many services).

Modes of engagement.—Capturing how citizens might engage the state through nonformal processes in a survey instrument is challenging. In our pilots we discovered that respondents were reluctant to report corruption. This might be because of social desirability issues of knowing that it is wrong to pay a bribe. Or it could be a problem of misrecognition (Bourdieu 1984). Clear cases of paying an official a bribe for a service or favor are often so naturalized that the exchange is seen as normal as in the Hindi expression *chai pani* (tea and refreshment), and reported as a "gift." From the focus groups we conducted as part of our preliminary research, we found such euphemisms to be common, but when pressed, respondents were willing to label the exchanges as bribe paying.

To address these problems, rather than ask directly about bribes or other ways of circumventing the normal decision-making process, we asked respondents to describe how they dealt with a specific problem and then asked them to describe all the steps taken, including paying a bribe or working through an intermediary. This not only provided us with a very concrete measure of engagement, but also yielded a significantly higher level of

[20] Until the recent introduction of a universal card (Aadhar), Indians relied on a wide number of cards to access various services. The idea of paper citizenship has been extensively developed by Sadiq (2008).

[21] Specifically, we ask the following question for a range of household problems related to services: Did you or anyone in the household approach a state agency to address a problem related to service provision (water, sanitation, electricity) or to acquire a card/document (BPL card, ration card, caste certificate, driver's license)? Where there was a problem related to services that a household could not fix on its own and approached a state agency, we coded such responses 1. Households that responded as having faced a problem they could not fix on their own yet did not approach the state were coded 0.

reporting bribes compared to a pilot survey in which we asked questions about bribing more directly and got very few positive responses.[22]

Social factors.—As for the associations between citizen engagement and basic socioeconomic variables, caste, religion, nonmigrant status, and class are all known to be significant drivers of inequality in India, and we use them here.[23]

Our measure of class is housing type that we classify into five broad types: (i) informal shacks (HT1), (ii) slum housing, notified and nonnotified (HT2), (iii) lower-middle-class housing (HT3), (iv) middle-class housing (HT4), (v) upper-class housing (HT5).[24] An advantage of the housing type measure is that unlike income, it is not self-reported. Instead, field investigators, following extensive training, classified housing types into one of the above categories.[25] Using this classification we find that about 13% of respondents live in slums and informal housing (HT1 and HT2), about 53% in lower-middle-class housing (HT 3), and about 34% in middle- and upper-class housing (HT4 and HT5).

[22] It may be that on the question of bribes there is still some underreporting, but there is no good way to decipher that. However, we are confident that our question about the use of intermediaries produced accurate responses.

[23] For religious inequality, see Sachar Commission (2006); for caste inequalities, Mandal Commission (1980), Deshpande (2016), Jensenius (2017), and Singh, Vithayathil, and Pradhan (2019); for migration-related inequalities, Weiner (1978); and for class inequalities, see Kohli (2012).

[24] For greater clarity, more details on the five housing types are perhaps necessary: HT 1: self-built dwellings often made from reclaimed wood, cardboard, plastic sheets, fabric, tarpaulin, corrugated metal, and/or sackcloth. They are often located in vacant or abandoned lots, behind buildings, on sidewalks, road medians, under overpasses, and construction sites. They almost always tend to be single-level, single-room dwellings. HT 2: one-room dwellings with brick walls, corrugated metal roof, small windows, and generally single level. Located in narrow side streets and generally densely packedHT 3: single- or multilevel concrete structures, with two to three rooms. They have shared balconies, small windows, publicly accessible staircases, may have commercial units on the ground level, and sometimes feature a surrounding wall and gate. HT 4: these are typically apartment complexes surrounded by a wall with a gate and with security guarding the entrance. They tend to be mostly concrete, but some have additional materials such as glass, wood, and/or brick. Apartments often have private balconies. HT 5: independent houses, often constructed using concrete, wood, glass with a surrounding wall and gate in front, and security guarding the entrance. Size of the structure is large with multiple balconies and large windows. In our statistical analysis we create three dummy variables combining HT1 and HT2 into one variable (slum/informal housing); HT4 and HT5 into another variable (middle-/upper-income housing). HT3—lower-middle-class housing—forms the reference category.

[25] Our reliance on housing type follows from previous work. We found that housing type is a much more robust measure of class than occupational category or asset measures. While the housing type variable may be positively correlated with assets, we prefer the former as it is identified and coded by the surveyors and not self-reported as is the case with the assets variable (Bertorelli et al. 2017).

Caste follows the standard self-identification categories of Dalit (officially Scheduled Castes, or SCs), Adivasi (officially Scheduled Tribes, or STs), other backward classes (OBCs), and upper castes. Dalit is the now accepted term for what were previously known as "untouchable" castes. Adivasi refers to tribal populations in India. OBC is a category that encompasses all castes that are neither Dalit nor upper castes.[26] Upper castes refer to Brahmin and near-Brahmin caste groups that have a higher traditional status. Religion, similarly, is categorized as Hindu, Muslim, Christian, and others. Migrant status measures whether a respondent has always lived in Bengaluru, and location captures whether the household is located in an inner or outer ward. Inner and outer wards are coded following the urban municipal government (Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike) classification of inner and outer city regions of Bengaluru.[27]

Citizenship practices.—As argued above, in navigating the city, citizens rely on and deploy different knowledge and relational resources. In our survey, we ask a set of questions that capture the level of electoral and civic knowledge focusing on who governs (i.e., knowledge of political parties governing at the federal and state level), information about their urban local governments, the names of state agencies that are responsible for the provision of services, such as water, sanitation, and electricity, as well as maintenance, such as road repairs and knowledge of transparency laws.[28] We field tested a far wider range of questions, but only included those that generate answers that we could verify with a high degree of reliability.[29] Participation in political and civic affairs are captured by asking questions about electoral participation (referring only to voting), non-electoral political participation (other forms of participation in politics, not including voting—for the sake of brevity, we call this entire non-electoral set political

[26] Often, the "dominant castes," just below the upper castes, are excluded from the OBC category.

[27] Bengaluru is classified into eight zones: three inner and five outer zones. About 137 wards fall in the inner zone and 61 in the outer zone.

[28] The questions we ask to measure political knowledge are as follows: (a) Which party or coalition of parties is currently ruling at the national level? (b) Which party or coalition of parties is currently ruling at the state level? (c) What is the name of the corporator of your ward? Correct responses are coded 1, and incorrect responses coded 0. To measure civic knowledge, we ask (a) Which public agency is responsible for providing (i) water, (ii) electricity, (iii) public transport, and (iv) traffic control? (b) What is the name of your ward? (c) What is the purpose of the Right to Information Act? Correct responses to the above questions are coded 1 and incorrect responses are coded 0. The political knowledge measure is then created as an additive index.

[29] We would, e.g., have liked to include more specific questions about how to navigate the bureaucracy such as which forms to file for a specified problem but found that there was so much variability across localities and sectors that verifying "correct" answers would have been impossible.

participation), and civic participation.[30] Particularistic connections to persons of influence are measured by asking whether a household personally knows public officials or persons of influence in and outside the community.[31]

Level of basic services.—We include the existing level of basic services as a measure of "need"— to ensure that engagement is not simply a function of having poor access to services and hence a greater need to engage. Level of services is a composite additive index of the extent and quality of basic services that a household has.[32]

Education.—Education is another variable likely correlated with engagement; that is, higher levels of education are likely to be positively correlated with knowing how to navigate the institutions of urban India. This variable is measured as a five-point scale that measures the level of schooling, ranging from no schooling to a "college and above" level. Descriptive statistics for all the variables used in this study are presented in table 1.

Empirical Strategy

Our empirical analysis rests on logistic regression models that regress citizen engagement on a set of variables that capture citizenship practices; that

[30] The three forms of participation include electoral participation, nonelectoral political participation, and civic participation. For electoral participation we ask the following questions: (a) Did you vote in the 2010 BBMP election? (b) Did you vote in the 2013 Karnataka State Assembly election? (c) Did you vote in the 2009 Lok Sabha election? Voting in any election is coded 1 and 0 otherwise. For nonelectoral political participation, we ask (a) Did you or anyone from the household contribute time to campaigns during municipal elections? (b) Did you or anyone from the household participate in meetings or rallies organized by political parties or officials outside of election time? (c) Did you or anyone in the household talk to friends or others in the community about supporting a candidate? Participation in any of these nonelectoral political activities is coded 1 and 0 otherwise. Civic participation is measured using the following questions: (a) Are you or anyone in the household a member of a (i) nongovernment organization (ii) resident welfare association (iii) caste organization (iv) religious organization (v) noncaste, nonreligious organization? (b) Do you or anyone in the household attend ward committee meetings? Membership in any of the above civic organizations or attending ward committee meetings is coded 1 and 0 otherwise.

[31] Particularistic connections to persons of influence are measured with the following questions. Do you or anyone in the household personally know any of the following: (i) bureaucrat (ii) police official (iii) politician (d) unelected politician, (e) local leader, (f) other person of influence? We code this variable as 1 if a household has access to any one of the above and 0 otherwise. Using this question, we also identify whether a particularistic connection is official (a connection that includes a bureaucrat, a police official, or an elected official) or informal (a connection to an unelected local leader).

[32] We consider four basic services: water, electricity, sanitation, and roads. We ask a series of questions related to household access and availability, quality, and supply for each of these services. The responses are coded as binary outcomes and aggregated into an additive index to arrive at an overall services index. See Bertorelli, et. al. 2017 for a fuller description of the services index.

TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	*N*
Dependent variables:					
Engagement	.76	.43	0	1	4,093
Brokered engagement	.37	.48	0	1	3,102
Issue resolution	.79	.41	0	1	3,102
Independent variables:					
Political knowledge	.68	.29	0	1	4,093
Civic knowledge	.29	.20	0	1	4,093
Electoral participation	.85	.36	0	1	3,996
Political participation	.11	.31	0	1	4,091
Civic participation	.14	.34	0	1	4,093
Particularistic connections	.23	.42	0	1	4,093
BSDII	.65	.19	0	1	4041
Dalit and Adivasi (SC and ST)	.29	.45	0	1	2,911
Muslim	.18	.38	0	1	4,093
Housing type:	3.24	.78	1	5	4,093
Informal housing	.02				
Slum housing	.11				
Lower-middle housing	.53				
Middle-class housing	.30				
Upper-class housing	.04				
Outer ward	.21	.41	0	1	4,093
Nonmigrant	.56	.49	0	1	4,093
Education:	3.77	1.23	1	5	4,093
No schooling	.11				
Primary	.03				
Middle	.15				
Secondary	.39				
College and above	.32				

Note.—BSDII is Basic Services and Infrastructure Index; SC and ST are Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe, respectively.

is, how citizens navigate the institutional setting. These variables include electoral and civic knowledge, political and civic participation, and connections as our key variables of interest. Also included are caste, class, religion, nonmigrant, location (whether inner or outer ward), existing level of services, and level of education as the other factors likely associated with engaging the state.

RESULTS

Who Engages?

Table 2 presents the results of the baseline estimation of logistic regression predicting citizen engagement using only the socioeconomic variables. Here, we summarize what we find in our baseline model.

Existing levels of services have no effect on the probability of engaging the state. That is, households that are characterized with lower levels of

TABLE 2
LOGISTIC REGRESSION: WHO ENGAGES (Baseline Model)

Independent Variables	Model 1 (All Sample)	Model 2 (Hindu Only)
Basic services	−.282	−.442
	(.253)	(.309)
Outer ward	.461**	.458**
	(.122)	(.124)
Nonmigrant	.343**	.375**
	(.085)	(.102)
Muslim	−.278	
	(.105)**	...
Caste (Dalit and Adivasi)	...	.0006
		(.123)
Slum/informal housing	−.220	−.324+
	(.152)	(.168)
Middle-/upper-income housing	−.313**	−.306*
	(.096)	(.116)
Education	.202**	.232**
	(.032)	(.036)
Constant	.484*	.477+
	(.221)	(.253)
N	3,935	2,795
Wald χ^2	85.24	75.51
-Log likelihood	2,126.41	1,473.57
Area under ROC curve	.61	.61
AIC	4,268.83	2,963.15
BIC	4,319.05	3,01.64

NOTE.—Nos. in parentheses are SEs clustered by polling part.
* $P < .10$.
* $P < .05$.
** $P < .01$.

services are not more likely to deal with the state. A reasonable expectation would be that need—the extent to which a household needs basic services—would drive engagement. While the coefficient on services measure is negative, that is, lower levels of household services are associated with a higher likelihood of engagement—the association is not statistically significant. We therefore conclude that need per se is not a driver of engagement. In other words, "need does not create its own fulfillment" (Elster 1982, p. 462).

Nonmigrant households are more likely to engage the state presumably because they have more experience and knowledge of how to deal with government agencies. Muslim households are less likely to engage relative to other religious communities. Upper-class households are significantly less likely to engage the state compared to lower-middle-class households, while informal and slum-type households are not statistically different from lower-middle households with regard to engagement. Similarly, Dalit and Adivasi households are not statistically different from the traditionally higher placed

OBCs or upper caste groups. Finally, education levels are positively correlated with engaging the state.

We also find that households in outer wards are more likely to deal with the state. The effect is statistically significant in both models. We believe this is because state responsiveness is more institutionalized in more established areas of the city (the inner wards), where city agencies have been operating for a long time. In these wards some or many problems may be dealt with in a routinized manner that does not require the citizen to engage as much as those living in outer wards. In outer wards, the presence of the state is much thinner, and residents are much more likely to have to reach out to the state than their inner ward counterparts.

We now turn to our principal variables of interest, variables that capture the practices and processes through which citizens navigate the city: (a) electoral and civic knowledge, (b) electoral and other forms of nonelectoral political and civic participation, and (c) particularistic connections to persons of influence.

Table 3 presents results of a logistic regression that includes the variables representing citizenship practices and the socioeconomic variables. Controlling for the social correlates of engagement, we find strong empirical support for our claim that engagement is negotiated through varied citizenship practices. Voting and political participation have positive and statistically significant effects ($P < .01$). Electoral and civic knowledge also have the expected sign and are significant ($P < .01$ and $P < .05$, respectively). Similarly, civic participation has a positive and significant relationship ($P < .05$). Particularistic connections, as expected, have a positive association with the probability of engagement ($P < .01$). As the literature on brokerage emphasizes, such ties increase the likelihood that one knows someone who knows how to get things done. We find support for hypotheses 1–3: knowledge, participation, and particularistic connections.

The marginal effects of citizenship practices are presented in figure 1. Electoral participation increases the likelihood of engaging the state by approximately 11%. Similarly, political participation increases the likelihood of engaging the state by approximately 16%, and civic participation does so by about 5%. Households with particularistic connections are 6% more likely to engage the state compared to households that do not have connections. Electoral and civic knowledge increase the likelihood of engagement by 7 and 9% respectively.[33]

[33] In addition to tests of the individual coefficients, Wald and likelihood ratio tests using model 3 (citizenship practices model) as the unrestricted model and model 1 (all sample baseline model) as the restricted version, indicate that knowledge, participation, and particularistic connections are jointly significant (LR $\chi 2(6) = 276.75$). Using two model selection criteria—AIC and BIC—we find positive support for model 3 given their lower

TABLE 3
Logistic Regression: Who Engages (Citizenship Practices Model)

Independent Variables	Model 3 (All Sample)
Electoral participation	.626**
	(.109)
Political participation	.915**
	(.170)
Civic participation	.274*
	(.130)
Electoral knowledge	.422**
	(.154)
Civic knowledge	.518*
	(.256)
Particularistic connections	.362**
	(.106)
Basic services	−.356
	(.262)
Outer ward	.591**
	(.126)
Nonmigrant	.217*
	(.086)
Muslim	−.247*
	(.112)
Slum/informal housing	−.169
	(.144)
Middle-/upper-income housing	−.403**
	(.100)
Education	.161**
	(.035)
Constant	−.368
	(.250)
N	3,838
Wald χ^2	211.05
-Log likelihood	1,988.03
Area under ROC curve	.67
AIC	4,004.08
BIC	4,091.62

Note.—Nos. in parentheses are SEs clustered by polling part.
+ $P < .10$.
* $P < .05$.
** $P < .01$.

All these findings are consistent with the idea that engaging the state is refracted by an institutional setting that requires varied citizenship practices. Navigating the city clearly requires knowledge, participation, experience, and particularistic connections, and as the outer ward finding underscores, households are more likely to have to engage with the state where the

values compared to model 1. Further, Hosmer-Lemeshow tests indicate that model 3 has an improved fit ($\chi 2(8) = 12.74$) (Long 1997).



FIG. 1.—Marginal effects of citizenship practices

state is not effective at responding. To sum up, not all households engage the state as often, and those that do tend to have more resources and capabilities in terms of knowledge, participation, and particularistic connections.

Modes of Engagement

We now turn to the question of the modes of engagement, addressed in hypothesis 4. We identify and differentiate two modes of engagement: First, *direct engagement* refers to those who engage the state directly—that is, those who did *not* go through an intermediary and were *not* asked to pay a bribe. This corresponds to institutionalized citizenship. Second, *brokered engagement* refers to those who engage indirectly through an intermediary, either brokers or elected political representatives, or those who report being asked for a bribe.[34] This corresponds to a form of negotiated citizenship, and

[34] It is worth recalling that we measure engagement if a household approached a state agency to resolve a specific problem related to services that they were unable to fix on their own (see n. 21 above). We continue the line of questioning by asking those who did approach a state agency: (a) Did you or anyone from your household approach the agency on your own or did you go through an intermediary? (b) Were you asked for a bribe? If the respondent said yes to either (a) or (b), we coded this as brokered engagement (equal to 1). If the respondent approached the state agency on their own and was not asked for a bribe, we code this as direct engagement (equal to 0).

some of it—such as bribes and quid pro quos—would clearly undermine the core of citizenship.[35]

Recall that 25% of the households in the sample did not engage the state at all. Of those that do engage, we find that 63% do so directly in an unbrokered form; that is, without paying a bribe or going through an intermediary. More than one-third of all households in other words have to engage the state by paying a bribe or through an intermediary.[36]

To test conditional effects, we specify a logistic regression model with a full set of interaction terms between the variables representing citizenship practices and housing types. Our dependent variable takes a value of 1 when engagement is brokered and 0 otherwise (i.e., if engagement is direct). Specifically, we are interested in the conditional effects of particularistic connections and political participation on brokered engagement noted in hypothesis 4 above. We expect the marginal effect of particularistic connections on brokered engagement to be significant and positive for the rich but not for the poor and the marginal effect of political participation on brokered engagement to be positive and significant for the poor but not for the rich.

Table 4 presents the results of a logistic regression model with brokered engagement as the dependent variable and includes interaction terms (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006; Kam and Franzese 2007). In order to reduce multicollinearity in models with interaction terms, we combine the lower-middle-class, middle-class, and upper-class housing types into one category and code this as 0. Similarly, slum and informal housing are combined into one category and coded as equal to 1.

Figures 2 and 3 present the marginal effects of political participation and connections on brokered engagement with 95% confidence intervals. Figure 2 shows that political participation significantly increases the likelihood of brokered engagement for the poor; that is, those living in informal and slum households, but has no effect on brokered engagement for the rich.[37]

[35] For a discussion of the differences among clientelist quid pro quo, patronage, and constituency service, see Stokes et al (2013, chap. 1).

[36] We believe this is a substantial percentage (37%), all the more so because many respondents might be reluctant to report paying bribes or engaging through a broker but also because we in effect set a very low threshold for engagement by focusing on engagements that are more readily routinized, such as complaining about service delivery problems or securing IDs to which citizens are entitled, rather than more complex engagements around jobs, permits, property titles, and licenses, which by nature invite more discretion and bargaining.

[37] The inclusion of the lower-middle class in this group may require further explanation. More privileged than the slum dwellers, but less privileged than the middle and upper classes, this class is known to have contacts with the lower levels of state bureaucracy. Many clerical level functionaries of the state often come from this class, and such connections can resolve problems.

TABLE 4

Logistic Regression: Mode of Engagement (Brokered Engagement Model)

Independent Variables	Model 4
Electoral participation	−.084
	(.146)
Political participation	.265
	(.153)
Civic participation	.199
	(.135)
Electoral knowledge	.076
	(.185)
Civic knowledge	.438
	(.253)
Particularistic connections	.313**
	(.102)
Slum/informal housing	.116
	(.459)
Particularistic connections × (slum/informal housing)	−.011
	(.376)
Political participation × (slum/informal housing)	1.049**
	(.298)
Electoral participation × (slum/informal housing)	−.533
	(.386)
Civic participation × (slum/informal housing)	−.363
	(.418)
Electoral knowledge × (slum/informal housing)	.220
	(.443)
Civic knowledge × (slum/informal housing)	.905
	(.921)
Basic services	−.089
	(.249)
Outer ward	.447**
	(.116)
Nonmigrant	.036
	(.080)
Muslim	.030
	(.112)
Education	−.002
	(.041)
Constant	−.907**
	(.277)
N	2,910
Wald χ^2	105.84
-Log Likelihood	1,861.85
Area under ROC curve	.61
AIC	3761.70
BIC	3875.25

Note.—Nos. in parentheses are SEs clustered by polling part.

+ $P < .10$.

* $P < .05$.

** $P < .01$.



FIG. 2.—Marginal effect of political participation

Political participation increases the likelihood of brokered engagement for the poor by approximately 30%.

On the other hand, figure 3 shows that while particularistic connections do have a positive association with brokered engagement, they do not have differential effects for the rich compared to the poor. Finally, we find that none of the other citizenship practices variables have significant conditional effects on brokered engagement; that is, the effects of electoral knowledge, civic knowledge, electoral participation and civic participation on brokered engagement are not significantly different for the poor and the rich.

The finding that particularistic connections do not increase brokered engagement for the rich compared to the poor goes against our expectations. Part of the problem is that brokered engagement is notoriously difficult to capture. In particular, the respondent from a household who is randomly selected may not be the person in the household who used a broker or paid a bribe. The chief wage earner of the household is more likely to have engaged the state this way. Using the chief wage earner subsample is likely to produce more accurate responses on brokered engagement since chief wage earners are more likely to have either contacted the intermediary or paid the bribe or both.

Therefore, we examine the conditional effects of connections on brokered engagement by estimating the model presented in table 4 in the subsample

FIG. 3.—Marginal effect of particularistic connections

with households where the chief wage earner is the respondent. In addition, we disaggregate the particularistic connections variable into official particularistic connections (including bureaucrats, police officials and politicians) and informal particularistic connections (unelected local leaders).[38] The marginal effects of political participation, official, and informal particularistic connections (conditional on class) on brokered engagement for the chief wage earner subsample are reported in figures 4–6, respectively.[39]

Consistent with our previous finding (reported in fig. 2), political participation increases the likelihood of brokered engagement for the poor but not for the rich (fig. 4) in the chief wage earner subsample. Importantly, we find support for the claim that official particularistic connections increase the likelihood of brokered engagement for the rich but not for the poor, and this effect is statistically significant at the 10% error level (fig. 5). Official connections increase the likelihood of brokered engagement for the rich by approximately 14% but have no effect for the poor.[40] We also find that

[38] We are grateful to an *AJS* reviewer for this suggestion.

[39] The results of the regression are presented in table A1 in the appendix.

[40] The point estimate for the marginal effect of official connections on brokered engagement for the rich is 0.14 (with a standard error equal to 0.03) and a 90 percent confidence interval ranges from 0.08 to 0.20. For the poor, the point estimate is −0.16 (with a standard error equal to 0.14) and the 90 percent confidence interval ranges from −0.40 to 0.06.

FIG. 4.—Marginal effect of political participation (chief wage earner sample)

FIG. 5.—Marginal effect of official particularistic connection (chief wage earner sample)

FIG. 6.—Marginal effect of informal particularistic connection (chief wage earner sample)

informal connections characterized by local leaders do not significantly increase the likelihood of brokered engagement for either the poor or the rich (fig. 6).[41]

To sum up these findings, we conclude that the rich have peers, and the poor have patrons. The richer classes are well connected through their class position to various persons of influence who are their class peers. As any rich person in India knows only too well, much government business is conducted through channels of influence. Contrary to Chatterjee's (2006) claim that the rich use their rights (that is civil society) to make demands on the state, we find that rather than seeking redress through routinized, rule-bound procedures, the rich use their privilege, that is their connections. The poor by dint of their structural position do not have influential peers. But in a country where the poor are politically active, they do have political ties. Those who are deeply invested in politics are more connected than

[41] We estimated all the previous models (presented in tables 2 and 3) using the chief wage earner sub-sample and find that the citizenship practices variables have the expected effects and are statistically significant. Some social-economic variables lose significance, but the overall results are consistent.

others. They in turn use those connections, much as the rich use their peers, to get things done. This could correspond to what the literature identifies as patronage (Chandra 2007) if there is a quid pro quo, or as constituency service if the political intermediaries involved are responding to citizen concerns regardless of partisanship (Bussell 2019; Auerbach and Thachil 2020).

Similarly, households in outer wards are also more likely to engage through an intermediary relative to those in the inner wards. This reflects the lack of institutional presence in the periphery, requiring go-betweens and/or bribes to deal with the state for basic services.

WHEN DOES ENGAGEMENT MAKE A DIFFERENCE?

In this section we test our final hypothesis. What is the relationship between mode of engagement and outcomes?

We estimate a logistic regression model with outcome of engagement as the dependent variable and present the results in table 5. We find that brokered engagement, our variable of interest, has a positive effect on the likelihood of a successful issue resolution and is significant ($P < .01$). The predicted probability of getting an issue resolved through brokered engagement is approximately 13% (with a 95% confidence interval of 0.08–0.18) greater than if a household engaged directly. One should also note that political participation by itself and connections in and of themselves are not significant, suggesting that they impact issue resolution only when translated into a form of engagement (i.e., through intermediaries or bribes).[42]

To summarize, class in and of itself has a weak influence on issue resolution as reported in the previous model. However, class does influence how citizens engage with the state—specifically it moderates the effect of particularistic connections and political participation. When the rich have particularistic connections, they are more likely to engage the state (through intermediaries or bribes). Interpersonal ties of influence support influence-based engagement with the state and increase the chances of positive outcomes. Political participation is not the medium the rich use to engage the state. The poor use this medium, which has other effects. It increases the use of bribes and the use of intermediaries, and this in turn increases the likelihood of an issue being resolved. As in the case of the rich, the mode of engagement

[42] In addition to our variable of interest, three other significant ($P < .01$) variables are civic knowledge, level of education, and whether household is in the outer ward—all of which are positively associated with issue resolution. Electoral participation and civic participation are also positively associated with successful issue resolution ($P < .10$ and $P < .05$, respectively). Informal and slum households are less likely to report a successful issue resolution relative to lower middle-class households ($P < .10$).

TABLE 5
Logistic Regression: Engagement Outcome (Issue Resolution Model)

Independent Variables	Model 5 (All Sample)
Brokered engagement	.668**
	(.121)
Electoral participation	.233^{+}
	(.137)
Political participation	.147
	(.137)
Civic participation	.379*
	(.166)
Electoral knowledge	.491*
	(.178)
Civic knowledge	1.35**
	(.343)
Particularistic connections	−.060
	(.141)
Outer ward	.621**
	(.144)
Nonmigrant	.230*
	(.101)
Muslim	−.161
	(.120)
Housing:	
Slum/informal housing	−.312^{+}
	(.179)
Upper-income	.221
	(.135)
Education	.438**
	(.042)
Constant	−1.63**
	(.231)
N	2,937
Wald χ^2	311.92
-Log likelihood	1.292.34
Area under ROC curve	.76
AIC	2,612.68
BIC	2,696.47

Note.—Nos. in parentheses are SEs clustered by polling part.
$^{+}$ $P < .1$.
* $P < .05$.
** $P < .01$.

that is most likely to meet with success is also a form of engagement that has an impact on the overall nature of citizenship.

CONCLUSION

Niraja Jayal, the preeminent scholar of citizenship in India, has proposed that "Indian democracy be judged, not by measures of voter turnout or

macro level generalizations about political participation, but through an evaluation of its ability to provide the conditions for the meaningful exercise of citizenship" (2013, p. 4). A wide and diverse qualitative literature has explored the ways in which citizenship in India is actually practiced, but to date there have been only limited efforts to develop more quantitative assessments, especially in the urban context. Drawing on an original and comprehensive survey that was specifically designed to evaluate day-to-day citizen engagement with the local state to secure basic services, we can draw four lessons.

First, one can raise three kinds of questions about the role of class in urban governance: (i) Which classes get better public services from the state? (ii) Which classes engage the state more? (iii) And how is engagement practiced and pursued? Earlier work (Bertorelli et. al. 2017) showed that the poorer classes are less well served by the government's public services, and the poorest are clearly ill-served. This article primarily addresses the second and third questions. We find that compared to the classes below them, the richer classes engage the state less. And these two sets of classes also engage the state differently. The rich approach the state via particularistic connections of influence, and the classes placed below them use political participation to engage the state. One can generalize by saying that the capacity to engage the state is very much a function of resources and capabilities. Those who have knowledge of the system, those who are politically engaged, and those who are well connected are more likely to engage.

Second, we find that a substantial portion of households find it necessary to engage the state through mediation; that is, either by paying bribes or using an intermediary. Paying bribes is a perversion of citizenship, but brokerage is more complicated. While some intermediaries may be playing a role that is perfectly consistent with democratic norms—for example an elected official who is simply providing constituency service—other forms of brokerage weaken democracy and citizenship, as, for example, when a service is predicated on a quid pro quo (clientelism), or the broker is circumventing rules and procedures to deliver goods.

Third, and of even greater concern, is the effect that particularistic connections and political participation have on the mode of engagement and the success of that engagement. When the rich have connections, they use them to engage through intermediaries and get better outcomes. This is hardly surprising. More surprising was our finding that political participation by the poor incentivizes brokered engagement. Political theorists and those who support participatory democracy generally argue that political participation has intrinsically positive effects. Indeed, going back to Tocqueville, it has long been argued that participation cultivates good citizens. While this may generally be true, when it comes to engaging the state, we find quite the opposite. Those among the poor who are politically engaged are much

more likely to engage the state through practices—bribes and brokers—that may be corrosive of citizenship and rule-based governance. It may be that they have no other better choices, but that does not invalidate the claim that clientelism, if not constituency service, significantly undermines democracy and citizenship.

Our fourth and final finding combines the first three. Overall, the nature of the bureaucratic and political institutions that characterize urban India, as exemplified by Bengaluru, incentivizes brokered forms of engagement. This confirms findings both from qualitative studies of citizenship in India and the literature on the institutional weaknesses of urban democratic governance. The larger lesson here is that to better understand the workings of democracy in India, we need to move beyond the traditional focus on elections and movements and examine the quotidian nature of urban citizenship. Citizenship is not a status; it is, following Somers (1993), an "instituted process." That process in India is, in principle, predicated on basic rights and associated with rule-bound practices. But our analysis in fact shows that the actual practices are governed by the differential distribution of basic resources and capabilities, as well as forms of particularistic connections to persons of influence and political participation that go against the democratic norm of rights-based engagement. That this norm is subverted in urban India, as it is in many other democratic settings, only underscores the need for more research on the day-to-day practice of democracy.

APPENDIX



FIG. A1.—Ward 73, Kottegepalya



FIG. A2.—Ward 73, polling part 30 with household listing

TABLE A1
LOGISTIC REGRESSION: BROKERED ENGAGEMENT (Chief Wage Earner Sample)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	MODEL 4 Official Connection	MODEL 4 Informal Connection
Electoral participation	−.113	−.116
	(.225)	(.222)
Political participation	.224	.289
	(.252)	(.244)
Civic participation	.030	.082
	(.190)	(.188)
Electoral knowledge	−.071	−.062
	(.292)	(.300)
Civic knowledge	.538	.730+
	(.385)	(.378)
Particularistic connections (official)	.580**	. . .
	(.154)	
Particularistic connections (informal)	. . .	.416
		(.243)
Slum/informal housing	−.759	−.705
	(.761)	(.747)
Particularistic connection (official) × slum/informal housing	−1.43+	. . .
	(.858)	

TABLE A1 (*Continued*)

Independent Variables	Model 4 Official Connection	Model 4 Informal Connection
Particularistic connection (informal) × slum/informal housing	...	−.350
		(.753)
Political participation × (slum/informal housing)	1.40**	1.30*
	(.530)	(.543)
Electoral participation × (slum/informal housing)	−.147	−.194
	(.583)	(.564)
Civic participation × (slum/informal housing)	.031	−.180
	(.732)	(.665)
Electoral knowledge × (slum/informal housing)	.749	.744
	(.720)	(.722)
Civic knowledge × (slum/informal housing)	1.42	.977
	(1.20)	(1.23)
Basic services	−.274	−.188
	(.347)	(.341)
Outer ward	.428**	.437
	(.162)	(.158)
Nonmigrant	.027	.042
	(.135)	(.132)
Muslim	.004	−.011
	(.177)	(.176)
Education	−.038	−.039
	(.069)	(.070)
Constant	−.394	−.429
	(.416)	(.421)
N	1,186	1,186
Wald χ^2	49.98	35.30
-Log likelihood	775.31	781.53
Area under ROC curve	.61	.59
AIC	1,588.63	1,601.07
BIC	1,685.12	1,697.56

Note.—Nos. in parentheses are SEs clustered by polling part.
* $P < .1$.
** $P < .05$.
** $P < .01$.

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