Citizenship, Inequality, and Urban Governance in India: Findings from Mumbai

About the Project

The Citizenship, Inequality, and Urban Governance (CIUG) Project is a collaborative project of academics in India and at Brown University. The project aims to systematically collect data on urban India, focusing in particular on assessing the quality of basic services and how urban Indian citizens use their civil, political, and social rights in cities.

About the Saxena Center for Contemporary South Asia

Based at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University, the Saxena Center for Contemporary South Asia (CCSA) supports faculty, graduate, and undergraduate research, as well as teaching on the region, and is home to the South Asian Studies concentration. The Center promotes research, teaching, and public engagement on modern South Asia's key issues in an interdisciplinary framework and in a historically and culturally grounded manner.

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Executive Summary

In Mumbai our sample covered 3007 households across 103 polling parts. We also conducted focus group discussions with residents and communities, and interviewed key respondents.
Slum and informal type housing accounts for nearly sixty-three percent of households in Mumbai. Large numbers – between 70 to 80 percent of Dalits, Adivasis, and Muslims live in slum or informal settlements. No other city has anywhere near the same level of concentration of the above groups in informal housing.

Residents of Mumbai report relying the most on their elected representatives to provide basic services, more so than in any other city. While a quarter of Mumbai residents rely on their corporators to get things done, they do not necessarily think that the corporators are working for everyone in the community and they only rarely interact with their corporators. Slum and shack dwellers, Muslims and Dalits - are much more likely to think that corporators work for their interest and more so than in any other city.

Mumbai offers contrasting views on citizenship. Residents have strong views on nationalism, second only to Ahmedabad, with a majority saying free speech should not include the right to criticise India. However, Dalits in comparison with Forward and other castes, in larger numbers think right to speech includes the right to criticise India. Mumbai is relatively liberal when it comes to opinions on institutions of marriage: a majority of Mumbaikars think that there should not be any laws against inter-religion or inter-caste marriages, the lowest for the large cities in our study. Voter participation is the lowest in Mumbai among all the cities, for long term residents as well as migrants, yet not entirely exclusionary. While Muslims are marginally less likely to vote than Hindus, OBCs and Dalits are much more likely to vote than forward castes and Adivasis. Class does not have distinct effects on voting.

Both non-voting and civic participation are low in Mumbai. Muslims and OBCs tend to participate more in non-voting activities while class has uneven effects, but generally lower housing residents tend to participate more than higher level housing. Education too matters - respondents with lower levels of education are more likely to participate in non-electoral political activities compared to respondents with higher levels of education.

Mumbai ranks lowest in citizen participation among the surveyed cities. Low levels of citizen participation are reflected in the low scores across all three components of the citizen participation index in stark contrast with other cities where voting dominates, and other components score relatively lower.

In terms of our aggregate measure of the quality of services (the BSDII index), Mumbai ranks sixth in our seven-city survey, and below Ahmedabad and Hyderabad but above Chennai among cities with populations greater than 5 million.

Where one lives in Mumbai is the most evident determinant of the kind of services one gets. Those in informal housing have inadequate sanitation, lower water availability in terms of hours and days, rare garbage collection and more waterlogging during the monsoon. Those who live in the middle class-and-above housing types have dramatically higher levels services. In the aggregate, class is the most significant predictor of the services in Mumbai. However, while informal housing in Mumbai has low service quality, there is significant variation implying reasonably good services in some informal settlements.

Mumbai reports low levels of city and neighborhood-wide discrimination (higher than only Kochi and Bhavnagar), but respondents see the police, in particular, as a key source of discrimination. Greater proportions of respondents from lower housing as well as Muslims perceive greater police discrimination.

Table of Content

1. Overview of the Project

One of the greatest challenges that India faces in the 21st century is the governance of its cities. Primarily a rural nation thus far, India will be increasingly urban in the coming years and decades. Cities are, moreover, known to be centres of innovation, opportunity and growth. But their full potential can only be achieved if they are well-governed. In any democracy, and especially in one as diverse as India's, the quality of governance is inextricably tied to whether citizens exercise their rights. A self-aware citizenry is more likely to produce better outcomes than an inert one.

With this understanding in mind, Brown University along with its partners in India developed a research project exploring urban governance and citizenship. The project aims to gather systematic and robust data on the relationship between citizenship, basic services, and infrastructure delivery in cities across India.

A first report was on Bengaluru (Bertorelli et al. 2014). We have since conducted research in fourteen other cities, including Mumbai. In this report, we provide a comprehensive overview of our findings from Mumbai. Where appropriate, we compare our findings for Mumbai to six other cities for which our data analysis is complete. These include three megacities - Hyderabad, Ahmedabad, and Chennai - and three smaller cities - Vadodara, Kochi, and Bhavnagar. The findings are based on the joint team's extensive research, which included focus groups, key respondent interviews, and a large and comprehensive household survey.

1.1 Why Study Citizenship and Basic Services?

Citizenship rights are at the heart of democracy. The rights conferred upon citizens have both intrinsic and instrumental value. Citizens are thought to value their rights as a recognition of their fundamental dignity as autonomous and legally equal individuals. But citizenship also empowers individuals to organise, to exert voice, to demand accountability, and to make substantive claims on the state. This ideal of citizenship is, however, contravened by social and institutional realities. Persistent material and status inequality mean that citizenship's actual rights can be highly differentiated, with some groups or classes being much better positioned to use their rights. And institutional weaknesses mean that the law and government bureaucracies can treat citizens quite differently. A growing body of research has, moreover, shown that the quality of citizenship varies not only across countries but also across sub-national entities and cities (O'Donnell 2004; Baiocchi et al. 2011).

But what exactly does citizenship look like, and how can we assess it?

The classic theoretical statement on citizenship is Marshall's *Citizenship and Social Class* [1992 (1950)]. Marshall sought to divide citizenship into three components: civil, political, and social. The civil component referred to individual freedoms, such as the freedom of speech, religion, association, and the right to property, contracts and justice. The courts were the main institutions concerned with this aspect of citizenship. The political component of citizenship encompassed

franchise as well as the right to run for office. The local governments and legislatures were the principal institutional arenas for these rights. The third, social, element of citizenship, was split by Marshall into two parts: (a) "the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security" and (b) "the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society" (Marshall 1992: 8). The so-called social services, especially (though not only) public provision of healthcare and education, were the institutions most closely associated with the third set of rights. This third aspect of citizenship, also called social citizenship, is inextricably tied to the rise of a welfare state.

It is noteworthy that Marshall conceptualised the problem of deprivation entirely in class terms. It was the economically poor, who had "the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security" and "the right to share to the full in the social heritage." If the state did not guarantee such rights and make allocations for them through state-financed health, housing, and education schemes, markets would not provide them. Indeed, left unchecked, markets would deprive the poor of full citizenship. Markets might be consistent with political and civil citizenship, but they were certainly in conflict with social citizenship.

The relative neglect of non-class forms of exclusion, which, as we shall see, play a big role in India, comes with some other limitations of the Marshallian model. Most notably, Marshall conflated rights-as-status with rights-as-practice. All citizens are presumed to have the basic rights and the capacity to exercise free will, associate as they choose and vote for who and what they prefer. Unlike Marshall, Somers (1993) has argued that the conventional treatment wrongly equates the status of citizenship (a bundle of rights) with the practice of citizenship (a set of relationships). Formal rights matter, but formal rights must also be actionable. Somers goes on to argue that given the highly uneven rates of political participation and influence across social categories that persist in richer democracies (especially the United States), the notion of citizenship should always be viewed as contested. But in the context of democracies in developing countries, where inequalities can be even higher and access to rights is also often circumscribed by social position and low overall literacy, or compromised by the state's institutional weaknesses, the problem becomes even more serious (Heller, 2000; Mahajan, 1999; Fox, 1994).

Which communities of India, defined in non-class terms, experience truncated citizenship? Given what we know from existing studies, Dalits (Scheduled Castes, or SCs), Adivasis (Scheduled Tribes, or STs), Muslims and women are some of the obvious candidates for investigation. Also relevant here is an Ambedkarite idea. He used to call the village a cesspool for Dalits and viewed the city as a site of potential emancipation. Is that true? Are cities sites where achievement and ability matter more than the social origin? Or do caste inequity and discrimination (as well as other social markers) persist in urban India, compromising citizenship?[1] By definition, this question acquires significance in the study of citizenship in urban India.

[1] For discrimination against against Dalits in general, see Ahuja (2019).

We thus seek to go beyond Marshall and much of the contemporary literature on citizenship in two ways. First, Marshall's concentration is on class deprivation; we include non-class forms of deprivation – caste, religion and gender – as well. In the Indian context, these are important sources of social exclusion in their own right. Second, Marshall focuses on the legal availability of rights, not on how the legally enshrined rights are experienced on the ground. Our focus is less on the laws or rights in theory, more on the practices on the ground.

Here we echo Somers (1993) and argue that the formal nature of citizenship, rights-as-status or the legal codification of basic rights of citizenship, should be analytically distinguished from its efficacy (rights-as-practice), that is, the degree to which a citizen can effectively use their rights independently of their social position and without compromising their ability to speak and organize freely.[2] There is no dispute as to the formal character of citizenship in India, at least with respect to basic civic and political rights. These are enshrined in the constitution, have been upheld by the courts and are the bread-and-butter of Indian democratic life[3]. Social rights in the Marshallian sense – right to food and education, if not health - have only just really come into play as formal rights of citizenship, although the principle of being able to deploy civic and political rights to demand social rights has been well established for some time.

The effective dimension of citizenship is, in contrast, much less clear, and in fact, presents the central conceptual and empirical challenge of this study. How effectively do urban Indians use their rights to associate, vote, participate, and engage the state? There is certainly widespread recognition that India's citizenship is highly differentiated. Chatterjee's claim that the realm of civil society – the realm in which citizens use their rights – is largely the privileged domain of the middle classes and that the poor have only their electoral clout to work with has become a dominant argument in the literature (Chatterjee 2006). Is Chatterjee right? Do the poor exercise only political, not civil, rights?

We argue that effective citizenship means essentially two things. First, it means being able to effectively participate in public life. This cannot merely be confined to voting but means enjoying the freedom to engage in public activities, and mobilise and organise freely. We explore the participatory dimension of effective citizenship in the sixth section of this report. There we report our findings on both basic attitudes towards citizenship and a complex measure of the different dimensions of participation.

Second, effective citizenship means actually being able to claim and obtain public goods from the local state. The welfare state in the Indian context remains poorly developed, yet the state does provide key services such as water, sanitation, housing and transport that are critical to building basic capabilities of citizens.[4] The participatory and the substantive dimensions of effective

[2] See Heller (2013) and Baiocchi, Heller and Silva (2011) for an elaboration.

[3] Of course even these classic liberal rights have often been contested in India. For the performance of India's democracy on two different dimensions of democracy – electoral and liberal – see Varshney (2013, Ch. 1; 2019).

[4] We borrow the concept of capabilities from Amartya Sen.

citizenship stand in a potentially mutually reinforcing relationship to each other. More effective participatory citizenship can lead to better substantive provisioning of public services, which in turn enhances participatory capacity. A large body of research has documented the substantive impact of this demand-side of citizenship, linking more politically and civically engaged citizens with higher levels of welfare (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992; Esping-Anderson 1990; Putnam 1993, Baiocchi et al. 2011, Kruks-Wisner 2018).

In this report, we focus on basic services as a substantive goal of effective citizenship for three reasons. First, either by law or by basic political pressure, all Indian cities are compelled to provide a modicum of basic services. In contrast to health and education, which are provided through a multiplicity of government agencies at different levels (local, state, central) and through different programs and allocations (e.g., specified subsidies or programs for specific groups), basic public services are generally provided by a single agency (municipal or state) and in principle on a universal basis. Second, access to basic services is critical to enhancing capabilities. Having clean and reliable water and sanitation, good transportation (and decent housing) are not only directly supportive of better health and education, but they also allow urban citizens to make the most of the opportunities in cities. Conversely, rationing access to these basic amenities is arguably one of the most important basic sources of urban inequality, as witnessed by the perverse developmental effects of slums. Third, compared to other social rights, basic services are relatively easy to measure. In earlier work on Bengaluru, we have established a statistical relationship between our measures of citizenship and service delivery (Bertorelli et al. 2017). This report provides a descriptive analysis of service delivery and how it varies across social categories in Mumbai.

2. Mumbai: Historical Overview

Mumbai is home to 12 million people, about 20 million if you include the inhabitants of the entire Greater Mumbai metropolis. A mix of people from all states, religions, identities and income levels of India, and squatter settlements with blue tarpaulin living near sleek modern towers home to millionaires, all in a relatively small area. Any government would have difficulty managing an area and its population as complex, extremely heterogeneous, and potentially fragmented. The city faces a severe disparity between the supply and demand of essential services and overall infrastructure.

Mumbai is the capital of the state of Maharashtra and dominates the state in many ways. The city occupies a dominant position in the economy and finance of India, where its share in all Indian foreign trade is 40%; 33% of all taxes are collected here (MCGM 2014). It is India's commercial, industrial and international hub, with India's largest film and television industry. It is also viewed as the most cosmopolitan Indian city, with numerous festivals and foreign links to the worlds of art, music and design.

Mumbai is a global city (Clark and Moonen 2014; Sivaramakrishnan 2011), and was ranked as the 21st most expensive city for residential real estate and is also home to the highest number of

billionaires in the country with 72 billionaires living in the city.[5] In the same city, about six million people live in slums (Census 2011); two to three million are extremely poor (MCGM 2009)[6].

Local State Institutions - MCGM and MMRDA

While the Mumbai corporation is one of the most financially and functionally strong city governments, the State government also has a solid grip over Mumbai- the city, people and its governance. There are two central institutions in Mumbai, dealing with public services and infrastructure: the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM), earlier (and sometimes even today) called the Bombay Municipal Corporation (BMC), and the Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Development Authority (MMRDA).

MCGM has a workforce of about 1.5 lakh and a yearly budget of INR 27,258 crore ($3.4 billion), the highest in India for a local government.[7] MCGM was founded in 1888 and covers 467.19 sq. km; MMRDA was established in 1974, covering 2,28,04,355 people spread over 4253 sq.km[8]. While MCGM "has a lot of capacity to do more mundane, everyday services like water, electricity, and sewerage, MMRDA was constituted to give direction to Regional Planning. For most of the initial years, it was a regional plan or planning body, but now it has increasingly become a project implementation or infrastructure body."[9] The primary role of MMRDA is to have coordination between the interlocal bodies, i.e. areas outside or between two corporations that the MMRDA has to provide services for: for instance, drinking water supplies, roads and other infrastructure. Currently, MMRDA has $2.26 billion (INR 18,404 crore) worth of projects being implemented.[10]

MCGM is governed by guidelines and rules adopted by the British, notably the Municipal Corporations Act of 1888. Most of the power is delegated to a powerful commissioner, and while there is a deliberative body in the city council, it has less power than the commissioner. From this perspective, it can be argued that the MCGM model is not entirely democratic, as the Commissioner is responsible for most of the Corporation's initiatives (Pinto and Pinto 2005). However, the elected corporator can make proposals to the commissioner and must approve his proposals in order for them to be implemented (Baud & Nainan 2012).

It is thus widely recognized that the most important officer of the city is the MCGM Commissioner, who makes the budget – decides what projects are to be taken up and how much is required in the next year. The Budgeted Estimate (BE) needs the approval of the Standing Committee (SC) and then the General Body, which is constituted by the entire body of elected corporators. "There are some negotiations on this, and the Commissioner knows which areas would be negotiated on, so he keeps a certain portion of the budget "safe"[11]. The budget is sent back to the Commissioner

[5] Hurun Global Rich List 2022
[6] http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/60-lakh-people-in-city--below-poverty-line-bmc-survey/305969/
[7] Interaction with line department heads at MCGM.
[8] Regional Plan, MMRDA (2016).
[9] Interaction with senior officers of the MMRDA.
[10] JAICA, ADB and NDB – funding is there.
[11] Interaction with senior officer of the MCGM.

after negotiations involving a few projects or some special permissions for the SC Chairman or the Mayor. The Commissioner then proposes the budget again with amendments, and usually, this gets approved. Essentially, the Commissioner can propose the budget, and only the SC can approve this."[12] Elaborating on the role of the Councillors, a sitting corporator of the MCGM said, "Corporators have two functions – constituency service and policy making. The Bombay Corporation is a city-state – we make a lot of policies viz. development control plan, sewer plan etc." On being probed about the policy inputs that the corporators provide, he says, "..the policy comes from *Mantralaya* (state government) mostly, but we still think and talk about it."

The greatest revenue sources for the MCGM are the Octroi taxes (38%) and property taxes (20%-24%). Besides, there are small revenue sources like those from solid waste and road taxes. On implementation of GST, a grant in lieu of octroi came in from the state governments with 8% growth each year. There is also a revenue source in the development charges which MCGM gets when it approves residential projects. Under the development charges, for an additional floor of development, the consumer pays extra fee which then goes to fund big-infra projects.

The revenue model for the MMRDA rests on monetizing the land owned by the state government, making land banks after taking loans, building infrastructure, and selling it. "The revenue model for us is a lease-and-develop model plus development charges on long leases".[13] The MMRDA has the Chief Minister (CM) as the head, along with the Mayors of eight corporations, Chief Secretary and other secretaries on their board.[14]

MCGM: Structure and Line Departments

Compared to other Indian cities and their governments, the Mumbai Corporation is both powerful and wealthy - "virtually a state within a state" (Pinto 2008). It is directly in charge of most of the city's services, such as water supply, roads and public transport, through its BEST division (Bombay Electricity Supply and Transport). It manages public schools, hospitals, solid waste management (SWM) and drainage, public parks, and cleaning and maintaining all these public facilities and properties (Shetye 2006).

The MCGM is marked by a power-sharing model, known as the "commissionerate style" (Pinto 2008), privileges for the Commissioner, a standing committee[15] second, and then the 227 elected councillors called the Corporators. A Mayor is elected for two and a half years by the corporators and essentially plays a ceremonial and normative role. Another important MCGM official is the city secretary, who reports to the standing committee (Shetye 2006).

[12] ibid
[13] Interaction with senior officers of the MMRDA.
[14] ibid
[15] The Standing Committee is the statutory executive organ of the Corporation. The members are drawn from the main body of the Corporation by nomination and election. For more: https://portal.mcgm.gov.in/irj/portal/anonymous/qlstandingcom?guest_user=english

The most significant chunk of the city's budget goes to the health department, headed by the Executive Health Officer (EHO), who reports to the Assistant Commissioner, MCGM. The entire healthcare infrastructure for the city of Mumbai is provided by the MCGM as the EHO was quoted saying, "MCGM does not take a single penny from either the state or the central government for healthcare funding for the city"[16]. Healthcare infrastructure is divided into three – the first level is the primary health service [like health posts, maternity homes and dispensaries]. Currently, there are 175 dispensaries, 208 health posts, 27- maternity homes, and one mother and child hospital]. The second level is the 16 "peripheral hospitals". Finally, are the "tertiary hospitals" – five medical colleges, four for MBBS and one for Dental degrees[17]. According to the EHO, primary care services are mostly located in the suburbs, and so are the 16 peripheral hospitals, but the tertiary care hospitals are mostly in the island city. Besides, under the current National Urban Health Mission, 120 urban health centres have been opened wherein the state government has provided contractual staff (which is the only contribution from the state government to MCGM for health). The MCGM administers all central government health schemes too. There are 1500 private hospitals, five hospitals owned by the state government in MCGM. The Health Department also licences and checks food items in the area. All census information, including data on religion, is also collected by the health department.

The next big chunk of MCGM funding is for water and sanitation.[18] The Corporation owns six dams which provide water to the city. MCGM is the only corporation in India that sources, distributes and collects water charges all by itself. There are two separate departments within the water department. One of them is the project department, which has a strength of 8000, of which 400 are engineers.

The education department of the MCGM caters to the primary education of the city. Approximately 3.5 lakh students are enrolled in its school network. They are taught in 7 languages in 1200 primary and 220 secondary schools with about 42,000 teachers. According to the officer in charge, the largest languages spoken are Hindi and Urdu. The officer further said, "we are spending Rs. 42,000 per student per year – textbook, pencil box, school dress amongst other items". An additional 1684 state government-run schools managed by the Deputy Director are run in the city.[19]

Mumbai has 3337 fleets of buses run by BEST (The Brihanmumbai Electric Supply & Transport Undertaking). They have 27 bus depots operating about 440 routes and carrying about 2.5 million (25 lakh) passengers every day. This service is for Mumbai city and its extended areas (Thane, Mira Bhayandar). They do not have either the suburban train or the under-construction metro under them. BEST also provides electricity only to the island city with about 10.5 lakh consumers.

[16] Interaction with line department heads at MCGM.
[17] Ear, Eye, Leprosy, Tuberculosis and Infectious Diseases at Kasturba. Tertiary care hospital is in the island city. Cooper hospital. is in western suburbs and the sixteen peripheral hospitals are in the suburbs.
[18] The Water officer was present in the meeting, but the sanitation officer was absent.
[19] These schools are known as Zilla Parishad school.

Tata and Adani [which it recently took over from Reliance] provide electricity to most of Mumbai, with Tata servicing 15%-20%, Adani about 35%-40% of the population and the remaining serviced by the state electricity board.

Neither the MCGM nor MMRDA does housing in Mumbai. The MMRDA's housing is only for project-affected people. The overwhelming understanding was that the rental housing schemes were also not working, as people were not moving into rental housing. Mumbai is investing significantly in the 300-kilometre Metro system, which came across as one of the solutions for Mumbai's housing problem; "Poor people can stay in the outskirts because of the Metro and come into the city for work[20]."

3. Method and Data

Here we present, very broadly, the essential elements of our research design and sampling methodology. For an extensive overall as well as a city-specific presentation of the methodology we direct the reader to Appendices 1 - 6.

For every city studied in this project we have followed the same nested research design and sampling strategy. In each city we began with field visits and interviewed key respondents including, often, the city commissioner, the police commissioner, the corporators, the heads of departments, academics, and civil society activists. We also conducted focus group discussions with multiple groups - Dalit/Adivasi women, Muslim women, and other mixed groups of people, both male and female, typically from very low-income neighbourhoods, especially in shack settlements (shacks hereafter) and informal slums (as opposed to what are in government terminology called slums).[21] In each city, we conducted at least one focus group with Dalits and another with Muslims[22] (See Appendix 4). The goal of the focus groups was twofold. The first was to collect qualitative data on how citizens access services, how they engage with politicians and the state, how communities are organised and how subaltern communities in particular understand their rights. The second was to use focus group responses to adapt and fine tune our survey instrument to actual conditions and practices in these communities.

In Mumbai, we held three focus group discussions (FGDs), especially concentrating on Dalit and Muslim communities living in slums. The participants were generally vendors of fruit and

[20] Interaction with senior officers of the MMRDA
[21] See footnote 22 for differences in how "slums" are defined.
[22] Since it is mostly women who are responsible for running the household and who are generally more aware than their male counterparts of the quality of public service delivery in their neighbourhoods, the team felt that it was important to take the views of women on the same.

vegetables as well as those who wash pots and pans, sweep floors in richer households, and generally engage in informal work of various kinds.[23]

We followed up on the field work with a large sample survey, which provides the bulk of the data reported here. Developing a representative sample in Indian cities is a major challenge.[24] First, there are no reliable baseline sampling frames from which to draw a representative sample. Second, the informal nature of many settlements in Indian cities poses the risk of undercounting certain populations, most notably those who live in informal shack settlements or other impermanent settings.[25] Third, as with any sample, for groups that are only a small proportion of the total population (e.g. Adivasis) we run the risk of getting too few respondents for statistical analysis.

To address these challenges, we developed a multi-stage stratified systematic random sampling strategy that stratifies the sampling frame based on Muslims and Dalit/Adivasis, to generate a representative sample of households in each city (See 3). We began with identifying all wards and assembly constituencies falling within the city municipal corporation area, followed by all polling parts within each of these political-administrative units. We stratified polling parts using Dalit/Adivasi population data from Census 2011 and expert knowledge (i.e., revenue officials, and government officials in the city corporation offices) on Muslim-dominant regions within a city prior to randomly sampling polling parts. Following the stratification and random selection of polling parts (from the stratified list), we then undertook classification, listing, and counting of residential buildings within the selected polling parts. We counted and classified every residential building in a polling part as falling into one of five housing type categories: HT-1 (Informal shacks), HT-2 (Informal slums), HT-3 (Lower middle class), HT-4 (Middle class) and HT-5 (Upper class housing) (See the note on measuring class by housing types and 4). This listing and categorisation were done by a field team which literally walked through the entire area identified in the base maps and drew the buildings onto the base maps and assigned the housing type (See Appendix 4). The listed data thus provided a full inventory of all the buildings located in our geographically delineated sections of our randomly selected polling parts giving us a complete distribution of residential structures by housing type classification and formed the sampling frame from which we ultimately selected households. Once the sampling frame was identified, we followed a systematic random selection method to select households. Depending on the size of the

[23] The FGDs were held in Mumbai in December 2018. These were in (1) Ghatkopar area with Dalit women, (2) Dharavi area with Muslim women, and (3) Santa Cruz area with mixed group of slum dwellers.

[24] Urban voter lists which are most commonly used as sampling frames are riddled with errors of deletion and addition of urban constituents, which renders them unsuitable for sampling respondents directly. The urban NGO Janaagraha's studies of the quality of voter lists confirms this. See: https://www.janaagraha.org/voter-list-management/.

[25] This is confounded by erratic and unstructured planning generally across urban centres, with inconsistent door and road numbering, area demarcation, etc.

city, the total sample size ranged from approximately 1,000 to roughly 3,000 households. In Mumbai we sampled 3007 households.

Our design and sampling strategy followed a complex process that enables us to generate a representative sample of households within a city stratified along caste, religion, and class dimensions. We elaborate on the methods we employed to create a sampling frame, select households, and respondents from within households (including the training process) in detail in 3. Before we present the socio-demographic characteristics of our sample and the results from our survey, we outline our measure of class as defined by housing types in the following note.

3.1 Measuring Class by Housing Type (HT)

Measuring class is a notoriously difficult proposition. There are definitional and measurement problems. Though we collected data on household assets, we decided that our Housing Type (HT) measure is the most reliable measure of class (See also 4 for additional details).

Conceptually, housing type conveys a very different material dimension of class than assets. Assets are, for the most part, procured on the market and directly reflect purchasing power — that is, income.[26] By contrast, access to housing in India is driven by market forces, highly regulated and sometimes directly supplied by the state, and shaped by social networks. As such, in addition to disposable income, housing type will also reflect one's location in both formal and informal networks of distribution, including access through state patronage, inherited position, strategic networks, etc. In this sense, "housing type" is a much noisier proxy for class but is also more likely to capture the actual dynamics of class practices in an Indian city.

Another key advantage of our HT variable is that it was not self-reported. Instead, field surveyors, after receiving extensive field training, were asked to classify every household in every polling part we sampled into one of five HTs. We confirmed a very robust record across surveyors of assigning classification from the pilots conducted in every city. The classifications were as follows:

HT 1: Informal settlement (shack)

HT 2: Informal settlement (slum)

HT 3: Lower middle-class housing

HT 4: Middle-class housing

HT 5: Upper-class housing

Detailed descriptions of each housing type and pictures showing examples of each classification are presented in 4. It is important to comment here on HT1 and HT2. The Census of India

[26] Household assets may also be easily under or over-reported by respondents, leading to a biased measure of relative wealth. Using a non-self reported measure such as housing type helps to remove such concerns.

enumerates three kinds of slums (1) notified slums, i.e. notified by a statute including Slum Acts, (2) recognised slums, i.e. which may not be notified by a statute or law but are otherwise recognised by state or local authorities, and (3) identified slums, which are compact areas with at least 300 residents or about 60-70 households in poorly built, congested tenements, in unhygienic environments, usually with inadequate infrastructure and lacking in proper sanitary and drinking water facilities. The last category of slums is "identified personally by the Charge Officer and inspected by an officer nominated by District Census Officer[27]". Unlike the Census, the NSSO's count is more generous - it counts both notified and non-notified slums but keeps the lower cut-off limit for non-notified slums[28] at 20 or more households.

These designations are bureaucratic and political, and they are also inevitably somewhat arbitrary (more discussions in the next section).[29] This is because they depend on varying definitions and on how officials subjectively evaluate the overall nature of a neighbourhood. Critics (Bhan and Jana 2013) have pointed out that the census definition suffers from two problems. First, many small shack settlements are often simply not counted in the census either because they don't meet a size threshold or simply have not been recognised. Second, many shacks or very poorly constructed houses that are located in non-slum neighbourhoods are not counted as part of the slum population even though they may otherwise meet all the criteria for being slum-like. To avoid this, our classifications are based on the housing type itself, not on the status of the neighbourhood in which it is located (slum or other). We classify both HT1 (shacks) and HT2 (slums) as "informal" to underscore the precarious and degraded nature of such housing but to simplify use the term "shacks" for HT1 and the term "informal slums" for HT2. We use the term "informal slum" so as not to confuse our category with the census categories of slums.

To reiterate, our categories of HT1 and HT2 refer to the *housing type and are both housing types that are clearly slum-like and categorised as such whether or not they are located in what the census designates as a slum.* We note two possible sources of difference between our classification system and that of the census. First, as already noted, between classifying the housing type rather than the neighbourhood we believe we are capturing many slum-like households that are not captured in the census. Second, and going in the opposite direction, our

[27] The lower number in the 76th round is due to the under-reporting of non-notified slums, which was 27% of all slums in the 69th round. The sampling design in these two rounds are different and hence it impacts the results.

[28] India - Urban Slums Survey, N. and National Sample Survey Office - M/o Statistics and Programme Implementation(MOSPI), G., 2012. *India - Urban Slums Survey, July 2012 - December 2012, NSS 69th Round - Data Dictionary*. [online] Microdata.gov.in. Available at: <http://microdata.gov.in/nada43/index.php/catalog/128/data_dictionary> [Accessed 10 May 2022].

[29] "Under Section-3 of the Slum Area Improvement and Clearance Act, 1956, slums have been defined as mainly those residential areas where dwellings are in any respect unfit for human habitation by reasons of dilapidation, overcrowding, faulty arrangements and designs of such buildings, narrowness or faulty arrangement of streets, lack of ventilation, light, sanitation facilities or any combination of these factors which are detrimental to safety, health and morals." (Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner, India, Primary Census Abstract for Slum, 2011). See also footnote 19.

classification would not designate as slum-like (HT1 or HT2) the many houses that are of higher quality (HT3 and even HT4) but that are sometimes located in areas that have been designated as slums by the Census. An obvious example would be Old Delhi: the dense conditions and poor overall infrastructure have produced an official recognition as a slum, but many of the houses located there are of the same quality as houses in non-slum areas and more properly designated as lower middle class (HT3) or middle class (HT4).

3.2 Basic Demographic Findings

Our sample in Mumbai comprised 3,077 households spread across 103 polling parts. The response rate to the survey was 91%. Table 3.1 summarises our basic sample demographics and compares them to 2011 census figures. Our survey collected demographic information on gender, education, religion, and caste groups. In addition, the survey enumerators were tasked with identifying the housing type of each respondent's dwelling. As briefly reported above, dwellings were categorised as one of five types: informal shacks (HT1), informal slums (HT2), lower middle class (HT3), middle class (HT4), and upper class (HT5).

When we consider our sample's representativeness concerning Dalits, Adivasis, and Muslims, we find differences compared to the Census (2011). Table 1 compares our sample with the population proportions for Mumbai. The Census (2011) reports that Hindus constitute the majority population of Mumbai (66%), followed by Muslims (21%), Jains (about 4%), and Christians (3%), with Sikhs and Buddhists accounting for about 1%. Our sample, however, contains about 79.2% Hindus, 14.7% Muslims, and others constitute about 6%. In Mumbai, the census also finds that Dalits are about 7% of the population, and Adivasis are approximately 1%. Our sample has 12% Dalit and 4% Adivasi respondents. Caste and religious distributions for all the cities in our sample are listed below in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. We note here that in contrast to the other cases in this report, we did not require a booster sample of HT1 and HT2 in Mumbai because our initial sampling provided robust representation of these categories. As such, and in contrast to the other cases, the data in this report is unweighted.

Table 3.1: Census and Sample Compared - Mumbai

	Population			Religion			Dalits and Adivasi		Slums
Variable	City	M	F	Hindu	Muslim	Others	Dalit	Adivasi	Slum
Census 2011	12,442,373	51%	48%	66%	21%	8%	7%	1%	41.84%
Sample	3,077	58%	42%	79.9%	14.7%	6%	12%	4%	62.6%

Table 3.2: Caste proportions- All Cities

City	Forward Caste	OBC	Dalit	Adivasi	Other
Mumbai	68%	6%	12%	4%	9%
Vadodara	56%	25%	17%	2%	0%
Bhavnagar	71%	22%	6%	1%	1%
Ahmedabad	39%	38%	9%	5%	9%
Chennai	13%	52%	22%	4%	10%
Hyderabad	7%	44%	22%	10%	16%
Kochi	27%	60%	5%	2%	6%

Table 3.3: Religious Distribution of Sample - All Cities

City	Hindu	Muslim	Other
Mumbai	79%	15%	6%
Vadodara	88%	10%	3%
Bhavnagar	92%	5%	3%
Ahmedabad	77%	18%	5%
Chennai	87%	7%	7%
Hyderabad	68%	30%	2%
Kochi	49%	19%	32%

Table 3.4: Comparison of proportion of slums: Sample (CIUG Index) and Census, 2011

City	Sample numbers (HT1 and HT2)	Census, 2011
Ahmedabad	27%	4%
Vadodara	13%	5%
Bhavnagar	10%	10%
Kochi	5%	1%
Chennai	15%	29%
Hyderabad	33%	26%
Mumbai	63%	42%
Bangalore	13%	8%

The 2011 census reports that 41.8% of households in Mumbai live in slums (Table 3.4). Our survey estimates of housing informality are higher in all cities than the census estimates, with the exception of Chennai. The National Sample Survey Office, another government agency that reports slum figures, puts the number of slum households in Mumbai at 50.92% in its 69th round (2012) and 38.36% in the 76th round (2018)[30]. By contrast, in our sample, the distribution of housing types shows that HT1 and HT2 account for nearly 63% of the households sampled in Mumbai, with HT2 constituting the largest housing category at 40%. HT3 and HT4 account for nearly 35% of our sample, and the remaining 2% are HT5 (Table 3.5).

Table 3.5: Housing Type proportion - Mumbai

Housing Type	Sample Proportions
HT 1 - Informal shack settlement	23%
HT 2 - Informal slum settlement	40%
HT 3 - Lower Middle Class	17%
HT 4 - Upper Middle Class	18%
HT 5 - Upper Class	2%

One of the reasons for the different slum numbers as discussed in the Note on Measuring Class by Housing Type (HT) is definitional. To elaborate, the Census and NSS differ in their methods of identifying slum settlements. Our survey differs in that we are counting ***individual households*** that meet our definition of a slum type and that as such we do not have a minimum threshold. Critically, the national surveys do not always count small clusters of households (below 60-70 for Census definition 3 as mentioned above and below 20 for NSSO) as slums, nor do they count slum-like housing in areas not otherwise classified as slums. It is also possible that our listing captures settlements that have cropped up since the last census date (2011). If that latter point is true, it would indicate that the overall percentage of shack areas has increased since 2011. This difference in slum identification between our survey and the Census/NSS might account for the variation between our numbers and the official surveys. Second, our survey best captures the quality of housing or "***the housing stock***" of a city. The preponderance of HT2 type housing in Mumbai is reflective of the higher informality of the city and hence a housing stock having one

[30] The urban stratum (both million and non-million cities) in the 2018 survey did not have a sub-stratum that differentiated the UFS blocks containing slums and those not containing slums. The selection of slums in any city was purely by chance and was not pre-designed by the sampling frame of the 2018 survey. For more read "Note on sample design and estimation procedure of NSS 76th round" pages A3-A4. The sample size for NSSO 2018 was 192.

room *pakka* housing with corrugated roof with few and small windows and are located in densely populated neighbourhoods.

A general comment on slum enumeration is also necessary. Since definitions of slums (particularly identified slums) are anchored in subjective criteria, like dilapidation, overcrowding, and lack of ventilation, the absence of clear protocols to stratify households can lead to severe undercounting. An NSSO official was quoted in the press saying, "The dividing line between 'narrow' and 'non-narrow' will be drawn differently by different survey officials, and the same is true for 'overcrowded', 'dilapidated', 'faulty', and so on," summarising this point well.[31] Also, the Census 2011 enumerated 40,309 identified slums, which formed 37% of the total slums in India. While the Census' household cluster threshold for slums is thrice that of NSSO for one part of its definition, the Census projection was higher than the NSSO's projection. This mismatch could be attributed to the differing methodology discussed above[32]. This underscores our point about the need to interpret official slum data with care[33].

3.3 Relationships between Class (Housing Type), Caste and Religion

As is true of many countries in the world, Indian cities are spatially segregated by class, caste and religion. There is emerging literature in India on spatial segregation, but the spatial analysis is often limited by the lack of data at the local level. Our data was collected at the polling part and we plan to conduct further research using this data on spatial inequality. Here we examine segregation based on housing type which, as we said above, is our measure of class. Throughout the report, we break down all of our findings by class (housing types), caste and religious community, and when relevant, by education and migration status. In this section, we look at the relationship between class, caste and religion. As Table 3.6 shows, Mumbai has, by far, the highest percentage of HT1 (informal shacks) and HT2 (informal slums) of any city in our study.

Table 3.6: Housing Type Distribution Across Cities - Listing Data

City	HT1 - Informal Settlements/Shacks	HT2 - Informal Settlements/Slums	HT3 - Lower Middle-Class	HT4 - Upper Middle-Class	HT5 - Upper-Class
Mumbai	23.1%	39.5%	16.8%	17.9%	2.7%
Vadodara	0.4%	12.9%	4.6%	74.4%	7.7%

[31] Verma, S., 2014. *slum population: Census, NSSO differ on slum population figures | India News - Times of India*. [online] The Times of India. Available at: <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/census-nsso-differ-on-slum-population-figures/articleshow/28415537.cms> [Accessed 10 May 2022].https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/census-nsso-differ-on-slum-population-figures/articleshow/28415537.cms

[32] An important reason is that NSSO absolute numbers depend on weights which are derived from Census of different time-period and projected population by RGI for different time period.

[33]Bhan, G., & Jana, A. (2015). Reading spatial inequality in urban India. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 49-54.

Ahmedabad	1.0%	26.1%	11.4%	56.8%	4.8%
Bhavnagar	0.1%	10.0%	10.7%	60.6%	18.7%
Chennai	2.4%	12.8%	59.8%	23.9%	1.1%
Hyderabad	1.5%	31.4%	52.8%	9.7%	4.7%
Kochi	0.0%	5.5%	11.0%	23.0%	60.5%

Table 3.7: Distribution of Caste and Religious Groups Across Housing Types in Mumbai

	Caste					Religion		
Housing Type	Dalit	Adivasi	OBC	Forward Caste	Other	Hindu	Muslim	Other
HT1 - Shacks	33%	40%	22%	20%	26%	21%	35%	18%
HT2 - Slums	38%	39%	49%	37%	55%	39%	38%	48%
HT3 - Lower middle class	23%	11%	15%	17%	8%	17%	16%	16%
HT4 - Upper middle class	6%	10%	12%	22%	10%	20%	10%	15%
HT5 - Upper class	0.3%	1%	2%	4%	1%	3%	0.2%	3%

Table 3.8: Proportion of Dalits/Adivasi in each city living in informal housing

City	Caste Group	Total (Informal)
Ahmedabad	OBC/Forward	23%
	Dalit/Adivas	47%
Bhavnagar	OBC/Forward	9%
	Adivasi	6%
Chennai	OBC/Forward	10%
	Dalit/Adivas	32%
Hyderabad	OBC/Forward	37%
	Dalit/Adivas	29%
Kochi	OBC/Forward	5%
	Dalit/Adivasi	9%
Mumbai	OBC/Forward	58%
	Dalit/Adivasi	73%
Vadodara	OBC/Forward	12%
	Dalit/Adivasi	17%

The distribution of castes and religious groups across housing types is given in Table 3.7. In Mumbai, 79% of Adivasis and 71% of Dalits live in informal housing (HT1 and HT2). No other city has anywhere near the same level of concentration of these groups in informal housing (Table 3.8). We find a similar trend for religious groups (Table 3.9). Thus, 73% of Muslims live in

informal housing, again a much higher figure than any other city. Of course, the high percentages also reflect the overall high rate of informal housing. When we compare the percentages of Muslims to Hindus living in informal housing, we find the gap in Mumbai (+13%) to be about average for our cities. We note that Bhavnagar has the largest gap with Muslims 37% above Hindus in informal housing.

Table 3.9: Proportion of Hindus/Muslims in each city living in informal housing

City	Religion	HT1 - Informal Shacks	HT2 - Informal Slums	Total (Informal)	Gap between Muslims and Hindus
Mumbai	Hindu	21%	39%	60%	
	Muslim	35%	38%	73%	13 Muslim
Ahmedabad	Hindu	1%	25%	26%	
	Muslim	1%	38%	38%	12 Muslim
Bhavnagar	Hindu	0%	8%	8%	
	Muslim	0%	45%	45%	37 Muslim
Chennai	Hindu	2%	13%	15%	
	Muslim	1%	6%	8%	7 Hindu
Hyderabad	Hindu	2%	27%	29%	
	Muslim	0%	41%	42%	13 Muslim
Kochi	Hindu	0%	6%	6%	
	Muslim	0%	6%	6%	equal
Vadodara	Hindu	0.5%	12%	12%	
	Muslim	0.1%	25%	25%	13 Muslim

We now present the same data, but this time we look at the caste and religious composition of different housing types. In other words, given that housing types are generally clustered together, just how diverse or homogenous are these settlements in terms of caste and religion? Conversely, how exclusionary might these types of settlements be?

In Table 3.10, we report the ratio of a caste or religious community's percent representation in a housing type to its percent representation in the city overall. That is, if a group constitutes 10% of a housing type and is also 10% of the city-wide population, then the ratio is 1. Any number above one means that the group is overrepresented in that housing type (green shading). Any number below 1 means that it is under-represented (red shading). Our first observation is that HT1 has the most skewed representation, with all the marginalised groups (Dalit, Adivasis and Muslims) being significantly over-represented. Thus, Adivasis are present at a ratio of 1.73, meaning that they are 73% above what their representation should be. Dalits are at 1.43 and Muslims at 1.53. What is

just as striking is just how integrated slums (HT2) are. Every group is very close to its base line ratio, with the exception of OBCs who are slightly over-represented. Hindus and Muslims occupy slums in the exact same ratio. Lower middle class housing (HT3) is also quite integrated, though Adivasis are significantly underrepresented (0.66). Somewhat surprisingly Dalits are overrepresented at 1.36. Less surprising is the fact that all groups except forward castes are underrepresented in upper middle class and upper class (HT4 and HT5) housing. Most notably, Muslims and Dalits are practically excluded from HT5.

Table 3.10: Group Ratios of Housing Representation in Mumbai

Housing type	HT1	HT2	HT3	HT4	HT5
	Caste				
Adivasi	1.73	0.97	0.66	0.54	0.27
Dalit	1.43	0.96	1.36	0.34	0.10
OBC	0.96	1.23	0.90	0.66	0.80
Forward	0.86	0.93	1.04	1.25	1.30
Other	1.15	1.39	0.45	0.54	0.51
	Religion				
Hindu	0.92	0.99	1.01	1.09	1.16
Muslim	1.53	0.96	0.96	0.58	0.08
Other	0.80	1.22	0.93	0.81	1.20

Note: Green highlighted cells indicate intensity of over-representation of each group. Red highlighted cells indicate intensity of under-representation. Both are expressed as likelihood ratios.

Table 3.11: Group Ratios of Housing Representation (Non-Mumbai Sample)

Housing type	HT1	HT2	HT3	HT4	HT5
	Caste				
Adivasi	2.74	0.86	0.81	0.78	0.93
Dalit	1.92	1.20	0.89	0.72	0.42
OBC	0.57	1.10	1.07	0.94	0.97
Forward	0.40	0.77	0.92	1.47	1.59
Other	1.66	0.83	1.21	0.72	0.75
	Religion				
Hindu	1.15	0.94	0.94	1.12	0.99
Muslim	0.35	1.34	1.27	0.56	0.51
Other	0.98	0.76	1.01	0.84	2.22

Note: Green highlighted cells indicate intensity of over-representation of each group. Red highlighted cells indicate intensity of under-representation. Both are expressed as likelihood ratios. These are based on data from Ahmedabad, Bhavnagar, Chennai, Hyderabad, Kochi, and Vadodara.

In comparative terms, however, housing integration is relatively more equitable for some caste groups. OBCs and FCs are not massively over-represented in the higher housing types, nor are they under-represented in informal housing as is the case elsewhere (Table 3.10). While Dalits and Adivasis are still over-represented in informal shack housing in Mumbai, it is less severe than in other cities (Table 3.11). They are, however, much more excluded from the top two housing types than elsewhere. With regard to religion, Hindus in Mumbai are to be found in each of the five housing types with near-even probability, which is similar compared with our other cities. Muslims, on the other hand, are more likely to be located in informal shacks in Mumbai than in our other cities, where they are generally less present. The exclusion of Muslims at the top (in HT5 housing) is much more severe in Mumbai than in other cities – indeed, they are more than 10 times less likely to be found in upper class housing than their sample proportion would suggest, and in the rest of our sample they are usually "only" under-represented by a factor of two (Table 3.11).

3.4 Governance

3.4.1 Basic issues in governance

What do urban residents think municipal governments should be doing, and how are they doing it? We began by asking our respondents what they believe are the most important services that municipal governments should be providing (Table 3.12). In Mumbai, while non-response rate was high,[34] those who did answer said that water was the most important service the government could provide. This is consistent with survey results across our seven cities, where a plurality of citizens believe that the most important service city governments should provide is water. The next most important item, according to our respondents in Mumbai, was education, followed by electricity, housing and sanitation.

Even though a high non-response rate to this question restricts our ability to make confident generalisations, we do however find a meaningful variation on the ranking of these services by social categories. For instance, 22% of OBCs, 16% of Dalits and 12% of Adivasis, compared to 6% of Forward Castes, think that water is the most important government service for the citizenry. We find a similar trend in education where OBCs (17%) and Adivasis (15%) give higher importance to education being provided by the city government than the Forward Castes (5%). This varying order of importance in services is also sensitive to class, where those who live in informal slums (15%) or shack settlements (11%) are far more likely to rank water as an important service compared to the middle class (4.3%) and the rich (9.6%).

[34] 57% of our respondents opted for Don't Know (33%) or Refused to Answer (24%). The "Don't Know" category is highest for those in HT4 (55.4%) and lowest for HT1 (24.7) and HT5 (24%). We recorded a particularly high incidence of DK/RA responses for Mumbai on questions that had rank order preferences. Such questions can be time consuming for respondents to answer.

Table 3.12: How would you rank the following services provided by the government for importance

	Mumbai	Ahmedabad	Bhavnagar	Chennai	Hyderabad	Kochi	Vadodara
Public Transportation	2%	2%	2%	2%	4%	1%	4%
Safety and Personal Security	3%	4%	6%	2%	7%	4%	15%
Clean Air	3%	21%	4%	6%	17%	28%	9%
Health Services	3%	2%	4%	3%	5%	3%	10%
Sanitation	4%	4%	3%	4%	4%	1%	9%
Electricity	5%	7%	13%	4%	4%	5%	8%
Housing	4%	7%	8%	13%	14%	9%	14%
Education	7%	6%	22%	10%	9%	18%	16%
Water	11%	26%	32%	43%	15%	20%	13%
DK/RTA	57%	21%	7%	13%	21%	10%	2%

When asked who plays the most important role in delivering public services - elected representatives, officials or intermediaries - we found that citizens of Mumbai rely on their elected representatives. The three-tier of representatives – MLA, MP and Corporators – together account for 57% of Mumbai's choice of who is most important for the delivery of public services. This figure is the highest of all our survey cities - big or small. In most of our cities (with Hyderabad, Vadodara and Chennai as exceptions), corporators are the most important access point for citizens, with Mumbai in the middle of the range (25%). What stands out for Mumbai is that along with approaching elected representatives, 29% of citizens also reported going through an intermediary. Also, only 14% of our respondents, the second lowest in our survey cities, think that the responsible government official is critical to service provisioning (Table 3.13). While they rely on their corporator to get things done, 91% of our respondents, the lowest in our survey cities, reported not visiting the Municipal corporator's office in the last six months.

Table 3.13: Who do you think is most important in ensuring neighbourhood access to public services?

	Ahmedabad	Bhavnagar	Chennai	Hyderabad	Kochi	Mumbai	Vadodara
Corporator	33%	49%	21%	13%	48%	25%	19%
Government Office	21%	26%	13%	27%	28%	14%	62%
MLA	9%	3%	10%	12%	5%	17%	5%
MP	7%	1%	9%	16%	3%	15%	3%
Intermediaries	30%	20%	48%	32%	16%	29%	11%
Corporator, MLA and MP	49%	53%	40%	41%	56%	57%	27%

One of the services that the corporators provide is access to essential cards. As scholars have reported, getting identity cards like ration and voter cards are central for urban residents, especially for migrants and the urban poor (Sriraman 2018). Citizens of Mumbai rely more on their corporator to get ration (BPL) cards and caste certificates than in any other city. Their reliance on the corporator in getting an aadhaar card is also significant (Table 3.14).

Table 3.14: Corporator helped in getting

City	BPL Card	Voter Card	Caste Certificate	Aadhaar Card
Ahmedabad	29%	16%	22%	14%
Bhavnagar	9%	3%	5%	4%
Chennai	15%	25%	15%	25%
Hyderabad	42%	39%	43%	38%
Kochi	8%	10%	5%	13%
Mumbai	71%	28%	44%	34%
Vadodara	16%	4%	18%	3%

We also asked our respondents what their view of their local elected representatives was (Table 3.15). Referred to as corporators, councillors or *sabhasad*, academic scholarship and popular opinion classifies such representatives into three types: self-serving (clientelism), parochial and only really concerned about their communities (group patronage), or, as in the democratic ideal, committed to doing what is best for all their constituents (constituency service). In Mumbai, a majority of 59% describe their corporator as caring about the well-being of all their constituents, with only 20% saying they are more focused on their personal interests and only 4% stating they only care about a certain community. Even though these numbers suggest that Mumbai's corporators for the most part serve all constituents, disaggregating these numbers by class, religion and caste, reveals a different story (Table 3.16).

Table 3.15: Which of these statements, in your opinion, describes your Municipal Corporator?

	Vadodara	Bhavnagar	Ahmedabad	Chennai	Hyderabad	Kochi	Mumbai
Cares about all the people of their constituency	56%	41%	54%	42%	66%	80%	58%
Cares only about certain communities in their constituency	21%	30%	8%	16%	5%	10%	4%
Is mostly concerned with own interests	11%	22%	22%	34%	25%	5%	20%
Don't Know	11%	5%	14%	8%	4%	4%	15%
Refused to Answer	1%	1%	1%	1%	0%	1%	3%

28% more Muslims than Hindus in Mumbai think their Corporator is mostly concerned with their own interests. This is the largest gap in our cities between Muslims and Hindus, and by a high margin. In Hyderabad, the other city where Muslims also have a less charitable view of their corporators than Hindus, the gap is only 3%. Dalits also have a much more negative opinion of their corporators. Compared to forward castes, 31% more of Dalits responded that corporators of Mumbai are self-serving and care about their own interests - again the highest in our sample followed by Bhavnagar (3%). Class too follows a similar pattern, with 30% of shack residents (HT1) responding that their corporator is concerned with their own interests. Compare this with 16% of those in upper class (HT5) and 13% upper middle class (HT4) saying the corporator is concerned with their own interest.[35] In Mumbai, thus, marginalised groups have a much lower opinion of their corporators than privileged groups.

Table 3.16: What different groups think about their corporators as being "self interested"

	Dalits Compared with Forward Caste	Muslim Compared with Hindus	Shack and Slum compared with upper middle and upper class
Mumbai	31%	28%	20%
Ahmedabad	-7%	1%	16%
Bhavnagar	3%	1%	5%
Chennai	-13%	-8%	-6%
Hyderabad	-14%	3%	4%
Kochi	0%	-11%	-3%
Vadodara	2%	0%	6%

Note: Figures are reported % difference between groups. Positive means greater % of group think corporator is self-interested, negative means less.

3.5 Networks

In democracies where institutions are weak, citizens often have recourse to interpersonal links to secure public goods. In more concrete terms, if you cannot have concerns and claims addressed through routine, rule-bound procedures, citizens will often have recourse to personal connections, be it a representative, a government official they know or brokers of various kinds. As we have seen, elected officials and intermediaries play an important role in Mumbai. But to what extent does this reflect the kinds of interpersonal networks that people have? As this project has shown elsewhere, having networks can make a difference in how you engage with the state (Bertorelli et

[35] Those in Mumbai who think their Corporator works for their own interests: HT1 (30%), HT2 (19%), HT3 (20%), HT4 (13%), and HT5 (16%).

al. 2017). These networks vary in their composition and density depending on one's social or economic position. Here we provide a description of such networks.

By comparison with the other cities in our project, citizens in Mumbai are comparatively well connected to the state in interpersonal terms (Table 3.17). Overall, 61% of Mumbai households know either a government official, a politician (elected or unelected), a police officer or someone else of influence (religious or community leader) the highest percentage of our big cities (Chennai is 44%, Ahmedabad is 40% and Hyderabad is 50%). But it is not even close to being as high in the smaller city samples of Kochi, Bhavnagar and Vadodara.

Table 3.17: Respondents who know persons of influence personally by city

	Vadodara	Ahmedabad	Bhavnagar	Chennai	Hyderabad	Kochi	Mumbai
Bureaucrats or Government Officers	16%	16%	19%	11%	17%	15%	16%
Police officer	28%	7%	11%	12%	3%	15%	17%
MP/MLA/Corporator	28%	1%	26%	4%	19%	33%	16%
Unelected politician	24%	3%	8%	5%	3%	16%	6%
Other local leader	13%	5%	16%	5%	5%	19%	5%
Other person of influence (Religious leader, community leader)	11%	8%	17%	7%	3%	13%	1%
None of the Above	38%	60%	23%	43%	25%	25%	54%
Don't Know	7%	11%	19%	18%	31%	13%	8%
Refused to answer	0%	2%	3%	7%	2%	2%	4%

Table 3.18: Proportion of citizens/households, by categories who know persons of influence

Housing Type	Bureaucrat or Police	MP MLA corporator	Intermediary	None of the Above	DK/Refused
HT1 - shacks	24%	16%	4%	55%	15%
HT2 - slums	43%	16%	15%	53%	9%
HT3 - middle class	27%	17%	6%	52%	17%
HT4 - upper middle	28%	15%	12%	56%	12%
HT5 - rich	47%	25%	28%	49%	6%
Hindu	32%	14%	11%	57%	12%
Muslim	41%	32%	6%	38%	13%
Forward Caste	36%	15%	11%	54%	13%
OBC	28%	12%	19%	52%	14%
Dalit	38%	39%	6%	42%	5%
Adivasi	17%	4%	4%	67%	14%

On disaggregating it becomes clear that class position (housing type) has an effect on interpersonal relationships with the state (Table 3.18). Almost half of the rich in Mumbai who stay in upper class housing know a bureaucrat or a police officer in the city. A quarter of them know the elected representatives (MP, MLA or the Corporator) and the rich are also the most likely to know an intermediary. Interestingly, slum dwellers (HT2) of Mumbai have connections with the police or bureaucrats (43%) but when it comes to knowing the elected representatives or intermediaries, their reach is significantly less than those in the upper class housing. The pattern is different for caste: 36% of the forward castes compared with 38% of Dalits and only 17% of the Adivasis knew either a bureaucrat or police official. However, 39% of the Dalits claimed to know elected representatives, compared with 15% of the forward castes. Further, Muslims in the state are better connected with the bureaucrats, police and the elected representatives than the Hindus.

3.6 Summary

One of the most striking findings of this section is that citizens in Mumbai report relying the most on their elected representatives to provide basic services, more so than in any other city. This stands in contrast to the existing scholarship, which argues for an inverse relationship between city size and citizen-state relationships, meaning that citizen-state interaction decreases with the increase in the size of the city. Mumbai, where India's first city-centred nativist political party - the Shiv Sena - took root, is also home to national parties like the Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party and regional parties like the MNS and NCP. Besides these, the Samajwadi Party, and the BSP and RPI, further make the city's politics highly contested. While a quarter of Mumbai residents rely on their corporators to get things done, they do not necessarily think that the corporators are working for everyone in the community and they only rarely interact with their corporators. The marginalised - slum and shack dwellers, Muslims and Dalits - are much more likely to think that corporators work for their interest and more so than in any other city.

We can think of two reasons for this mismatch. One, corporators have no say in policymaking. As a corporator from Mumbai, told us, "We do not make policy. Policy is made at the legislative level, not here. We only implement.[36]" One could argue that given very little policymaking, the corporator falls back on patronage to their groups, communities or areas. This argument could also explain the reliance of a quarter of the citizens on intermediaries to "get things done". A second related argument could be inequality and the big city. Despite the enormous resources with MCGM, the poor and the marginalised are rarely a priority. A 2021 study on the MCGMs finance concluded that "(MCGM) has increasingly directed public resources to the private sector and reduced access to healthcare and school education for Mumbaikars"[37].

[36] Interview with sitting corporator of the MCGM, February 2019, in Mumbai.

[37] Duggal, R. (2021). Political Economy of Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation Budgets. *Economic & Political Weekly*, *56*(32), 69.

4. Citizenship

The idea of citizenship goes to the heart of democracy. How citizens understand their relationship to the state – the so-called vertical citizenship – and how they understand their relationship to each other – the so-called horizontal citizenship –- are important parts of democratic practice. To develop a concrete understanding of this complex and dynamic phenomenon, we break citizenship down into two dimensions. The first has to do with basic attributes and beliefs about citizenship. What do citizens actually think it means? Second, what actual ability do citizens have to use their rights as citizens? We capture this by measuring, as best we can, if and how citizens exercise their rights. This is captured through the citizen participation index (CPI) which covers various aspects of participation.

We begin with the attitudes. To gain a general sense of what kinds of beliefs citizens hold about citizenship, we asked some direct and some less direct questions. We asked all of our respondents what they believe are the most important responsibilities of citizens (Table 4.1). About 53% of citizens of Mumbai in our sample again either refused or didn't know an answer which is the highest in our sample[38]. Of those who answered, most think that voting (19%) is most important, followed in distant second by respecting the law and treating others as equal (11%).

Table 4.1: What do you think are the most important responsibilities of a citizens of India

City	Being involved in the community	Respecting the law	Treating others as equals	Voting	DK/Refused to Answer
Mumbai	7%	11%	11%	19%	53%
Ahmedabad	11%	17%	10%	47%	15%
Bhavnagar	13%	20%	9%	50%	8%
Chennai	11%	21%	20%	36%	13%
Hyderabad	12%	22%	15%	31%	20%
Kochi	7%	28%	18%	43%	5%
Vadodara	17%	21%	13%	48%	1%

The 68% non-response (don't know or refused to answer) amongst the residents of HT4 i.e. upper middle-class housing is the highest (Table 4.2). 51% of HT4 residents said they didn't know what the responsibilities of being an Indian citizen are. The shack dwellers (20%) and slum dwellers HT2 (23%) think voting is the most important right. The OBCs in our sample think voting is most important (31%), followed by respecting the law. The Adivasis in the sample think voting (24%)

[38] We recorded high incidence of DK/RA responses for Mumbai on questions that had rank order preferences. Such questions can be time consuming for respondents to answer.

and treating others as equals (22%) are most important (Table 4.2). We also measured attitudes about citizenship by asking key questions that capture how citizens feel about political and social liberties (Table 4.3). On our first question on freedoms about 58% of Mumbai's residents, the second highest among big cities in our sample, think that those who refuse to chant *Bharat Mata Ki Jai* (Hail Mother India) should be punished. Relatedly, about 56% of the respondents feel that the right to criticise India should not be covered under speech protection which is second only to Ahmedabad (88%) among the big cities in our study. We also captured conservatism by asking questions on marriage and food. To the question "should there be laws against inter-caste and inter-religion marriage", only 8% of respondents in Mumbai agree to having laws against inter caste or inter religious marriage, the lowest among the big cities in our study.

Table 4.2: What are the most important responsibilities of a citizens of India - Mumbai

Mumbai	Being involved in the community	Respecting the law	Treating others as equals	Voting
HT1 - shacks	7%	11%	13%	20%
HT2 - slums	7%	12%	10%	23%
HT3 - middle class	7%	10%	12%	16%
HT4 - upper middle	7%	7%	8%	10%
HT5 - rich	11%	12%	12%	17%
Hindu	7%	11%	11%	18%
Muslim	4%	9%	8%	18%
Forward Caste	6%	9%	9%	14%
OBC	8%	21%	16%	31%
Dalit	7%	11%	13%	21%
Adivasi	19%	19%	22%	24%

Table 4.3: Conservative or Liberal? Those saying "yes" to...

City	laws against inter-caste marriage	laws against inter-religion marriage	Not saying BMKJ should be punished	Right to Speech does not include Right to criticise India
Vadodara	46%	46%	41%	76%
Bhavnagar	9%	13%	47%	82%
Ahmedabad	16%	22%	21%	88%
Chennai	10%	11%	19%	46%
Hyderabad	13%	14%	62%	20%
Kochi	1%	1%	5%	22%
Mumbai	8%	9%	58%	56%

Breaking these figures down by social categories (Table 4.4), class has an effect on acceptance of inter-religious marriage, with those living in informal shack settlements more in favour of anti inter-marriage laws (11%) than those in middle (7%) or upper class housing (4%). More Muslims than Hindus think that inter-religious marriages should be outlawed. Lastly, forward castes (6%)

are the least opposed to inter-religious marriages compared with the OBC (14%) and Adivasi (16%).

On questions of free speech, there is no clear trend across class, though 57% of our respondents living in shack settlement compared with 66% in the upper middle-class housing think that right to speech includes the right to criticise India. Interestingly 46% of upper-class housing residents were the least likely to suggest that the right to speech could be included under the right to criticise India. Muslims differ substantially on the speech related questions, 62% Muslims in comparison with 54% Hindus think that the right to speech does not include the right to criticise India, and 55% of them compared to 60% Hindus think those who do not say *Bharat Mata ki Jai* should be punished. The most significant difference however is with respect to caste: 75% Dalits in comparison with 54% Forward castes and 52% OBCs think that right to speech includes the right to criticise India.

Table 4.4: Mumbai: Conservative or Liberal? Those saying "yes" to...

	Laws against inter-caste marriage	Laws against inter-religion marriage	Not saying BMKJ should be punished	Right to Speech doesn't include Right to criticise India
HT1 - shacks	65%	57%	11%	11%
HT2 - slums	47%	52%	10%	10%
HT3 - middle class	65%	53%	5%	5%
HT4 - upper middle	68%	66%	7%	7%
HT5 - rich	36%	46%	4%	4%
Hindu	60%	54%	9%	8%
Muslim	55%	62%	11%	10%
General	59%	54%	7%	6%
OBC	50%	52%	14%	14%
Dalit	69%	75%	12%	11%
Adivasi	75%	27%	15%	16%

4.1 Summary

Mumbai offers contrasting views on citizenship. It has strong views on nationalism, second only to Ahmedabad, with a majority saying free speech should not include the right to criticise India, probably a reflection of the ultra-nativist party, Shiv Sena, which has ruled the Mumbai corporation for over two decades (Maheshwari, 2022) (Banerjee, 2020) (Hansen, 2001). However, Dalits in comparison with Forward and other castes by a large number think right to speech includes the right to criticise India. Meanwhile, Mumbai is liberal when it comes to opinions on

institutions of marriage: a majority of Mumbaikars think that there should not be any laws against inter-religion or inter-caste marriages - lowest for the big cities in our study.

5. Participation

We now turn to our citizen participation index (CPI) and its component parts, which include voting, non-voting political participation and civic participation. Each component included several questions for a total of 10 (see Appendix 2) for questions and how the index was constructed). Each score is reported on a scale of 0-1, with 0 indicating no participation and 1 indicating that the respondent participated in all 10 activities.

Mumbai's overall score of 0.207 places it at the lowest of our surveyed cities, big or small (Table 21). It is to be noted that the participation can be seen to be tied to city size, with all the large cities having much lower levels of citizen participation. As we shall discuss in the subsequent sections, across the studied cities, Mumbai has the lowest scores across all subcomponents except civic participation.

Table 5.1: Citizen Participation Index (CPI) by Sub-component

City	CPI	Subcomponents of CPI		
		Voting	Non-voting	Civic
Mumbai	0.207	0.290	0.063	0.261
Ahmedabad	0.319	0.660	0.087	0.195
Bhavnagar	0.397	0.764	0.098	0.318
Chennai	0.303	0.485	0.17	0.234
Hyderabad	0.35	0.581	0.135	0.316
Kochi	0.395	0.761	0.13	0.275
Vadodara	0.422	0.793	0.144	0.327

We now turn to the components of our citizen participation index: voting, non-voting political, and civic.

5.1 Voting

Mumbai has the lowest self-reported voter registration (38%) among all cities (Table 5.2). Voter registration is somewhat even across housing types except for upper class housing type (HT5).

Only 34 % of respondents from informal shack settlements (HT1) are registered to vote[39] (Table 5.3). This increases to 42% among slum settlement (HT2) respondents, but drops to 33% and to 35% for lower and upper middle-class housing. Registration is highest among HT5 respondents (61%). We also find that about 22% of respondents from HT1 have tried to register but were unsuccessful. In comparison, 13% in HT2, HT4 and HT5 were unsuccessful in their attempt to register to vote. There are, in other words, clear barriers to registration for those living in informal settlements in Mumbai.

Table 5.2: Are you currently registered to vote?

City	Yes	No, but I have tried to register	No, and I have not tried to register
Mumbai	38%	16%	37%
Ahmedabad	74%	7%	17%
Bhavnagar	89%	3%	5%
Chennai	54%	8%	30%
Hyderabad	61%	20%	16%
Kochi	81%	2%	11%
Vadodara	86%	1%	8%

Table 5.3: Mumbai: Are you currently registered to vote?

Category	Yes	No, but I have tried to register	No, and I have not tried to register
HT1 - shacks	34%	22%	33%
HT2 - slums	42%	13%	39%
HT3 - middle class	33%	16%	36%
HT4 - upper middle	35%	13%	42%
HT5 - rich	61%	13%	19%
Hindu	37%	13%	41%
Muslim	32%	32%	25%
Other	59%	10%	23%
Forward	34%	14%	42%
OBC	55%	9%	29%
Dalit	44%	38%	14%
Adivasi	19%	6%	65%
Other	56%	5%	26%

[39] In Maharashtra, the State Election Commission (SEC) and the Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) share electoral rolls.

Voter registration among OBCs in Mumbai is about 55%, not unlike Chennai and Hyderabad, but well below the Gujarat cities and Kochi (Table 5.2). Registration among Dalits (44%) is comparatively somewhat lower. Registration figures for Adivasis (19%) and forward castes (34%) are the lowest among all cities. With regard to variation across religion, Muslims (32%) are less likely to be registered to vote than Hindus (37%). Voter registration among other religious communities is the highest (59%) across all groups (Table 5.3).

Table 5.4: Mumbai- of those registered to vote only 34.5% are registered to vote at their current address

City	Yes	No, but I have tried to register	No, and I have not tried to register	NA/Not registered at all
Mumbai	35%	0%	2%	62%
Ahmedabad	70%	1%	3%	26%
Bhavnagar	84%	2%	3%	11%
Chennai	48%	1%	4%	46%
Hyderabad	59%	1%	1%	39%
Kochi	76%	3%	2%	19%
Vadodara	84%	1%	1%	14%

Table 5.5: Registration at current address (Mumbai)

Category	Yes	No, but I have tried to register at this address	No, and I have not tried to register at this address	NA / not registered at all
HT1 - shacks	30%	0%	2%	66%
HT2 - slums	37%	1%	3%	58%
HT3 - middle class	32%	1%	0%	67%
HT4 - upper middle	34%	0%	0%	65%
HT5 - rich	61%	NA	NA	39%
Hindu	34%	1%	2%	63%
Muslim	36%	1%	2%	60%
Other				
Forward	30%	1%	1%	67%
OBC	46%	2%	7%	45%
Dalit	46%	1%	4%	48%
Adivasi	18%	1%	1%	80%

While we have examined overall voter registration in three levels of elections, it is important to ask a follow-up question: whether respondents are registered to vote at the address where they

currently reside. This is because voter registration laws in India only allow for a person to register to vote at one address. Those who have moved from one city or state to another (even crossing constituency boundaries in the same city) would need to update their voter registration to vote in a new constituency – a process which is fraught with issues and often leads to citizens not being listed on the voter list[40]. In order to vote, those who have not updated their registration (or not been successful in doing so) must physically travel back to their last-registered constituency, given the lack of "absentee" or mail-in ballots for most categories of voters in India. The difficulties of either travelling back to one's previous constituency or updating one's voter registration in a new area may pose participation barriers to those from poorer backgrounds, although many do in fact travel back. In our sample for Mumbai, of those registered to vote only 34.5% are registered to vote at their current address (Table 5.4). Disaggregating this data, we find that the highest registration at address rates for Mumbai are for those who stay in HT5 type housing, where 61% of those are registered to vote at their current address. Across other housing types the differences are not large, hovering in the 30s. Caste produces an interesting pattern: OBCs and Dalits are much more likely to be registered than forward castes, and Adivasis are very unlikely to be registered at their current address (Table 5.5).

Similar to patterns observed in Ahmedabad and Bhavnagar, respondents who have lived longer in the city are more likely to be registered to vote in the State and Union elections. For example, 47% of respondents who have lived their entire life in Mumbai are registered to vote. This is 28% for those who have lived in Mumbai for five or fewer years, 14% for those between 6-10 years, and 37% for those who have lived for more than ten years.

While the distribution of respondents across registration is unevenly spread among migrant categories, the pattern suggests that migrants have lower voting registrations. Our sample also shows that among those who have lived their entire lives in Mumbai (comprising 50% of our sample), 23% have *unsuccessfully* tried to register. Among those who have not lived their entire lives in Mumbai, the proportion of respondents who have even tried to register drops sharply. Among those who have lived in the city for more than 10 years (but not their entire lives), only 8% have attempted to register to vote and this proportion drops to about 7% among those who have lived in the city five years or less. Migrants are not only less likely to be registered, but less likely to try to register to vote as well.

Given such low levels of registration for both natives and migrants, it comes as no surprise that electoral participation in Mumbai is the lowest across all cities (Table 26). Only a third of respondents report having voted in any election compared to close to 80% in Bhavnagar, Vadodara, and Kochi. Those who list Marathi as the first language spoken at home are more likely to have voted in all 3 levels (close to 50% on each), whereas other groups are much lower (Hindi/Urdu speakers, etc.). While voting participation is about 30% at local and State level

[40] Several studies of Janaagraha indicate issues of quality with voter lists which are rooted in voter list management issues. For a comprehensive overview, see Janaagraha (2017). Voter List Management: Booth Level Officer and Landscaping Study in 21 Cities in India. Available: http://janaagraha.org/files/Janaagraha_BLO_Study_2017.pdf (accessed 21.06.2021).

elections, it is about 28 percent for national elections in Mumbai. It should be noted that this self reporting is lower than the official turnout numbers for the Mumbai Municipal Corporation elections[41].

Mumbai's notorious voting record has earned titles like "Maximum city, Minimum voting". In a study by the Election Commission of India, constituencies in and around Mumbai had the lowest registrations in Maharashtra. It noted that lower coverage is evident in many constituencies within the MMR - predominantly in suburban centres that have recently seen a large upswing in residential properties (e.g., Andheri, Goregaon, Versova, etc.) (Tagat et al 2020)" Another survey found that Mumbai's non-registered voters found voter registration tiresome and time-consuming[42]. Indeed, a study of frontline workers of the election commission, the booth level officers or the BLO, responsible for facilitating and collecting data on voters and verifying their claims and requests found that reaching out to these officers was most challenging in Mumbai. Even after "multiple attempts were made to reach 599 BLOs, just 38 BLOs were spoken to (6%)" - the lowest in their study, compared to 21 cities in India[43].

Table 5.6: Self-reported Voting in three levels of Elections

City	Local	State	National
Mumbai	30%	30%	28%
Vadodara	77%	83%	77%
Bhavnagar	76%	79%	73%
Ahmedabad	66%	67%	63%
Chennai	47%	49%	49%
Hyderabad	57%	60%	57%
Kochi	75%	77%	75%

Across religious communities, we do not observe large differences between Hindus and Muslims when it comes to voting (Table 5.7). While the voting subcomponent of our index (an average of the three voting proportions) is the lowest for Mumbai compared to other cities across religious identity communities, the voting component for Muslims is slightly lower than that of Hindus (0.28). This difference, though very small, contrasts to what we see in Bhavnagar, Vadodara, Chennai, and Hyderabad, where Muslims vote in greater proportions relative to Hindus.

[41] The turnout for Greater Mumbai Municipal Corporation has been: 55.28% (2017), 44.75% (2012), 46.05% (2007), 43.25% (2002), 44% (1997), 49% (1992). Sourced from the State Election Commission, Maharashtra.

[42]https://gipe.ac.in/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/WHY-PEOPLE-DO-NOT-VOTE-IN-MUNICIPAL-CORPORATION-ELECTIONS-A-VOTER-BASED-SURVEY-IN-MUMBAI-MUNICIPAL-CORPORATION.pdf

[43] The urban NGO Janaagraha's study on Block Level Officers (BLO) confirms this. See: http://janaagraha.org/files/Janaagraha_BLO_Study_2017.pdf

Class effects do not appear pronounced in Mumbai (Table 5.8). Unlike other cities, where the voting component increases across housing types, the score for Mumbai remains relatively flat for all housing types except the upper class. Consistent with other cities, respondents from informal shacks have the lowest voting index score (0.25) across housing types. The score increases to 0.32 for slum housing and then drops to around 0.26 for the lower and middle housing types. However, the score almost doubles to 0.59 for the upper classes (HT5). Respondents from slums vote marginally more compared to those from other housing types – informal through middle-class housing, while the upper classes vote the most.

Table 5.7: Voting Sub-Index by Religion

City Name	Hindu	Muslim
Mumbai	0.283	0.250
Bhavnagar	0.761	0.837
Ahmedabad	0.664	0.622
Chennai	0.479	0.528
Hyderabad	0.549	0.661
Kochi	0.805	0.741
Vadodara	0.780	0.901

Table 5.8: Voting Sub-Index by Housing Type

City Name	HT 1 - Informal shacks	HT 2 - Informal slum	HT 3 - Lower Middle	HT 4 - Upper Middle	HT 5 - Upper
Mumbai	0.247	0.315	0.256	0.277	0.586
Bhavnagar	0.767	0.827	0.835	0.749	0.74
Ahmedabad	0.377	0.536	0.547	0.732	0.809
Chennai	0.448	0.484	0.470	0.522	0.596
Hyderabad	0.426	0.587	0.585	0.554	0.607
Kochi	0.788	0.816	0.865	0.716	0.754
Vadodara	0.582	0.837	0.838	0.778	0.844

Differences in voting across caste groups are similar to the voting registration proportions encountered earlier (Table 5.9). OBCs and Dalits have the highest scores, followed by forward

castes and Adivasis. Forward castes and Adivasis are the least likely to vote. Patterns in the voting component of the participation index across levels of education show that those having between 4-9 years of schooling are more likely to vote relative to the more highly educated and those without any schooling (Table 5.10). The score for not having any schooling is low, though it is not the lowest. Respondents who have completed school and those with some college have the lowest score (between 0.20 and 0.25) while respondents with some schooling (up to 4 years) score highest on the voting component. The voting component increases for the group with a college degree or above (0.37). Still, the overall pattern suggests a marginally higher level of voting among those with some schooling relative to those with higher or lower levels of education.

Table 5.9: Voting Sub-Index by Caste

CITY	Mumbai	Bhavnagar	Ahmedabad	Chennai	Hyderabad	Kochi	Vadodara
Forward Caste	0.249	0.765	0.620	0.455	0.767	0.784	0.74
OBC	0.461	0.781	0.728	0.490	0.548	0.774	0.863
Dalit	0.352	0.746	0.497	0.438	0.570	0.560	0.864
Adivasi	0.156	0.523	0.620	0.308	0.842	0.508	0.736

Table 5.10: Voting Sub-Index by Education

City Name	No Schooling	School: up to 4 years	School: 5-9 years	School: SSC/HSC	Some college but not graduated	College Graduate & Above	Don't Know/ Refused
Mumbai	0.278	0.432	0.415	0.245	0.199	0.373	0.185
Bhavnagar	0.870	0.713	0.858	0.821	0.527	0.789	0.000
Ahmedabad	0.550	0.715	0.619	0.676	0.536	0.794	0.303
Chennai	0.669	0.321	0.532	0.453	0.344	0.548	0.848
Hyderabad	0.276	0.444	0.679	0.771	0.433	0.657	0.411
Kochi	0.970	0.879	0.873	0.799	0.683	0.703	0.413
Vadodara	0.904	0.828	0.818	0.859	0.732	0.693	0.703

In sum, we find that while Mumbai has the lowest voter participation among all the cities - both for natives and migrants. Muslims are marginally less likely to vote than Hindus. In terms of caste, the most notable finding is that OBCs and Dalits are much more likely to vote than forward castes and Adivasis. This is the largest such gap in any of our cities. The fact that OBCs and Dalits vote in roughly equal measures is similar to Bhavnagar and Chennai but stands in contrast to

Ahmedabad or Kochi where OBCs dominate. In other cities, Dalits are slightly ahead of OBCs. Class effects are not distinct. While the upper classes are most likely to vote overall, respondents from HT2 are more likely to vote compared to respondents from other housing types. What is starkly clear in Mumbai is that while voting is low overall, it is not exclusionary - Dalits, and religious minorities are as likely to vote as are OBCs and Hindus.

5.2 Non-Voting Participation

There is more to politics than voting. Between elections, people organise and support political parties in varied ways. A well-known problem of representation in democracies is the fact that the rich and the more socially privileged often play a more proactive role in politics and are more likely to dominate political parties.

The likelihood of a respondent being a member of a political party is greater in Mumbai relative to the Gujarat cities but less so relative to the other cities in our sample (Table 5.11). OBC respondents are most likely to be members of a political party followed closely by Adivasis. Dalits and forward castes are less likely to hold party membership. There is only a two percentage point difference between Hindus and Muslims. While respondents from HT 2 (slums) were slightly more likely to hold party membership (about 8 percent), respondents from other housing types are more or less the same (between 3 and 5 percent are members of a political party).

Table 5.11: Are you a member of any political party?

City	Forward Caste	OBC	Dalit	Adivasi	HT1 - Shack	HT2- Slums	HT3 - middle class	HT4- Upper middle class	HT5 Rich	Hindu	Muslim
Mumbai	5%	10%	6%	9%	5%	8%	3%	5%	5%	5%	7%
Bhavnagar	3%	1%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	3%	1%	2%	0%
Ahmedabad	3%	7%	5%	4%	2%	4%	3%	6%	3%	4%	7%
Chennai	28%	7%	10%	32%	18%	12%	12%	11%	15%	13%	4%
Hyderabad	8%	20%	4%	2%	10%	16%	9%	7%	2%	6%	22%
Kochi	10%	18%	14%	7%	3%	13%	11%	13%	17%	14%	12%
Vadodara	3%	1%	0%	1%	0%	1%	2%	2%	1%	2%	2%

Table 5.12: Non-voting participation Index

Mumbai	0.063
Bhavnagar	0.097
Ahmedabad	0.086
Chennai	0.170
Hyderabad	0.135
Kochi	0.129
Vadodara	0.143

Table 5.13: Non-Voting Sub-Index by Housing Type

City Name	HT 1 - Informal shack settlement	HT 2 - Informal slum settlement	HT 3 - Lower Middle Class	HT 4 - Upper Middle Class	HT 5 - Upper Class
Mumbai	0.068	0.082	0.036	0.038	0.071
Bhavnagar	0.041	0.090	0.052	0.111	0.086
Ahmedabad	0.053	0.089	0.073	0.092	0.058
Chennai	0.405	0.231	0.155	0.154	0.184
Hyderabad	0.233	0.192	0.119	0.077	0.033
Kochi	0.025	0.126	0.087	0.123	0.141
Vadodara	0.076	0.105	0.128	0.143	0.233

Table 5.14: Non-voting Sub-Index by Caste

City Name	Dalit	Adivasi	OBC	Forward Caste
Mumbai	0.074	0.103	0.138	0.047
Bhavnagar	0.0003	0.095	0.110	0.094
Ahmedabad	0.060	0.083	0.123	0.074
Chennai	0.442	0.183	0.108	0.333
Hyderabad	0.040	0.059	0.240	0.109
Kochi	0.121	0.159	0.124	0.121
Vadodara	0.107	0.093	0.102	0.180

We now turn to our index of non-electoral participation. It includes four questions covering political party membership, attendance at rallies, talking about politics with neighbours, and contributing time to a campaign. A score of "1" would mean that the respondent answered affirmatively to all 4 questions, with "0" indicating only negative responses. Mumbai also exhibits the lowest level of participation between elections (Table 5.12).

Across housing types, non-voting participation in Mumbai is highest in slums (HT2), although this is still the lowest score for HT2s in any of our cities (Table 5.13). The score almost halves to 0.04 for the lower-middle, and middle-class housing.

In Mumbai, OBCs are the most active caste group in politics between elections. Adivasis are also relatively active (Table 5.14). The score for Dalits is closer to that seen in Chennai and Kochi. Forward castes have the lowest scores on this sub-index, followed by Dalits. Across religious communities, Muslims are slightly more likely than Hindus to engage in non-electoral political participation (Table 5.15).

Table 5.15: Non-voting Sub-Index by Religion

City Name	Hindu	Muslim	Other
Mumbai	0.056	0.071	0.137
Bhavnagar	0.100	0.074	0.07
Ahmedabad	0.082	0.117	0.047
Chennai	0.180	0.073	0.152
Hyderabad	0.082	0.254	0.137
Kochi	0.139	0.085	0.141
Vadodara	0.155	0.059	0.080

Across levels of education, we find that respondents with lower education levels (completed high school or below) have higher non-voting participation scores. The score drops sharply for those with higher education levels (some college or having a college degree).

To summarise, non-voting participation is higher among OBCs and Adivasis than among Dalits and forward castes. Similarly, Muslims are marginally more likely to participate in non-electoral activities. Class has uneven effects – lower housing types (HT1 and HT2) tend to participate more than higher-level housing types (HT3 and HT4) except in the case of HT5 for which the score is about the same as that for HT1. But compared to other cities, non-voting participation in HT2 remains quite low. Finally, we find that respondents with lower levels of education are more likely to participate in non-electoral political activities compared to respondents with higher levels of education.

5.3 Civic Participation

The civic participation index is constructed using indicators that measure a citizen's participation in civic affairs such as participating in ward committee meetings and membership in voluntary social organisations. While the civic participation score for Mumbai is not especially high, and similar to Kochi, it is higher than Ahmedabad and Chennai, but it is lower than Vadodara, Bhavnagar, and Hyderabad (Table 5.16).

We want to distinguish civic participation from voting and the demands it puts on citizens. Voting is a once-in-five-year participation exercise, with the state and civil society actively enabling and facilitating it. There is a public holiday on voting day, and political party representatives cross-verify electoral rolls with citizens; civic-centred NGOs and the election authorities put out messages that nudge citizens to go out and vote. Civic participation, on the other hand, demands higher commitment. Participation in a civic activity often involves much more time and energy and can sometimes mean dealing with recalcitrant officials requiring building deeper engagements. Even participative forums under a legal statute like the area sabha and ward committee face hurdles - in some cities, they are not formed, and in others, the participation is limited (like restricting the election of these forums where only the ward corporator or their nominated candidates can chair these meetings) - further impeding active civic citizenship.

Table 5.16: Civic Participation sub-Index

Mumbai	0.261
Bhavnagar	0.317
Ahmedabad	0.194
Chennai	0.233
Hyderabad	0.316
Kochi	0.274
Vadodara	0.327

We do not observe substantial differences in civic participation across caste groups, except that forward castes are slightly less civically active than other groups (Table 5.17). The civic participation score is also essentially flat across housing types, with a slightly higher score for HT2, suggesting that class has little effect on civic participation in Mumbai (Table 5.18). While Muslims are slightly more engaged than Hindus or other religious communities, the differences are not large (Table 5.19).

Table 5.17: Civic Participation Sub-Index by caste

City Name	Forward Caste	OBC	Dalit	Adivasi
Mumbai	0.249	0.295	0.300	0.286
Bhavnagar	0.323	0.303	0.335	0.185
Ahmedabad	0.183	0.202	0.159	0.178
Chennai	0.338	0.194	0.201	0.465
Hyderabad	0.274	0.360	0.306	0.313
Kochi	0.307	0.255	0.336	0.224
Vadodara	0.352	0.309	0.283	0.249

Table 5.18: Civic Participation Sub-Index by Housing type

City Name	HT 1 - Informal shack settlement	HT 2 - Informal slum settlement	HT 3 - Lower Middle Class	HT 4 - Upper Middle Class	HT 5 - Upper Class
Mumbai	0.256	0.274	0.240	0.258	0.245
Bhavnagar	0.252	0.325	0.318	0.314	0.325
Ahmedabad	0.199	0.161	0.175	0.211	0.241
Chennai	0.254	0.226	0.228	0.246	0.307
Hyderabad	0.206	0.336	0.311	0.317	0.282
Kochi	0.250	0.253	0.253	0.277	0.279
Vadodara	0.220	0.295	0.277	0.335	0.343

Since an essential element of civic action is participation in civic organisations, we examine the distribution of such participation across cities separately.

In Mumbai, the form of civic participation favours civic/professional organisations over religious or identity-based ones (Table 5.20). For instance, 35% percent report membership in a civic organisation such as an NGO or RWA. In comparison, only 11% are members of religious or caste-based organisations (and nearly 50% say they don't participate in either sort of organisation) - a surprising finding given the strength of local level identity politics in cities in Maharashtra. Participation in civic/professional organisations in Mumbai is high when compared to other cities. Only Kochi scores higher (36%). Participation in identity-based organisations is among the lowest in Mumbai. Only Hyderabad and Chennai have a lower participation rate in these organisations.

Table 5.19: Civic Participation Sub-Index by Religion

City Name	Hindu	Muslim	Other
Mumbai	0.257	0.276	0.265
Bhavnagar	0.319	0.316	0.29
Ahmedabad	0.196	0.185	0.210
Chennai	0.241	0.174	0.205
Hyderabad	0.292	0.373	0.302
Kochi	0.295	0.277	0.242
Vadodara	0.333	0.293	0.260

Table 5.20: Comparative table with % participating in different types of organisations or associations

City	Identity-based	Civic/Professional	Does not participate	DK/RTA
Mumbai	11%	35%	49%	5%
Bhavnagar	35%	15%	46%	16%
Ahmedabad	26%	17%	48%	12%
Chennai	9%	14%	45%	32%
Hyderabad	8%	19%	48%	27%
Kochi	23%	36%	33%	13%
Vadodara	51%	17%	34%	10%

However, when asked which organisations provide help with public services, about 33% point to identity based organisations, whereas only about 14% point to modern civic organisations (Table 5.21). Mumbai is a case where membership in the type of association appears to be inversely correlated with the perception that the same (type of) association provides public services. In all other cities, membership in a particular form of association (civic or otherwise) increases the likelihood that the member perceives the same organisation as also providing public services.

Table 5.21: Which organisation helps in providing public services?

City Name	Identity-based	Professional/Civic	DK/Can't Say/Refused
Mumbai	33%	14%	53%
Bhavnagar	29%	4%	67%
Ahmedabad	30%	13%	57%
Chennai	9%	17%	74%
Hyderabad	23%	28%	49%
Kochi	13%	14%	73%
Vadodara	34%	23%	44%

Civic participation does not vary significantly across social groups. We find very little difference across both caste and religious identity groups. Concerning class, respondents from lower housing types are slightly more likely to be engaged in civic matters than those from higher housing types. More generally, civic participation lies between voting and non-voting participation.

5.4 Citizen Participation Index

We now examine the citizen participation index, an additive index that includes voting, non-voting political participation, and civic participation as its components, and summarise the patterns across class and other social characteristics. The aggregate citizen participation index for Mumbai (0.21) is also the lowest participation score across all cities (Table 5.22). The low level of aggregate participation we observe in Mumbai is a result of the low levels of participation across all three components of the index – voting, non-voting political participation, and civic participation. This contrasts with what we see in other cities, where voting dominates, and other components score relatively lower.

The OBCs score highest among caste groups in Mumbai on the overall index (Table 5.23). Dalits score slightly lower, and forward castes and Adivasis are both substantially lower. Recall that while Adivasis vote less, they tend to participate as much as forward castes in civic organisations and slightly more than forward castes in non-voting activities. Muslims and Hindus have almost identical scores on the overall index. Other religious identities show the highest level of citizen participation, and these religious groups consistently participate more than both Hindus and Muslims. This is clearly reflected in the citizen participation index (Table 5.24).

Table 5.22: Citizen Participation Index

Mumbai	0.207
Bhavnagar	0.397
Ahmedabad	0.318
Chennai	0.303
Hyderabad	0.350
Kochi	0.394
Vadodara	0.422

Table 5.23: Citizen Participation Index by Caste

City Name	Forward Caste	OBC	Dalit	Adivasi
Mumbai	0.184	0.302	0.252	0.173
Bhavnagar	0.397	0.398	0.39	0.424
Ahmedabad	0.298	0.353	0.249	0.294
Chennai	0.376	0.273	0.280	0.431
Hyderabad	0.388	0.390	0.317	0.402
Kochi	0.406	0.390	0.358	0.303
Vadodara	0.426	0.423	0.414	0.383

Table 5.24: Citizen Participation Index by Religion

City Name	Hindu	Muslim	Other
Mumbai	0.201	0.202	0.296
Bhavnagar	0.397	0.411	0.405
Ahmedabad	0.320	0.311	0.338
Chennai	0.307	0.265	0.300
Hyderabad	0.314	0.432	0.346
Kochi	0.417	0.374	0.373
Vadodara	0.424	0.418	0.390

Aggregate citizen participation across housing types indicates the highest scores for respondents from the upper class (0.30), followed by the informal slum settlements (0.23). Respondents from HT1, HT3, and HT4 exhibit similar levels of participation (ranging from 0.18 to 0.19) (Table 5.25). This again appears to be driven by the variation in voting and civic participation across housing types. In both the voting and civic participation components, we see a spike in participation among HT2 and HT5 respondents while the other housing types generally participate less. Having said this, compared to other cities, citizen participation in HT1 and HT2 is the lowest of any city.

Table 5.25: Citizen Participation Index (CPI) by Housing Type

City Name	HT 1 - Informal shack settlement	HT 2 - Informal slum settlement	HT 3 - Lower Middle Class	HT 4 - Upper Middle Class	HT 5 - Upper Class
Bhavnagar	0.357	0.415	0.402	0.399	0.382
Ahmedabad	0.219	0.267	0.274	0.347	0.370
Chennai	0.385	0.320	0.292	0.312	0.374
Hyderabad	0.363	0.376	0.344	0.321	0.309
Kochi	0.354	0.398	0.404	0.377	0.399
Mumbai	0.191	0.228	0.180	0.194	0.298
Vadodara	0.294	0.415	0.416	0.420	0.474

6. Services

We develop an additive index to explain the level of services for our city. The basic Service Delivery and Infrastructure Index (BSDII) covers water, electricity, sanitation, flooding, and road infrastructure. The details on how this index was created is given in Appendix 3. The aggregate BSDII index is ranked from 0 to 1, where a score of zero means the household has inadequate services, i.e. water is neither from a piped source nor is it available inside premises, is of general use, and has to be stored. Furthermore, the household has no electricity and no toilets on premises, and members defecate in the open, in addition to waterlogging during monsoons and having a *kutcha* road in front of the house. On the other hand, a score of one means best services - piped water within premises available 24 hours a day, and a toilet facility connected to a sewer line with no blockages and no flooding during monsoons. In addition, this household will have 24 hours electricity availability with no power cuts, and the road infrastructure would be good.

Table 6.1: Basic Serve Delivery and Infrastructure Index (BDSII)

City	BSDII Score (0 -1 Scale)
Vadodara	0.907
Kochi	0.904
Bhavnagar	0.880
Ahmedabad	0.855
Hyderabad	0.814
Mumbai	0.768
Chennai	0.743

Given the above, Mumbai, with 0.768 is second from the lowest, with Chennai being the last in terms of the aggregate (Table 6.1). Mumbai's housing stock and the kind of services available, particularly in sanitation drive this score. On disaggregating the index, we find that housing type greatly affects the BSDII index.

Table 6.2: BSDII by Housing, Religion and Caste: Mumbai

HT1 - shack	0.654
HT2 - slum	0.668
HT3 - middle class	0.936
HT4 - upper middle class	0.949
HT5 - upper class	0.96
Hindu	0.773
Muslim	0.746
Forward	0.786
OBC	0.744
Dalit	0.758
Adivasi	0.733

Housing types 1 and 2 (informal slums and shacks) have a BSDII index of .654 and .668 which jumps to .936 for the HT3 (middle-class housing) and above (Table 6.2 and Figure 6.1). It is essential to note the *variation in housing type*s in Mumbai, as shown in Figure 3. In both housing types 1 and 2 (informal housing), while the level of services is lower than the middle and above housing types, there is a lot of variation from the mean. The high variance in the slum like housing (HT2) compared to shacks (HT1) might be because shacks are almost always unrecognized and hence get poor services, whereas some slum like housing will be recognized slums that will get good services. Simply put, some households in informal housing receive services similar to those

in middle-class housing. This variation in services within informal housing in Mumbai suggests further analysis is necessary.

Figure 6.1: BSDII by Housing Type



6.1 Water

Piped water is nearly ubiquitous in Mumbai, with 96% of residents receiving their primary water supply in this way (Table 6.1). In our survey of cities, this is second only to Hyderabad. Even those living in informal settlements/shacks (HT1s) report receiving piped water at a rate of 90%, with the remainder of HT1s relying primarily on borewells or other well-water sources. Close to 100% of the other household types (HT2-HT5) receive their main water supply through piped water lines. There is little variation in water sources across religious groups, although the caste picture is a bit different. 92% of OBCs rely on piped water, with a nontrivial amount of these households (5.4%) depending on handpumps (Table 6.3).

Despite the prevalence of piped water in Mumbai, a relatively high number of households get their water from sources outside their house (18.8%). This high rate is driven almost entirely by those living in informal settlements or slums, where 31% and 27% of households get their water from outside their homes, whereas almost all residing in better-off housing types receive their water from an inside source. Muslims, Dalits, and Adivasis also fare worse than upper-castes, Hindus and OBCs in this regard (Table 6.4).

Table 6.3: What is the main source of water for members of your household?

City	Borewell	Hand pump	Other source	Tap (Piped)	Well
Mumbai	1%	1%	1%	96%	1%
Ahmedabad	10%	0%	2%	88%	0%
Bhavnagar	9%	1%	0%	90%	0%
Chennai	27%	18%	12%	40%	4%
Hyderabad	1%	0%	1%	98%	0%
Kochi	27%	0%	3%	67%	3%
Vadodara	2%	0%	3%	94%	0%

Table 6.4: What is the main source of water for members of your household?

	Borewell	Hand pump	Other source	Tap (Piped)	Well
Forward	1%	0%	0%	97%	1%
OBC	2%	5%	1%	92%	1%
Dalit	0%	NA	1%	97%	1%
Adivasi	NA	NA	1%	99%	NA

Table 6.5: Percentage of households with location of primary water source inside or outside the house

Housing Type	Inside	Outside
HT1 - Informal Shacks	69%	31%
HT2 - Slums	73%	27%
HT3 - Lower Middle Class	98%	2%
HT4 - Upper Middle Class	97%	3%
HT5 - Upper Class	100%	0%
Hindus	83.3%	16.6%
Muslims	73.5%	26.4%
Adivasi	70%	30%
Dalit	72.5%	27.4%
OBC	73.3%	26.6%
Forward	90.6%	9.3%
Overall	81.2%	18.8%

90% of the residents get water all seven days a week (Table 6.6). There is relatively little variation along religion or caste in this measure for Mumbai, although there exists a positive relationship between housing type and days of access per week (Table 6.7).

Table 6.6: Average days per week of water supply by City

City	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Mumbai	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	2%	6%	90%
Ahmedabad	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	98%
Bhavnagar	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	78%	19%
Chennai	0%	0%	2%	27%	16%	6%	1%	48%
Hyderabad	1%	1%	3%	43%	29%	19%	2%	2%
Kochi	0%	0%	0%	2%	8%	12%	9%	69%
Vadodara	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	98%

Table 6.7: Average days per week of water supply by Housing Type (Mumbai)

Housing Type	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
HT1 - Informal Shacks	0%	1%	0%	2%	2%	2%	5%	88%
HT2 - Slums	0%	0%	0%	2%	1%	3%	9%	85%
HT3 - Lower Middle Class	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	97%
HT4 - Upper Middle Class	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	7%	92%
HT5 - Upper Class	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%

While only about 10% of Mumbai gets water for all 24 hours of a day, the majority of our sample mentioned receiving at least 3 to 5 hours of water everyday (Table 6.8). Housing type plays a huge role here, with 71% of HT 5 getting anywhere between 11-24 hours of water a day, more than 40 percentage points higher than the next highest (HT4 - upper-middle class). In terms of religion, 10.8% Hindus report 24-hour access, which is twice as much as for Muslims (5.4%). There is only minor variation in water availability by caste group, although Dalits/Adivasis actually report slightly higher rates of 24-hour water than forward castes or OBCs.

According to the officials, Mumbai has piped water for 99% of its population/area. On the question about why some parts of the cities get only 2 hours of water and others do not, the officer in charge said, "…this comes through the reservoir and goes to several reservoirs and is supplied to several zones. There are different outflow and outgrow. It's a technical issue…"[44] A sitting MCGM corporator, however, points to institutional disparity built into access to water services in the city. For instance, the M-East ward was getting only 9 MLD (million litres per day) of water which has

[44] Interaction with line department heads at MCGM.

now changed to 25 MLD. This, he says, is because of a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) he filed in 2009 arguing that there is a "right to life" in the Constitution – which can be extended to the "right to water".

Table 6.8: Average hours per day of water supply by housing type (Mumbai)

Mumbai	0-1	1-2	3-5	6-10	11-24
HT1 - Informal Shacks	8%	12%	43%	17%	20%
HT2 - Slums	5%	23%	39%	11%	22%
HT3 - Lower Middle Class	4%	13%	42%	17%	24%
HT4 - Upper Middle Class	0%	6%	38%	23%	32%
HT5 - Upper Class	1%	2%	11%	14%	71%

For those with limited daily access, storage becomes essential. When water services are generally measured in India, for example in the census, questions are limited to the type of delivery and whether it is in or outside the premises. Yet, water storage is key to ensuring easy access to water when delivery is so limited. So, as part of our survey, we also measured the quality of storage. The proportion of respondents in Mumbai who have a storage system - 66% - is the lowest in our sample by a substantial margin (Table 6.9). Of those who have storage, 90% rely on small, medium or large drums, with no pump attached. This is the highest of any city, and suggests that for many storing water in Mumbai is done through very rudimentary means.

Low storage in Mumbai could be a function of "less variation" in water availability. Since piped water is ubiquitous and most respondents get water seven days a week for an average of three to five hours, storage is not required. Additionally, given the competition for space, particularly in informal settlements, low storage is understandable.

Table 6.9: Water Storage in our cities

	Mumbai	Vadodara	Bhavnagar	Ahmedabad	Chennai	Hyderabad	Kochi
Yes, we do have secondary water storage	66%	96%	97%	79%	90%	93%	91%
Movable containers (small sized)	47.8%	18%	50%	22%	24%	26%	6%
Drum (medium sized)	43%	26%	10%	45%	43%	37%	10%
Large Tank/Drum without motorised pump	11%	39%	42%	21%	17%	30%	30%
Large Tank/Drum with motorised pump	12%	46%	67%	24%	23%	26%	NA

Only about 62% of residents identify the municipal corporation as the source of their primary water supply, with much of the remainder accounted for by self-provision through borewells (26%). There is relatively little difference across housing types. Muslims report higher rates of receiving water services through the municipal corporation than the Hindus (Table 6.10). The caste picture

is the most interesting, with a majority of Adivasis relying on self-provision of their primary water supply, compared to higher rates for all other caste groups. Mumbaikars also pay the most of any of our cities for water, and Adivasi's wind up paying the most of any caste group. Housing type also relates positively to the amount paid, with the implication that the rich pay a premium for improved water reliability and quality. Consumption levels among different income levels would also be a likely factor in this class differentiation.

Figure 6.2 - Water availability (hours) -All cities



Table 6.10: Water source by Religion & Caste (Mumbai)

Source	Hindu	Muslim	Forward Caste	OBC	Dalit	Adivasi
Corporation/Government	60%	68%	61%	66%	80%	27%
Private Sources (Private Tanker)	3%	2%	2%	3%	2%	4%
Self-provision (E.g. Bore-Well)	29%	19%	30%	23%	8%	54%
Tanker Licensed by Corporation	5%	4%	4%	6%	6%	11%
Other	0%	2%	0%	0%	1%	0%
Don't Know	2%	5%	2%	2%	4%	3%
Refused to answer	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

6.2 Sanitation

Access to household sanitation in Mumbai is starkly divided along class lines. In the aggregate, 58% rely on public latrines, and 1.11% defecate in the open. In aggregate, 59.96% use compromised sanitation in Mumbai, the highest of our cities - with Ahmedabad, which is next,

reporting only 9% of its citizens relying on public latrines (Figure 6.3)[45]. The balance in Mumbai indicated that they have flush toilets connected to a sewer system (31%) or a septic tank (8%). While very puzzling when considered at the city level, this astonishingly high number is driven almost entirely by those living in informal settlements (shacks or slums) - nearly all of whom indicate that they are reliant on public toilets (Table 6.11). By contrast, almost 100% of those living in improved housing types (in our case, HT3, HT4 and HT5 housing) have a toilet in their homes, connecting either to a sewer or septic tank. Also, 70% Muslims compared to 56% Hindus have recourse only to a public toilet.

The sharp class differentiation here by housing type is remarkable and requires explanation. Mumbai is well-known for the scale of the community toilet program supported by local government, much of it undertaken in partnership with community-based organizations, including the National Slum Dwellers Federation, Mahila Milan (a federation of women's savings groups), and SPARC (a local NGO), together known as the Alliance (Patel, 2015). Since 1991, the alliance in partnership with the Mumbai city corporation sought city-wide construction of public toilets followed by a system to monitor conditions in the hundreds of community toilet blocks so built. Census data from 1991-2011 also shows that Mumbai saw the sharpest decrease in open defecation due to public toilet construction.

Figure 6.3: Sanitation Across Cities



[45] We make use of the WHO-UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme guidelines for Water and Sanitation for Sustainable Development Goals in defining compromised and good sanitation. Good sanitation are those facilities which can be serviced (de-sludged like septic tank or covered or ventilated pit latrines) for proper treatment of wastewater. Improved sanitation facilities are those designed to hygienically separate excreta from human contact which makes open defecation, public latrine, open pit latrine, flush/pour latrine not connected to a sewer line i.e. waste flowing into ground or into water body through covered drain or uncovered drain all - unimproved or compromised sanitation. For more read (Page 8, 16) Progress on drinking water, sanitation and hygiene: 2017 update and SDG baselines. Geneva: World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 2017. Licence: CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO.

Table 6.11: Household sanitation by housing type (Mumbai)

	Type	HT1 - shacks	HT2 - slums	HT3 - middle class	HT4 - upper middle	HT5 - upper class
Good	Piped sewer	1%	5%	74%	80%	81%
	Septic tank	0%	1%	25%	19%	19%
Compromised	Public latrine	94%	92%	0%	0%	0%
	Open defecation	3%	1%	0%	0%	0%
	Open drainage	0%	1%	1%	0%	0%

Table 6.12: Does the sewer line in or near your house get blocked?

City	Yes	No	DK/RTA
Mumbai	20%	79%	1%
Ahmedabad	39%	60%	1%
Bhavnagar	29%	71%	0%
Chennai	37%	62%	1%
Hyderabad	42%	57%	1%
Kochi	4%	95%	1%
Vadodara	15%	76%	9%

We see the typical class-based pattern of infrastructure differentiation persisting in Mumbai. Overall 77% of Mumbai has pakka road and 23% have kutcha road. Around 34% of HT1s and HT2s have *kutcha* roads in front of their houses, compared to upwards of 90% of HT3s-HT5s having *pakka* roads (Table 6.13). Hindus also report somewhat higher road quality than Muslims, although caste seems to make little to no difference. The same can be said about the reported condition of roads, and a majority of all caste groups report that the state of the roads near their homes is in “excellent” or “good” condition. The same trends are also reflected in reported rates of road waterlogging during the monsoon season, in addition to ground floor flooding.

Table 6.13: Road type by housing type (Mumbai)

	Pakka	Kutcha
HT1 - shacks	66%	34%
HT2 - slums	66%	34%
HT3 - middle class	91%	9%
HT4 - upper middle	99%	1%
HT5 - rich	99%	1%

Garbage collection in the city is split between very frequent collection and complete absence compared to other cities in our sample (Table 6.14). While regular trash collection is the norm in Mumbai, those living in shacks and slums are much more likely to report that their waste is never collected than those in improved housing. 25% of those in shacks and 17% of slum residents report that their garbage is never collected (Table 6.15).

Table 6.14: Frequency of garbage collection by city

City	More than once a day	Once a day	Several times a week	Once a week	Less frequently than once a week	Don't Know	Never	Refused to answer
Mumbai	29%	49%	5%	1%	0%	1%	15%	0%
Ahmedabad	10%	78%	4%	2%	1%	0%	5%	0%
Bhavnagar	2%	87%	6%	2%	0%	0%	2%	NA
Chennai	12%	71%	9%	5%	2%	0%	1%	0%
Hyderabad	1%	63%	22%	5%	4%	1%	5%	0%
Kochi	6%	29%	44%	5%	0%	0%	15%	0%
Vadodara	2%	71%	18%	2%	2%	0%	5%	0%

Table 6.15: Respondents whose garbage is 'never' collected by housing type

City	HT1-shacks	HT2 - slums	HT3-middle class	HT4-upper middle class	HT5 - rich
Mumbai	25%	17%	4%	7%	1%
Ahmedabad	70%	10%	2%	3%	1%
Bhavnagar	29%	14%	4%	0%	1%
Chennai	3%	1%	1%	2%	1%
Hyderabad	67%	5%	4%	2%	2%
Kochi	NA	41%	26%	22%	8%
Vadodara	48%	14%	8%	4%	1%

Muslims also report less frequent garbage collection than Hindus. Caste seems to play little role. The same trends extend to the convenience of waste collection, in the sense that those in worse-off housing must travel farther to dispose off their waste for pickup, as do Muslims. And compared to other cities, Mumbai has the third highest proportion of residents who report that their garbage is collected outside of their neighbourhood (Table 6.16 and 6.17). Payments for trash collection in Mumbai are the second-lowest of any city in our study (except for Chennai). Most of these payments are given to the municipal corporation, although a private collection seems somewhat common across housing types and particularly so for Muslims (23% of whom report payments to

private waste collectors, compared to only 7% of Hindus). Payments to intermediaries make up a stable 5-10% of trash payment recipients (Table 6.18).

Table 6.16: Frequency of garbage collection by housing type (Mumbai)

	HT1-shacks	HT2 - slums	HT3-middle class	HT4-upper middle class	HT5 - rich
More than once a day	24%	31%	27%	30%	42%
Once a day	45%	44%	61%	57%	57%
Several times a week	3%	7%	6%	5%	NA
Once a week	2%	1%	1%	0%	NA
Less frequently than once a week	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Don’t Know	1%	0%	0%	2%	NA
Never	25%	17%	4%	7%	1%
Refused to answer	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

Table 6.17: Location of garbage collection by city

City	At my door	Outside the household
Mumbai	65%	35%
Ahmedabad	58%	42%
Bhavnagar	66%	34%
Chennai	55%	45%
Hyderabad	96%	4%
Kochi	93%	7%
Vadodara	69%	31%

Outside the household means - “At the end of the street in my neighborhood/Within my neighborhood" and "Outside my neighborhood."

Table 6.18: Who do you pay most of your garbage pickup charges to? (Mumbai)

Religion	Government/Municipal Office	Private party/contractor/worker	Intermediary	Other
Hindu	82%	10%	5%	3%
Muslim	62%	26%	8%	4%
Other	86%	5%	7%	1%

Insights from the Field - Mumbai

McFarlane (2008) believes that slum people are not treated as 'proper citizens' and that there is a fundamental policy - he calls it "administrative ambivalence" – at play. On the one hand, authorities are constrained by a legal compulsion where "a full recognition of the legitimacy of informal settlement would undermine and threaten the structure of legally held property". But, on the other hand, this contradicts with the everyday reality where authorities do have important social, economic and political reasons to provide services to the poor, ranging from ethnic ties, the availability of low-cost labour and the readiness of poor people to vote for particular political candidates. As a result, a range of services and facilities are extended on an ad hoc, or exceptional basis, without jeopardising the overall structure of legality and property.' To discuss the ad hoc provision of services, we provide insights from our focus group discussions held in December 2018 in the Ghatkopar, Dharavi and Santa Cruz (E) areas of Mumbai.

Most of our respondents migrated from nearby areas within and outside Maharashtra. They have under twelve years of education and live in housing consisting of *Chawl* and other informal slum/shack tenements. Most have a one room dwelling, which usually has four members. In Ghatkopar, all our respondents were women and housewives. In Santa Cruz E Ward, we had male and female respondents, mainly engaging in informal jobs (mason, tailor, housework).

Most households have access to piped water. In Ghatkopar, all the chawl dwellers were getting water, but the adjoining Jhuggi Jhopri (JJ) dwellers had to collect water from the chawl area. Water connection is variable – in Ghatkopar, it is shared by four households (HH), but in some places was shared by 12 HH. In contrast, in Santa Cruz E Ward, 4 HH shared one connection, and some even have individual connections outside their house. The water pressure was fine for the ground floor, but for "+1 housing", they were using water pumps. Water is clean, however, "in May and June or, more broadly, during monsoon, the water is dirty". The communities in both areas self-regulate lines to fill water buckets and pots. As our survey also indicated, there has not been a water problem in recent times (we inquired if they have faced water problems in the last year). Both places reported that if faced with water issues, they buy packaged water bottles. While generally rare for slum persons to visit a ward or other agency office, in case of a prolonged water crisis, a group of aggrieved dwellers go to the Corporator (*Nagar-sewak*) who usually knows what is going on; and expedites the solution of their grievances. Chawls in Ghatkopar get no water bill, but the Jhopar Patti (JJC) pays about INR 100 per household. In

Santa Cruz E Ward, they all have water metres, and they get a three-month bill of around INR 700, which is split primarily by three households.

The quality of sanitation in our sites was invariably compromised. As is also reflected in our survey, none of our respondents who live in informal settlements had an individual household toilet. Instead, they all use the community toilets, which the MCGM and the *Nagar Sewak* have set up. If the toilets do not have water, the respondents take buckets with them. An MCGM worker comes in about 15 days to clean the toilet; the access to the toilet in Ghatkopar is free, however, in Santa Cruz E Ward, people were paying variable amounts (anywhere between INR 30-50 a month) for accessing community toilets. They went to the MCGM office (N Ward) to demand toilets, but the lack of space and gradient meant that individual toilets were denied. Corporator (*Nagar Sewak*), though, helps them out if there is a sewerage problem in the area by calling the MCGM staff and machines.

Most services are accessed through the *Nagar Sewak*. In Ghatkopar, it is Rupali Suresh of the Shiv Sena, who is the current corporator and Suresh Awde, her husband, was the corporator before her. This ward, before the couple, was represented by an NCP member who is still very active in the ward. In Santa Cruz E Ward, the corporator is from Shiv Sena and has been doing good work in the area, including providing *silai* (sewing) machines to women in the ward. Our respondents were unanimous in mentioning that the corporator is most essential, and then the MLA, followed by the MP. People attributed corporators criticality in everyday functioning because they approached them for the gutter line or *gali safai*, and sewerage.

Poor people not only face access problems to claim entitlements; they are also not treated well by MCGM and other (e.g. PDS, SRS) officials. Our focus group discussions were close to municipal hospitals – Rajawadi in Ghatkopar and Santa Cruz E Ward. The respondents relied on the local clinic where the medicine is free for minor medical issues. People go to a private hospital so that they can get quicker services. They believe that the Municipality hospitals have better services than private ones, but the "treatment from staff and nurses is bad". This discrimination from the health staff was reported in both Ghatkopar and Santa Cruz E Ward, confirming findings from other research (Siddiqui and Bhowmik 2004) that the MCGM office bearers hold strongly negative attitudes towards the poor (and the women).

Ghatkopar field site mostly had Dalits who are Buddhists. For them, the biggest event of the year is Ambedkar Jayanti; while other festivals are also celebrated. Santa Cruz E Ward was more mixed with Hindus and Muslims staying next to each other. Most respondents did not approve of inter-religious marriages and told us that inter-religious weddings did not work. Others,

however, believed that if their children decided to marry outside their religion or caste, they had very little say in it. Unlike in our survey, our respondents did not report discrimination from the police; however, in earlier conversations, they alleged discrimination in the hospitals by staff members.

Imperative here to include our conversation with a sitting corporator, who said, "I have never seen any discrimination at the micro level in Mumbai in 7 years. M East (the ward they represents), with the largest slum and Muslim population, has the biggest fund allocation in the development work. 3.5 lakh children in the municipality schools are still being taught in Urdu. "

6.3 Summary

Given Mumbai's population and city governments' capacity, the city's citizens, relative to other big cities in our study, receive better services. However, where you live in Mumbai is the most evident determinant of the kind of services you get. Those who live in the middle class-and-above housing types have dramatically different access to services than others. Those in informal housing have access to inadequate sanitation, lower water availability in terms of hours and days, rare garbage collection and more waterlogging during the monsoon. Our aggregate index, the BSDII, attests to class (as defined by housing type) as the most significant predictor of the services in Mumbai. It is also important to note the variation in services within housing types - while informal housing in Mumbai has low service quality, there is significant variation from the mean, implying reasonably good services in some informal settlements.

7. Discrimination, Networks, and Social Ties

We know that there is a lot of inequality in Indian cities, including pronounced patterns of spatial exclusion (Bharathi et al 2018) (Heller, 2015) (Singh, 2019). Inequality does not just happen. It is created through specific practices through which groups hoard resources or through which other groups are excluded from accessing resources. As we have seen in the previous section, the level of services that households get varies across social categories. If you live in an HT1 or HT2 settlement, you are less likely to get quality services. We now look at discrimination between groups and by state actors, how citizens might use personal networks to access the state and the degree to which social ties might reproduce social categories.

7.1 Discrimination

We asked a series of questions designed to measure discrimination or preferential treatment. Specifically, we asked respondents to tell us how they thought the police and government officials treated people based on income, caste, religion, gender and language. We then asked if respondents felt that any of these categories got better treatment in their neighbourhoods and at the level of the city.

Our findings from the survey about discrimination in Mumbai give evidence to a stronger and more group differentiation. We first look at perceptions of police discrimination (Table 7.1). 34% of respondents indicate that the police will treat a rich person better. Also, 33% think an upper caste person would be treated better than Dalits - the highest in our cities. Similarly, 22% think Hindus are treated better than Muslims - again highest in our study. Nearly 43% of HT1s report that the rich are treated better than the poor (Table 7.2). This trend is amplified when it comes to caste: almost half of HT1s think the police treat forward castes better than Dalits, decreasing as one moves up housing types. There is relatively little disagreement between caste groups on discrimination by the police.

Table 7.1: Citizen perception of discrimination by the police in their city (Percentage)

	Mumbai	Vadodara	Bhavnagar	Ahmedabad	Chennai	Hyderabad	Kochi
Rich Treated Better than poor	34%	25%	29%	23%	38%	10%	8%
Upper Caste Treated Better than Dalit	33%	17%	17%	16%	24%	5%	2%
Hindu Treated Better than Muslims	22%	10%	10%	6%	10%	3%	0%
Person speaking local language is treated better	2%	3%	3%	2%	4%	1%	0%

Table 7.2: Respondents saying 'Yes' to different types of discrimination from Police - Mumbai

	HT 1 - Informal shack	HT 2 - Informal slum	HT 3 - Lower Middle Class	HT 4 - Upper Middle Class	HT 5 - Upper Class
Rich Treated Better than poor	43%	35%	30%	25%	6%
Upper Caste Treated Better than Dalit	47%	31%	32%	22%	11%
Hindu Treated Better than Muslims	26%	23%	20%	16%	2%
Person who speaks local language is treated better that native	46%	34%	37%	32%	11%

Table 7.3: Who do you think the police will treat better: Hindus or Muslim?

City	Religion	Hindu treated better	Non-Hindu treated better	Both treated the same	Don't know
Ahmedabad	Hindu	7%	2%	74%	17%
Ahmedabad	Muslim	7%	1%	82%	10%
Bhavnagar	Hindu	7%	1%	86%	5%
Bhavnagar	Muslim	4%	NA	90%	7%
Chennai	Hindu	10%	2%	77%	10%
Chennai	Muslim	8%	2%	79%	11%
Hyderabad	Hindu	4%	1%	90%	5%
Hyderabad	Muslim	1%	0%	97%	2%
Kochi	Hindu	0%	0%	96%	3%
Kochi	Muslim	NA	0%	86%	13%
Mumbai	Hindu	20%	1%	71%	7%
Mumbai	Muslim	36%	3%	51%	8%
Vadodara	Hindu	9%	2%	79%	10%
Vadodara	Muslim	9%	0%	86%	4%

On the issue of religion, the results need discussion. Mumbai numbers indicate that police are seen as the most prejudiced against Muslims out of all our cities, with the next three cities of Vadodara, Bhavnagar and Chennai saying this only 10% of the time (Table 7.1). 35% of Muslims in Mumbai say the police treat Hindus better, and only about half think that Hindus and Muslims are treated equally by the police (Table 7.3). Both these numbers are exceptional for our cities in this study. Again, the class-based pattern (as reflected through housing type) persists - those in worse-off housing types report higher levels of belief in police discrimination in all measures than those in better-off housing. Respondents are highly divided on the issue of police discrimination when it comes to gender. A full 37.1% of Muslims in Mumbai think that women are treated better by the police than men (12.2%). All caste groups report a strong pro-woman bias in police treatment, except for forward castes.

Figure 7.1: Respondents reporting “yes” to Neighborhood level discrimination by type



Figure 7.2: Respondents reporting ‘Yes’ to City level discrimination by type



Moving beyond the police, we also asked about discrimination at the neighborhood and at the city level.At the neighborhood level, however, reported levels of discrimination are generally the lowest of all cities in our study except for Kochi (Table 7.4).

Table 7.4: Respondents reporting 'yes' to Neighbourhood-level discrimination by type

City	Caste	Religion	Gender	Income	Language
Mumbai	4%	3%	2%	2%	2%
Vadodara	15%	18%	13%	11%	21%
Bhavnagar	3%	2%	1%	1%	1%
Ahmedabad	8%	8%	6%	7%	6%
Chennai	14%	12%	12%	11%	11%
Hyderabad	16%	13%	11%	12%	12%
Kochi	3%	2%	1%	1%	1%

The picture is a bit different when we look at city-level discrimination. Caste-based discrimination is reported at a relatively high rate of 14% (Table 7.5). Curiously, it is those belonging to forward castes (Table 7.4) who report the highest levels of discrimination based on caste at the city level (15.4%), compared to much lower rates for OBCs (8.1%), Dalits, (8.4%), and Adivasis (3.9%). Gender-based discrimination is perceived as low in the city, with all subgroups numbering in the single-digits for this measure.

Table 7.5: Respondents reporting 'Yes' to City-level discrimination by type

City	Caste	Religion	Gender	Income	Language
Mumbai	14%	18%	3%	3%	3%
Vadodara	16%	20%	13%	12%	22%
Bhavnagar	3%	3%	3%	4%	2%
Ahmedabad	11%	13%	9%	11%	8%
Chennai	14%	14%	13%	12%	12%
Hyderabad	12%	12%	12%	12%	11%
Kochi	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%

Table 7.6: Reported City-level Caste Discrimination by Caste (Mumbai)

Caste	Yes	No	Don't Know	Refused to answer
Forward	15.42%	82.79%	1.47%	0.32%
OBC	8.11%	87.53%	3.59%	0.77%
Dalit	8.42%	88.80%	2.78%	NA
Adivasi	3.92%	92.21%	3.23%	0.64%

7.2 Social ties

To what extent are the lives of urban Indians marked by "strong ties" (that is ties defined by primary identities) and to what extent are they defined by "weak ties" (social connections that go

beyond one's community)?[46] It is generally assumed that cities nurture a plurality of associational ties, giving individual opportunities to engage, and develop social ties, with those beyond their immediate identity group. We tried to gauge these questions by asking our respondents about their social ties, and specifically how many friends they had outside their caste/community and how often someone in their family had married outside their caste/community.

By these measures, Mumbai is not very pluralistic either in terms of caste. More than half (40%) of our respondents report not having any close friends from a different caste (Table 7.7). However, 36% in Mumbai report that they do not have any friend outside their religion (Table 7.8) which is better than outside caste friendship.

Table 7.7: How many of your friends are from a different caste?

City Name	0	1	2	3	4	5	Don't know	Refused to answer
Vadodara	57%	23%	8%	1%	0%	0%	6%	0%
Bhavnagar	47%	29%	12%	2%	0%	0%	6%	2%
Ahmedabad	67%	14%	8%	2%	0%	0%	6%	1%
Chennai	25%	21%	21%	4%	0%	0%	20%	10%
Hyderabad	43%	5%	11%	4%	0%	0%	27%	11%
Kochi	35%	24%	20%	6%	2%	2%	2%	8%
Mumbai	40%	7%	7%	5%	1%	1%	21%	19%

Table 7.8: How many of your friends are from a different religion?

City Name	0	1	2	3	4	5	Don't know	Refused to answer
Vadodara	57%	29%	10%	3%	0%	0%	2%	0%
Bhavnagar	31%	21%	29%	7%	1%	0%	7%	3%
Ahmedabad	64%	13%	10%	4%	1%	0%	5%	1%
Chennai	20%	14%	15%	2%	0%	0%	31%	17%
Hyderabad	41%	6%	11%	4%	0%	0%	25%	12%
Kochi	44%	22%	12%	3%	2%	2%	2%	13%
Mumbai	36%	10%	9%	8%	1%	3%	16%	18%

In Mumbai, marriage outside caste or religion is a rarity. Only 5% of the total respondents in Mumbai reported that within their family someone married outside their caste or religion (Table 7.9). Our focus group discussions made it clear that even among the poorer communities, marriage outside of one's caste is frowned upon. As some respondents said about their children getting married outside caste, "if they get married, they have to live on their own, not in my house". Similar disapproval is shown for inter-religious marriage. The general opinion is vehemently against it. "In our religion it is not allowed to marry someone from other religions." On this measure, Mumbai is no different than other cities. Indeed, outside of Chennai, we find very little evidence for inter-caste or inter-religion marriages.

[46] The concept of strong and weak ties is associated with Mark Grannovetter (1973).

Table 7.9: Within your family has anyone married outside caste/Religion?

City Name	Outside Caste	Outside Religion
Vadodara	4%	4%
Bhavnagar	0%	0%
Ahmedabad	4%	2%
Chennai	13%	10%
Hyderabad	7%	6%
Kochi	3%	1%
Mumbai	5%	4%

7.3 Summary

We can now summarize our findings. First, compared to other cities in our study, respondents report police discrimination at much higher rates in Mumbai. It is also significantly more tilted against the less privileged (the poor, Muslims and Dalits). Also, less priviledge groups identify much higher levels of discrimination against less privileged groups than the more privileged. We should however note the finding with respect to gender. In Mumbai, as in other cities, respondents generally feel that women are treated better by the police. Interestingly, we find little evidence of discriminaton at the neighbourhood level, in absolute terms and in comparative terms. We find somewhat higher levels of discrimination at the city level, but this does not stand out in comparative terms.

8. Conclusion

Any writing on Mumbai - its politics, governance and people- is bound to be contentious, yet it is an opportunity to engage with the machinations of how the city is governed. Despite all pressures, the city still functions - its trains run on time, rents are generated and invested back, those living in slums and informal housing have a say in the city's politics, which is highly contested, and its city corporation - the Brihan Mumbai Municipal Corporation, is the wealthiest in the country and a prized entity for political parties. This report, combining survey data and field insights - elite surveys and focus group discussions, is an effort to understand the machinations and the city's working.

Our report highlights the relationship between informality and the quality of citizenship in Mumbai. Though inadequate, public service provisioning in Mumbai is better than in other cities in our survey. 63% of our respondents stay in slum-type housing, which profoundly impacts the kind of services they receive. Where you live is the clearest indicator of the kind of services you get. For example, 94% of those in HT1 and 92% of those in HT2 have access to compromised sanitation, the highest for our cities; however, those living in HT3 housing and above have access to good sanitation and have piped water inside their premises. Our numbers for slums differ from that of the Census (42%), which, as discussed in section 3.1, is a definitional issue. Unlike the Census and the NSS, which have a "cluster threshold" for slums, our survey counts individual

households without any threshold for slum-like clusters. What is striking, though, is how integrated slums (HT2) and lower middle-class housing (HT3) are. Every group is very close to its baseline ratio, except OBCs, who are slightly over-represented. Less surprising is that all groups except forward castes are underrepresented in the upper middle class and upper class (HT4 and HT5) housing, with Muslims and Dalits, practically excluded from HT5.

Mumbai is home to political movements and a medley of parties, like the nativist Shiv Sena and its outfits, the Congress and its breakaway faction, the National Congress Party (NCP), Bharatiya Janata Party, Samajwadi party, Republican Party of India (A). The relationship between politics and the city also comes up in our report. For instance, a quarter of Mumbaikars, the highest of the cities in our survey, rely on their elected representatives to get things done but, critically, do not hold them in high esteem. The marginalised population comprising slum dwellers, Muslims and Dalits majorly think that the corporators in Mumbai are self-serving. Despite many political parties, Mumbaikars do not use their rights to associate, vote, participate, and engage with the state. With just 38% voting registrations, Mumbai ranks last on our list, with the informal settlements being least likely to register to vote. Given such low levels of registration for both natives and migrants, it comes as no surprise that electoral participation in Mumbai is the lowest across all cities. Another aspect of the state-society relationship is their views on social values. While Mumbai's views against inter-caste and inter-religious marriage are liberal on questions of freedom of speech, Mumbaikars are conservative. Therefore, compared to other cities, the citizens of Mumbai are socially liberal but politically conservative.

Finally, compared to other cities, respondents report discrimination at much higher rates and the police, in particular, is seen as a key source of discrimination. For example, 35% of Muslims in Mumbai say the police treat Hindus better, and only about half think that Hindus and Muslims are treated equally by the police. In addition, the poor, those in informal housing types, report higher levels of police discrimination than those in HT3 and above.

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