Citizenship, Inequality, and Urban Governance in India: Findings from Ahmedabad

About the Project

The Citizenship, Inequality, and Urban Governance (CIUG) Project is a collaborative project of academics in India and at Brown University. The project aims to systematically collect data on urban India, focusing in particular on assessing the quality of basic services and how urban Indian citizens use their civil, political, and social rights in cities.

About the Saxena Center for Contemporary South Asia

Based at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University, the Saxena Center for Contemporary South Asia (CCSA) supports faculty, graduate, and undergraduate research, as well as teaching on the region, and is home to the South Asian Studies concentration. The Center promotes research, teaching, and public engagement on modern South Asia's key issues in an interdisciplinary framework and in a historically and culturally grounded manner.

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Executive Summary

In Ahmedabad, we interviewed 3,018 citizens across 79 polling parts, conducted focus groups and interviewed a wide range of key respondents.

When we compare Ahmedabad to our other cities (Bhavnagar, Chennai, Hyderabad, Kochi, Mumbai and Vadodara), we find that Ahmedabad has a relatively high concentration of SC/STs living in informal settlements (i.e. shacks and slums). Close to half of SC/STs are concentrated in informal housing in Ahmedabad, a figure surpassed only by Mumbai and, in the case of STs, Vadodara. When we turn to religion, we find that the percentage of Muslims living in informal housing to be 12% more than for Hindus – an appreciable gap, but not the largest in our sample.

While the citizens of Ahmedabad rely more on corporators than other state actors to address their problems with services and generally have a favorable view of the work they do, they also rely heavily on "intermediaries." Moreover, residents of informal settlements (shacks and slums) have a very different view and experience of the local state. They don't have as favorable a view of corporators as the middle and upper classes and are far less likely to actually engage with their corporators directly.

Attitudes about citizenship in Ahmedabad tend to be somewhat conservative. Citizens see their responsibilities largely in terms of voting (and less to about respecting others or community engagement), they think people should not criticize the nation and a comparatively high number believe the state should prohibit inter-caste and inter-community marriage.

When we examine the nature of citizenship participation in Ahmedabad, we find that it is weak when compared to other cities and is highly differentiated, especially across class lines. In our overall citizen participation index, Ahmebabad received the second lowest score of our 7 cities, with only Mumbai scoring lower. The citizens of Ahmedabad are fairly good voters, turning out to vote in larger numbers than in other large cities (Hyderabad, Chennai, and Mumbai).

Beyond voting, Ahmedabadis are not very engaged. They have very low levels of participation in political activities other than voting and are also not very civically engaged. To the extent that they are civically engaged, there is a pronounced bias for identity-based forms of association, as opposed to more civic or voluntary associations.

Across all of our measures of citizen participation - voting, non-electoral, and civic - there is a persistent pattern of lower classes being much less involved than the upper classes. Indeed, the

inhabitants of informal settlements - both shacks and slums - are the least mobilized of any city in our sample except for Mumbai. We also find that OBCs are very active and that the gap between them and SC participation is the highest for all our cities.

We did not find a significant difference in citizen participation between Hindus and Muslims, although Muslims do vote somewhat less frequently than Hindus, in large part because they are less likely to be registered to vote.

In terms of our overall measure of the quality of services (the BSDII index), Ahmedabad ranks fourth in our seven-city survey but first amongst cities with populations greater than 5 million (including Chennai, Hyderabad and Mumbai).

When we look at the delivery of key services across social categories, there are very marked patterns of inequality. OBCs do extremely well in absolute and comparative terms, but Dalits and especially Adivasis are very marginalized. The class pattern is even sharper. The gap in service delivery between upper-class households and lower-class households is the largest of any of the seven cities we have examined so far.

When it comes to services, the condition of informal settlements is extremely bad and is by far the worst in our sample. The gap between Muslim and Hindu households in terms of access to services in Ahmedabad is not as pronounced as for class or caste, but it still remains one of the highest among our cities.

In terms of mechanisms of inequality, we find that there is a significant level of reported discrimination against the poor especially by the police, though 3 cities reported higher numbers. But when it comes to social ties, Ahmedbadis are the most parochial of our sample. We find that large majorities confine their social ties to their own castes and religious communities.

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1. Overview of the Project

One of India's greatest challenges in the 21st century is the governance of its cities. Primarily a rural nation thus far, India will be increasingly urban in the coming years and decades. Cities are, moreover, centers of innovation, opportunity and growth. But their full potential can only be achieved if they are well-governed. In any democracy, and especially in one as diverse as India's, the quality of governance is inextricably tied to whether citizens exercise their rights. A self-aware citizenry is more likely to produce better outcomes than an inert one.

With this understanding in mind, Brown University along with its partners in India developed a research project exploring urban governance and citizenship. The project aims to gather systematic and robust data on the relationship between citizenship, basic services, and infrastructure delivery in cities across India.

Our first report was on Bengaluru (Bertorelli et al. 2014; Heller et al. 2023). We have since conducted research in 14 other cities, including Ahmedabad. In this report, we provide a comprehensive overview of our findings from Ahmedabad. Where appropriate, we compare our findings for Ahmedabad to six other cities that were included in the first wave of the project. These include three megacities - Mumbai, Hyderabad, and Chennai - and three smaller cities – Bhavnagar, Kochi, and Vadodara. The findings are based on the joint team's extensive research, which included focus groups, key respondent interviews, and a large and comprehensive household survey.

1.1 Why Study Citizenship and Basic Services?

Citizenship rights are at the heart of democracy. The rights conferred upon citizens have both intrinsic and instrumental value. Citizens may value their rights as a recognition of their fundamental dignity as autonomous and legally equal individuals. But citizenship also empowers individuals to organize, to exert voice, to demand accountability, and to make substantive claims on the state. This ideal of citizenship is, however, contravened by social and institutional realities. Persistent material and status inequality mean that citizens' actual, as opposed to legal, rights can be highly differentiated, with some groups or classes being much better positioned to use their rights. And institutional weaknesses mean that the law and government bureaucracies can treat citizens quite differently. A growing body of research has, moreover, shown that the quality of

citizenship varies not only across countries but also across sub-national entities and cities (O'Donnell 2004; Baiocchi et al. 2011).

But what exactly does citizenship look like, and how can we assess it?

The classic theoretical statement on citizenship is Marshall's *Citizenship and Social Class* [1992 (1950)]. Marshall sought to divide citizenship into three components: civil, political, and social. The civil component referred to individual freedoms, such as the freedom of speech, religion, association, and the right to property, contracts and justice. The courts were the main institutions concerned with this aspect of citizenship. The political component of citizenship encompassed franchise as well as the right to run for office. The local governments and legislatures were the principal institutional arenas for these rights. The third, social, element of citizenship, was split by Marshall into two parts: (a) "the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security" and (b) "the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society" (Marshall 1992: 8). The so-called social services, especially (though not only) public provision of healthcare and education, were the institutions most closely associated with the third set of rights. This third aspect of citizenship, also called social citizenship, is also tied to the rise of a welfare state.

It is noteworthy that Marshall conceptualized the problem of deprivation entirely in class terms. It was the economically poor, who had "the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security" and "the right to share to the full in the social heritage." If the state did not guarantee such rights and make allocations for them through state-financed health, housing, and education schemes, markets would not provide them. Indeed, left unchecked, markets would deprive the poor of full citizenship. Markets might be consistent with political and civil citizenship, but they were certainly in conflict with social citizenship.

The relative neglect of non-class forms of exclusion, which, as we shall see, play a big role in India, comes with some other limitations of the Marshallian model. Most notably, Marshall conflated *rights-as-status* with *rights-as-practice*. All citizens are presumed to have the basic rights and the capacity to exercise free will, associate as they choose and vote for who and what they prefer. Unlike Marshall, Somers (1993) has argued that the conventional treatment wrongly equates the status of citizenship (a *bundle of rights*) with the practice of citizenship (a *set of relationships*). Formal rights matter, but formal rights must also be actionable. Somers goes on to argue that given the highly uneven rates of political participation and influence across social

categories that persist in richer democracies (especially the United States), the notion of citizenship should always be viewed as contested. But in the context of democracies in developing countries, where inequalities can be even higher and access to rights is also often circumscribed by social position and low overall literacy, or compromised by the state's institutional weaknesses, the problem can become even more serious (Heller, 2000; Mahajan, 1999; Fox, 1994).

Which communities of India, defined in non-class terms, experience truncated citizenship? Given what we know from existing studies, Dalits (Scheduled Castes, or SCs), Adivasis (Scheduled Tribes, or STs), Muslims and women are some of the obvious candidates for investigation. Also, relevant here is an Ambedkarite idea. He used to call the village a cesspool for Dalits and viewed the city as a site of potential emancipation. Is that true? Are cities sites where achievement and ability matter more than the social origin? Or do caste inequalities and discrimination (as well as other social markers) persist in urban India, compromising citizenship?[1] By definition, this question acquires significance in the study of citizenship in urban India.

We thus seek to go beyond Marshall and much of the contemporary literature on citizenship in two ways. First, Marshall's concentration is on class deprivation; we include non-class forms of deprivation – caste, religion and gender – as well. In the Indian context, these are important sources of social exclusion in their own right. Second, Marshall focuses on the legal availability of rights, not on how the legally enshrined rights are experienced on the ground. Our focus is less on the laws or rights in theory, more on the practices on the ground. Here we echo Somers (1993) and argue that the formal nature of citizenship, rights-as-status or the legal codification of basic rights of citizenship, should be analytically distinguished from its efficacy (rights-as-practice), that is, the degree to which a citizen can effectively use their rights independently of their social position and without compromising their ability to speak and organize freely.[2] There is no dispute as to the formal character of citizenship in India, at least with respect to basic civic and political rights. These are enshrined in the constitution, have been upheld by the courts and are the bread-and-butter of Indian democratic life[3]. Social rights in the Marshallian sense – right to food and education, if not health - have only recently come into play as formal rights of citizenship, although the principle of being able to deploy civic and political rights to demand social rights has been well established for some time.

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[1] For discrimination against Dalits in general, see Ahuja (2019).
[2] See Heller (2013) and Baiocchi, Heller and Silva (2011) for an elaboration.
[3] Of course, even these classic liberal rights have often been contested in India. For the performance of India's democracy on two different dimensions of democracy – electoral and liberal – see Varshney (2013, Ch. 1; 2019).

The effective dimension of citizenship is, in contrast, much less clear, and in fact, presents the central conceptual and empirical challenge of this study. How effectively do urban Indians use their rights to associate, vote, participate, and engage the state? There is certainly widespread recognition that India's citizenship is highly differentiated. Chatterjee's claim that the realm of civil society – the realm in which citizens use their rights – is largely the privileged domain of the middle classes and that the poor have only their electoral clout to work with has become a dominant argument in the literature (Chatterjee 2006). Is Chatterjee right? Do the poor exercise only political, not civil, rights?

We argue that effective citizenship means essentially two things. First, it means being able to effectively participate in public life. This cannot merely be confined to voting but means enjoying the freedom to engage in public activities, and mobilize and organize freely. We explore the participatory dimension of effective citizenship in the fifth section of this report. There we report our findings on both basic attitudes towards citizenship and a complex measure of the different dimensions of participation. Second, effective citizenship means actually being able to claim and obtain public goods from the state. The welfare state in the Indian context remains poorly developed, yet the state does provide key services such as water, sanitation, housing and transport that are critical to building basic capabilities of citizens.[4] The participatory and the substantive dimensions of effective citizenship stand in a potentially mutually reinforcing relationship to each other. More effective participatory citizenship can lead to better substantive provisioning of public services, which in turn enhances participatory capacity. A large body of research has documented the substantive impact of this demand-side of citizenship, linking more politically and civically engaged citizens with higher levels of welfare (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992; Esping-Anderson 1990; Putnam 1993, Baiocchi et al. 2011, Kruks-Wisner 2018).

In this report, we focus on basic services as a substantive goal and measure of effective citizenship for three reasons. First, either by law or by basic political pressure, all Indian cities are compelled to provide a modicum of basic services. In contrast to health and education, which are provided through a multiplicity of government agencies at different levels (local, state, central) and through different programs and allocations (e.g., specified subsidies or programs for specific groups), basic public services are generally provided by a single agency (municipal or state) and *in principle* on a universal basis. Second, access to basic services is critical to enhancing capabilities. Having clean and reliable water and sanitation, good transportation and decent housing are not only

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[4] We borrow the concept of capabilities from Amartya Sen.

directly supportive of better health and education, but they also allow urban citizens to make the most of the opportunities in cities. Conversely, rationing access to these basic amenities is arguably one of the most important basic sources of urban inequality, as witnessed by the perverse developmental effects of slums. Third, compared to other social rights, basic services are relatively easy to measure. In earlier work on Bengaluru, we have established a statistical relationship between our measures of citizenship and service delivery (Bertorelli et al. 2017). This report provides a descriptive analysis of service delivery and how it varies across social categories in Ahmedabad.

2. Ahmedabad: A Brief Historical Overview

Ahmedabad's governance is formally rooted in the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949. In 1949, Ahmedabad was part of the Bombay province, a British-era legacy. In 1960, the province was split into Maharashtra and Gujarat states. The 1949 Act has governed all large cities of the two states since Independence.

The Act divides the services of the municipal corporations into two parts: "obligatory" and "discretionary." The obligatory services cover water and sanitation, health & medical services, - including the prevention and control of infectious diseases, public education, construction and maintenance of markets and bridges, burial grounds and funeral houses, etc. Discretionary services include public transportation, the upkeep of gardens and parks, and the provision of low-cost housing for the poor.

Ahmedabad's 20th-century urban governance has a fabled history. The city was Mahatma Gandhi's adopted home from 1918 to 1930, though he never formally ran for municipal office. Instead, his deputy, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, a leading political figure in the first half of the 20th century, played a major formal role. Patel started his political career in Ahmedabad, an elected member of the municipality from 1917 to 1928, and its chairman during 1924-28. Patel sponsored increasing indigenization of the municipality, often challenging British control over municipal governance. Ahmedabad is generally viewed in India's urban history as a city that, after the 1919 municipal election reforms, led the drive for the indigenization of municipal power, using it for nationalist purposes. Patel played a significant role in that evolution.

Between the 1920s and 1960s, the major players in the city's governance were: Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC), Ahmedabad Millowners Association (AMA), the Textile Labor

Association (TLA) and the Congress party. The AMA and TLA were significant because Ahmedabad was a leading textile city of India. A preponderantly large part of the city's labor force used to work in the textile mills. In the mid-1960s, the 133,000 textile workers comprised a third of the city's total adult male population.[5]

The textile sector collapsed by the 1980s, which also led to a decline of the AMA and TLA. No single industry has replaced the textile mills. Rather, many newer industries, connected to global supply networks, have emerged, especially chemicals, pharmaceuticals, soaps, denim and diamond polishing. They have restored the city's status as an industrial city and placed it among India's richest.[6]

Some other new projects have transformed the city. Starting in 2003, Sabarmati Riverfront Development (SRD) altered the slum-based surroundings around the city's major river (Desai 2012). In 2010, the Ahmedabad Bus Rapid Transit System (BRTS) was born, with dedicated lanes for buses and clean fuel, becoming a pioneer of urban transport in the country (Verma and Priyadarshee 2015). The Vibrant Gujarat Summits, beginning in 2003, have sought to bring global investments to the city (Desai 2012). All of these newer efforts have been led by the BJP, which has replaced the Congress party as the leading political party in recent decades.[7]

Along with the modernization of the city's center, another development has been widely noted. A Hindu-Muslim polarization of the city has led to the emergence of heavily segregated urban spaces. Juhapura has become the largest Muslim ghetto of the city. It was born as a "relief colony" for slum dwellers fleeing the Sabarmati river's flooding in 1973. As Hindu-Muslim tensions and violence repeatedly rocked Ahmedabad,[8] Muslims, both poor and rich, left the city's traditional neighborhoods and sought safety in Juhapura, swelling its size and making it the largest center of Muslim living and commerce in Ahmedabad.[9]

With a population of 5.5 million (2011 census), Ahmedabad is the largest city in Gujarat (and the seventh-largest in India). Cities in Gujarat have long had more governance autonomy than is the

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[5] See Spodek (2011), p. 131.

[6] Three of the more recent histories of the city track these changes well: Bobbio (2015), Yagnik and Sheth (2011), and Spodek (2011).

[7] The BJP was first elected to municipal power in 1987.

[8] Ahmedabad's Hindu-Muslim relations have been analyzed in Varshney (2002), Chs. 9-11. For the impact of 2002 riots, see Yagnik and Sheth (2011).

[9] For more details about Juhapura, see Desai et al (2016).

norm in India. Based on the Bombay Municipal Act 1949, the Amdavad Municipal Corporation (AMC) and the Municipal Commissioner in Ahmedabad have a larger budget (INR 6000 crores or roughly USD 850 million in 2017) and more authority over key departments than is the case in most Indian cities. Unlike most cities in India, which are financially dependent on the sub-national state or the Central government for money, the AMC generates half of its budget via its municipal revenue (mostly based on property tax, non-tax revenue, and the *octroi* compensation funds, a statutory grant from the state government), and it was amongst the first to issue municipal bonds in India.

The city has been governed since 1987 by the BJP, which has also governed at the state level more or less continuously since 1995. And as the dominant city in one of India's most economically dynamic states (as measured by growth rates and per capita income), Ahmedabad is quite prosperous. We would, as such, expect Ahmedabad to be a relatively well-governed city with good services. Yet what we find is a mixed bag. In terms of our overall measure of the quality of services, Ahmedabad ranks fourth in our seven-city survey but first amongst cities with populations greater than 5 million (including Chennai, Hyderabad and Mumbai). Moreover, when we look at the delivery of key services across social categories, there are very marked patterns of inequality. OBCs do extremely well in absolute and comparative terms, but Dalits and especially Adivasis are very marginalized. The class pattern is even sharper. The gap in service delivery between upper-class households and lower-class households is the largest of any of the seven cities we have examined so far. The condition of informal settlements is extremely bad and is by far the worst in our sample. The gap between Muslim and Hindu households in terms of access to services in Ahmedabad is not as pronounced as for class or caste, but it still remains one of the highest among our cities.

When we examine the nature of citizenship in Ahmedabad, we find that it is weak when compared to other cities and is highly differentiated, especially across class lines. The citizens of Ahmedabad are fairly good voters, turning out to vote in larger numbers than in other large cities (Hyderabad, Chennai, and Mumbai). But beyond voting, Ahmedabadis are not very engaged. They have very low levels of participation in political activities other than voting and are also not very civically engaged. To the extent that they are civically engaged, there is a pronounced bias for identity-based forms of association, as opposed to more civic or voluntary associations. Across all of our measures of citizen participation - voting, non-electoral, and civic - there is a persistent pattern of lower classes being much less involved than the upper classes. Indeed, the inhabitants of informal settlements - both shacks and slums - are the least mobilized of any city in our sample except for

Mumbai. We also find that OBCs are very active and that the gap between them and SC participation is the highest for all our cities. Somewhat surprisingly, we did not find a significant difference in citizen participation between Hindus and Muslims, although Muslims do vote somewhat less frequently than Hindus, in large part because they are less likely to be registered to vote.

3. Methods and Data Collection

For every city studied in this project, we have followed a nested research strategy (Leiberman 2005). In each city, we began with field visits by the team in which we conducted interviews with key respondents (including the city commissioner, police commissioner, corporators, heads of departments, and civil society activists). These primary materials were supplemented with secondary works dealing with the historical and contemporary accounts of urban governance in the selected cities. With the help of NGOs, we also conducted 3-5 focus group discussions (FGDs) in each city in the informal settlements and slums. We focused on informal settlements and slums because they are where informality is the most pronounced and where the practice of citizenship and access to services are most compromised. FGDs were conducted in each city with different target groups. The group size in each FGD varied from 10 to 15 members. The FGDs were conducted with SC/ST women, Muslim women, and a mixed group of people, both male and female, typically from very low-income neighbourhoods (either notified or non-notified slum localities). We also felt it was important to hear directly from those who are the most marginalized in urban India. In each city, we conducted at least one focus group with Dalits, another with Muslims, and strove to include women participants.

The goal of the focus groups was twofold. The first point was to collect qualitative data on how citizens access services, how they engage with politicians and the state, how communities are organized, and how subaltern communities, in particular, understand their rights. The second was to use focus group responses to adapt and fine-tune our survey instrument to these communities' actual conditions and practices. In Ahmedabad, we held five focus group discussions (FGDs)[10]. Our focus was on Dalit and Muslim communities living in slums in particular. They sell fruit and vegetables, wash pots and pans, sweep floors in more affluent households, and generally engage in informal work of various kinds. The third stage of data collection was a survey, which provides

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[10] Four FGDs were held in Ahmedabad between 22nd and 25th August 2018. These were held in (1) Ram Wadilsanpur area, with Dalit women, (2) Ekta Nagar area, with Muslim women (3) Sanjay Nagar area with Traders and Small Merchants (men) and (4) Juhapura area with Muslim women.

the bulk of the statistics reported here. Depending on the size of the city, the sample ranged from 1,000 to 3,000 households. In Ahmedabad, we sampled 3,018 households.

Our design and sampling strategy enables us to generate a representative sample of households within a city stratified along caste, religion, and class dimensions. We elaborate on the methods we employed to create a sampling frame, select households, and respondents from within households (including the training process) in detail in Appendix 4. Before we present how the sample was drawn, we outline our measure of class as defined by housing types.

3.1 Measuring Class by Housing Type (HT)

Measuring class is a notoriously difficult proposition. There are definitional and measurement problems. Though we collected data on household assets, we decided that our Housing Type (HT) measure is the most reliable measure of class (See also Appendix 4 for additional details).

Conceptually, housing type conveys a very different material dimension of class than assets. Assets are, for the most part, procured on the market and directly reflect purchasing power — that is, income.[11] By contrast, access to housing in India is driven by market forces, highly regulated and sometimes directly supplied by the state, and shaped by social networks. As such, in addition to disposable income, housing type will also reflect one's location in both formal and informal networks of distribution, including access through state patronage, inherited position, strategic networks etc. In this sense, "housing type" is a much noisier proxy for class but is also more likely to capture the actual dynamics of class practices in an Indian city. Another key advantage of our HT variable is that it was not self-reported. Instead, field surveyors, after receiving extensive field training, were asked to classify every household in every polling part we sampled into one of five HTs. We confirmed a very robust record across surveyors of assigning classification from the pilots conducted in every city. The classifications were as follows:

HT 1: Informal settlement (shack)
HT 2: Informal settlement (slum)
HT 3: Lower middle-class housing
HT 4: Middle-class housing

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[11] Household assets may also be easily under or over-reported by respondents, leading to a biased measure of relative wealth. Using a non-self-reported measure such as housing type helps to remove such concerns.

HT 5: Upper-class housing

Detailed descriptions of each housing type and pictures showing examples of each classification are presented in [Appendix](#) 4. It is important to comment here on HT1 and HT2. The census definition of slums is dis-aggregated into three types: designated, recognized and identified. These designations are bureaucratic and political, and they are also inevitably somewhat arbitrary.[12] This is because they depend on varying definitions and on how officials subjectively evaluate the overall nature of a neighbourhood. Critics (Bhan and Jana 2013) have pointed out that the census definition suffers from two problems. First, many small shack settlements are often simply not counted in the census either because they don't meet a size threshold or simply have not been recognized. Second, many shacks or very poorly constructed houses that are located in non-slum neighborhoods are not counted as part of the slum population even though they may otherwise meet all the criteria for being slum-like. To correct for this, our classifications are based on the *housing type itself*, not on the status of the neighbourhood in which it is located (slum or other). Also, because of the problem of unseen or unnotified settlements, we also created a booster sample of informal shack settlements (see above). We classify both HT1 (shacks) and HT2 (slums) as "informal" to underscore the precarious and degraded nature of such housing but, to simplify, deploy the term "shacks" for HT1 and the term "informal slums" for HT2. We use the term "informal slum" so as not to confuse our category with the census categories of slums.

To reiterate, our categories of HT1 and HT2 refer to the *housing type*. They are both housing types that are clearly slum-like and categorized as such *whether or not* they are located in what the census designates as a slum. We note two possible sources of difference between our classification system and that of the census. First, as already noted, between classifying the housing type rather than the neighbourhood and having a booster sample for shacks, we believe we are capturing many slum-like households that are not captured in the census. Second, and going in the opposite direction, our classification would not designate as slum-like (HT1 or HT2) the many houses that are of higher quality (HT3 and even HT4) but that are sometimes located in areas that have been designated as slums by the Census. An obvious example would be Old Delhi: the dense conditions and poor overall infrastructure have produced an official recognition as a slum, but many of the

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[12] "Under Section-3 of the Slum Area Improvement and Clearance Act, 1956, slums have been defined as mainly those residential areas where dwellings are in any respect unfit for human habitation by reasons of dilapidation, overcrowding, faulty arrangements and designs of such buildings, narrowness or faulty arrangement of streets, lack of ventilation, light, sanitation facilities or any combination of these factors which are detrimental to safety, health and morals." (Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner, India, Primary Census Abstract for Slum, 2011). See also footnote 19.

houses located there are of the same quality as houses in non-slum areas and more properly designated as lower middle class (HT3) or middle class (HT4).

3.2 Household Survey

Developing a representative sample in Indian cities is a major challenge. First, there are no reliable baseline sampling frames from which to draw a representative sample. Second, the informal nature of many settlements in Indian cities poses the risk of undercounting certain populations, most notably those who live in shacks or other impermanent settings.[13] Third, as with any sample, for groups with only a small proportion of the total population (e.g., Adivasis), we run the risk of getting too few respondents for statistical analysis. To address these challenges, we developed a sampling strategy that stratifies the sampling frame based on Muslims and SC/STs, and we generated an additional frame to include informal settlements using a spatial strategy.

3.3 Classifying and Sampling Polling Parts

To sample respondents for the survey, we first identified the urban Assembly Constituencies (ACs) in each city and obtained lists of all polling parts in the wards that fall within these ACs. We chose to work with polling parts because these are identified and defined in all cities using the same methodology by the Election Commission of India. Furthermore, they can be geographically identified through information and maps on the electoral list, or if not, a landmark within them such as a Polling Station or police station.

We stratified the list of ACs/wards and polling parts based on the population distribution of SC/STs and Muslims to ensure sufficient coverage of SC/STs and Muslims. For SC/STs, this was done by using 2011 census data to identify wards with high SC/ST proportions. Religion is not reported at the ward level in the census, so we identified high proportion Muslim wards from key respondent interviews. Using a "proportion to size" approach, we then included a proportion of these high SC/ST and high Muslim wards in the overall set of wards from which we then randomly selected between 29-94 polling parts (city and sample-size dependent). Each polling part tends to have 300 to 350 households and around 1,000 to 1,400 constituents. In Ahmedabad, 73 polling parts were sampled this way.

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[13]This is confounded by erratic and unstructured planning generally across urban centres, with inconsistent door/road numbering, area demarcation etc.

3.4 Booster Sample

During the survey period, to boost the inclusion of citizens from lower socioeconomic classes, we decided to add a series of booster polling parts to the sample (over and above the polling parts mentioned above). This was for all cities except Mumbai. We did this by identifying areas with larger proportions of informal settlements, particularly shacks, through local knowledge and by searching on Google Earth, particularly for a visible blue tarp. The same process as described below was then applied, except only informal shack settlements were sampled, and slum informal settlements also in Kochi (where it was harder to locate shacks). An additional six polling parts were sampled in this way in Ahmedabad.

3.5 Listing Buildings in Sampled Polling Parts

For each polling part (PP), we used Google maps to pin the polling station location of each PP and create an area map of a 100-metre radius around this pin. Every structure - from shacks to buildings with multiple units, temples, malls, etc. - in the area covered by the base map was counted, listed and drawn onto the base map. Each *residential* building was assigned a housing type (HT) category. Other buildings or landmarks were listed as they were, such as a temple or a mall but not assigned a HT. For the full listing purpose, five categories of housing type were used: HT-1 (Shacks-Informal settlements), HT-2 (Slums-Informal settlements), HT-3 (Lower middle class), HT-4 (Middle class), and HT-5 (Upper-class housing). This listing and categorisation were done by a field team that walked through the entire area identified in the base maps and drew the buildings onto the base maps and assigned the housing type. The parameters used to decide on the housing type categories are outlined in Appendix 4 and for an example of the household listing for a PP, see Appendix 5.

3.6 Sampling Buildings and Households

Once the total number of buildings were counted, listed and given a housing type designation, a sampling interval was determined, and households were systematically sampled with a random start in each PP. The skipping pattern to decide which building was to be selected was based on the skipping number which was calculated using the total number of buildings in the area map of the city and the total number of households to be sampled from those buildings (one per building) in that area.

Once the building was selected, the interviewer had to achieve one interview from that building (i.e., one respondent from one household). If the building was a multi-storey building or an apartment like structure with multiple households, the interviewers had to follow the right-hand rule and select the block on their right side and start from the top floor of that block or building. Once inside, the field team had to approach the apartment nearest to the place they entered and move clockwise.

In the case of Ahmedabad, the total sample size was 3,018 households/respondents across 73 polling parts/areas (not including the booster sample). This came to around 41 households per area map. With an average of about 200 households per polling part, the skipping number in each polling part was around five households for Ahmedabad.

3.7 Sampling Respondents

For each household, a single respondent who was 18 years or older and lived in the city for at least a year was randomly selected. If an interview could not be obtained after three visits, an alternative respondent was identified through a protocol for household selection aligned with our sampling criteria. The survey instrument was digitized and available in three languages: Hindi, English and a regional language (Tamil, Telugu, Gujarati or Malayalam). In all, the survey took on average 45-60 minutes per respondent. All interviews were conducted by enumerators with the appropriate language qualifications and were trained through workshops and pilots conducted by our field team. The enumerators in each city were trained in three rounds. The first round of training happened in January, 2019 where city heads and managers were trained on the questionnaire and the field survey's nuances at a common location. They in turn, trained their local field staff in their respective cities. The second round of training happened in early February, 2019, where the project team traveled and trained the enumerators just before the pilot survey. The final round of training was done before the main survey commenced. Over 100 enumerators across seven cities were trained to conduct the listing and survey work. The Ahmedabad surveys were conducted between March and July of 2019.

4. Findings

4.1 Demography

For our survey in Ahmedabad, we interviewed 3,018 citizens across 79 polling parts. The survey response rate was extremely high, at 90%, with 323 instances of refusals/door locked on multiple visits. A comparison of data from Census 2011 with our samples (raw and weighted) is listed in Table 4.1. A breakup of sample proportion by education is reported in Tables 4.2.

Our survey collected demographic information on gender, religion, and caste groups. In addition, the survey enumerators were tasked with identifying the housing type of each respondent's dwelling. As reported above, dwellings were categorized as one of five types: shacks, slums, lower middle class, middle class and upper class (see note below for further detail). In the sample, shacks/slums were deliberately oversampled. This was done by including a "booster" sample, which was in addition to the original randomized sample. By oversampling the lower housing types, we may have also increased the sample proportions for Dalits (SC), Adivasis (ST) and Muslims. For instance, Muslims represent 22% of our sample compared to only 13.5% in the census. Similarly, Dalits comprise 11% of our sample compared to 10.6 in the census. Adivasis comprise 7.65% of our sample but are only 1.2% of the population in the census. Our sample also produced a much higher figure for slums. The census reports only 4.5% of households in Ahmedabad as being in slums. Our *weighted* sample finds that 26.9% of households are either shack or slum housing types. This suggests that the census *dramatically* undercounts slums in Ahmedabad. We are confident one of the reasons is definitional since the census does not count small clusters of households that are shacks or slum-like housing in areas not classified as slums[14]. But we also speculate that our sampling methodology captures areas that the census just misses because of their high degree of informality. It is also possible that our sample captures settlements

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[14] There is a definitional issue with what is regarded as a slum. Census 2011 enumerates slums as *Notified Slums* notified by a statute including Slum Acts or a *Recognised Slum* which may not be notified by a statute but recognised by state or local authorities and *Identified slum*. The Census enumeration defines a slum "of at least 300 residents or about 60-70 households of poorly built congested tenements, in-hygienic environments usually with inadequate infrastructure and lacking in proper sanitary and drinking facilities". The National Sample Survey however, defined the slum as a cluster of 20 or more households which is different from the Census. Scholars have argued these thresholds are "of course, a matter of concern not just for exclusions of households within cities but also of the exclusion of entire cities and towns that report having no slums" (Bhan and Jana 2013:16).

that have cropped up since the last census date (2011). If that latter point is true, it would indicate that the overall percentage of shack areas has increased significantly since 2011.

Table 4.1: Census and Sample Compared

	Population			Religion			SC/ST		Slum
Variable	**City**	**Male**	**Female**	**Hindu**	**Muslim**	**Others**	**SC**	**ST**	**Slum**
Census 2011	5,577,940	53%	47%	82%	14%	5%	11%	1%	4%
Raw Sample	3,018	55%	44%	76%	22%	3%	11%	8%	45%
Weighted Sample	3,018	53%	47%	77%	18%	0%	9%	5%	27%

Table 4.2: Caste proportions- All Cities

City	ST	SC	OBC	Forward Caste	Other
Bhavnagar	1%	6%	22%	71%	1%
Ahmedabad	5%	9%	38%	39%	9%
Chennai	4%	22%	52%	13%	10%
Hyderabad	10%	22%	44%	7%	16%
Kochi	2%	5%	60%	27%	6%
Mumbai	4%	12%	6%	68%	9%
Vadodara	2%	17%	25%	56%	0%

Table 4.3: Ahmedabad by Education

No Schooling	School: < 4 years	School: 5-9 years	School: SSC/HSC	College, but not graduated	College Graduate & Above
8%	7%	24%	36%	16%	10%

Table 4.4: Religion proportions- All Cities

City	Hindu	Muslim	Other
Bhavnagar	92%	5%	3%
Ahmedabad	77%	18%	5%
Chennai	87%	7%	6%
Hyderabad	68%	30%	2%

Kochi	49%	19%	32%
Mumbai	79%	15%	6%
Vadodara	88%	10%	2%

These are the raw figures from our sample, which over-represents Muslims, SC/STs and informal settlements. Our sample's advantage is that it ensures sufficient representation for groups that are often undercounted in a purely random sample. For instance, had we sampled using the Census figures, we would have only interviewed about 32 Adivasi households in Ahmedabad. Instead, we have 231 such households. We have, however, applied a weighting to our figures, which we use throughout this report.

4.2 Weighting

We have chosen to reweight the sample data according to the respondents' housing type. From our previous work, we know that our housing type measure is the most significant predictor among all our socioeconomic variables for levels of service delivery and citizenship. As a principle, weighting necessitates that there are reliable population margins for all categories of a variable upon which one seeks to adjust one's data (Wooldridge et al. 2015). Since we lack reliable population counts for OBCs and General/Forward castes (the census only reports SC/ST), we cannot adjust our data to correct for the over or undersampling of caste groups. Given the relatively poorer economic condition of many individuals belonging to SC/ST groups, we expect that weighting along housing type will reduce bias and make our sample more representative.

While the key purpose of weighting the estimates is to adjust for oversampling from HT1 households, we also use the same weights to ensure that the sample proportions for Dalits, Adivasis, and Muslims more closely match the population proportions for each city, as per Census figures. As noted earlier, the Ahmedabad sample yields a proportion of 11 percent for Dalits while the Census figure is 11 percent (Table 1). Similarly, while the Census figure for Adivasis is 1.2%, our sample contains 7.6 percent Adivasis. The difference between the sample and population for Muslims is about eight percentage points (the sample includes 22 percent Muslims while the Census figure is 14 percent). We expect the housing type weights to help adjust for the Dalit, Adivasi, and Muslimsin the sample because we expect a larger share of Dalits, Adivasis, and Muslims to be located in informal housing. However, we need to be clear that the weights are

expected to produce the most accurate adjustment if the difference between sample and population proportions of Dalits, Adivasis, and Muslims in our sample is entirely due to the HT1 oversample (i.e., housing type distribution, particularly, HT1 is concentrated among the Dalits, Adivasis, and Muslims). We expect the weights to be less precise if the housing types are distributed across all caste-community categories, i.e., when we cannot be certain if the differences in sample and population proportions of caste-community are from the other housing types in addition to HT 1.

In the case of Ahmedabad, we find that among Muslim households, about 50 percent fall in HT 1 and HT2 types. In the case of Adivasis, about 36 percent of households are of HT1 type. We are confident that the excess proportions of Adivasis are due to the oversample of HT1 housing. However, among Dalit households, only 5 percent are drawn from HT1 and about 57 percent from HT2 households. Therefore, we expect the weights to adjust somewhat better for Adivasi and less so Muslim. While we are aware that the housing weight is not a perfect substitute for caste or religion weights, we use them to make the sample as representative as possible, particularly for Dalit, Adivasi, and Muslim populations across these cities.

For Ahmedabad, there was little difference between the raw sample and weighted sample for SCs and both were close to the census number. Our raw sample did produce a much higher percentage of STs than the census. We believe this reflects the fact that the census systematically under-reports informal settlements where many STs are concentrated. We did not weigh on gender because the survey's focus is on the household rather than the individual level, and so should not significantly affect results. When we weighted our data by religion, we found that it did not significantly affect the reported results for a representative subset of the questionnaire. To develop the weights by housing type, we used our own listing data. The listing data (as explained above) are based on a full inventory of all the households located in the geographically delineated sections of our randomly selected polling parts. The listing data does not include the booster sample of informal settlements. A detailed note on our weighting strategy can be found in Appendix 1.

Given the debate on slums that we note earlier, we create an additional set of weights that use city-level slum household counts from the Primary Census Abstract (Census 2011, see footnote 15). These alternate census based weights serve both as a comparison to our listing weights as well as a robustness check. We use the latter here (only for Table 4.5) to examine how our sample adjustments align with the Census 2011 results, and use the listing weights for all other reported results.

4.3 Housing Type

In order to be consistent with other city reports, Table 4.5 exceptionally uses weights based on the census.[15] As Table 4.5 shows, when we weight by census data, 7.6% of households in Ahmedabad live in informal settlements, shacks and slums combined (HT1 and HT2). Earlier in Table 4.1, we found a figure of 27% based on listing data weights for HT1 and HT2. Both of our weightings generate a higher figure than the census figure of 4.5% for 2011. The discrepancy between the listing and the census adjusted weights reflects what we believe in the systematic undercounting of informal settlements in census data.

Using the census weights, Ahmedabad falls in the middle of the distribution, lower than Hyderabad and Mumbai, but higher than the other cities.

Table 4.5: Housing Type Distribution Across Cities – Census Weights

City	HT1 Shacks	HT2 Slums	HT3 - Lower Middle-Class	HT4 - Upper Middle-Class	HT5 - Upper-Class
Ahmedabad	1.6% (9.3%)	6.0% (35.9%)	40.6% (24.1%)	45.4% (27.0%)	6.4% (3.8%)
Bhavnagar	3.2% (8.6%)	11.4% (30.5%)	39.5% (28.2%)	29.4% (21%)	16.5% (11.8%)
Chennai	9.4% (9.9%)	19.7% (20.8%)	41.6% (40.7%)	24.2% (23.7%)	5.1% (5.0%)
Hyderabad	7.9% (9.1%)	27.5% (31.6%)	41.6% (38.1%)	15.9% (14.5%)	7.3% (6.7%)
Kochi	0.2% (4%)	1.2% (25%)	52.5% (37.9%)	13.0% (9.4%)	33.1% (24.0%)
Mumbai	23.1%	39.5%	16.8%	17.9%	2.7%
Vadodara	2.3% (11.9%)	5.7% (30%)	40.8% (25.8%)	42.9% (27%)	8.3% (5.2%)

Unweighted proportions in parentheses.

4.4 Sample Composition: Relationships between Class (Housing Type), Caste and Religion

As is true of cities worldwide, Indian cities are spatially segregated by class, caste and religion. There is emerging literature in India on spatial segregation, but the spatial analysis is often limited by the lack of data at the local level. Our data was collected at the polling part and we plan to conduct further research using this data on spatial inequality. Here we examine segregation based

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[15] For details of the use of census data for weighting in this table, see the report "Citizenship, Urban Governance and Inequality: A Study of Indian Cities," The Citizenship, Inequality and Urban Governance Project (CIUG), Saxena Center for Contemporary South Asia, Brown University, 2025, available at CIUG14Cities.

on housing type, which is our measure of class. Throughout the report, we break down all of our findings by class (housing types), caste and religious community, and when relevant, by gender, education and migration status. In this section, we look at the relationship between class, caste and religion.

Table 4.6: Distribution of caste and religious groups across housing types

Housing Type	ST	SC	OBC	Forward	Other	Hindu	Muslim	Other
HT1	5.7%	0.6%	0.4%	0.4%	3.2%	1.1%	0.7%	0.1%
HT2	38.0%	48.1%	29.0%	15.5%	31.4%	24.5%	37.6%	5.9%
HT3	12.0%	12.2%	8.8%	11.8%	19.2%	10.4%	18.1%	1.7%
HT4	41.0%	38.3%	60.2%	63.0%	42.9%	58.4%	42.7%	85.7%
HT5	3.4%	0.9%	1.6%	9.3%	3.2%	5.6%	0.9%	6.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 4.7: Proportion of Dalits/Adivasis in each city living in informal (HT1+HT2) housing

City	Caste Group	Total (Informal)
Kochi	OBC/Forward	5%
	Dalit/Adivasi	9%
Ahmedabad	OBC/Forward	23%
	Dalit/Adivasi	47%
Bhavnagar	OBC/Forward	9%
	Adivasi	6%
Chennai	OBC/Forward	10%
	Dalit/Adivasi	32%
Hyderabad	OBC/Forward	37%
	Dalit/Adivasi	29%
Mumbai	OBC/Forward	58%
	Dalit/Adivasi	73%
Vadodara	OBC/Forward	12%
	Dalit/Adivasi	17%

Table 4.6 looks at how caste groups, Muslims and Hindus, are distributed across housing types in Ahmedabad. It is clear that the lowest castes - STs and SCs - are most heavily concentrated in informal settlements. Nearly 44% of STs and 49% of SCs live in either HT1 or HT2 housing. Fewer than 4% of STs and 1% of SCs live in upper-class housing (HT5). OBCs are primarily located in upper middle class housing (HT4), though they do have a substantial presence in slums. Forward castes are the most likely group to occupy the highest two housing types and have the least presence in informal housing. There is, in sum, a very strong overlap of class and caste in Ahmedabad.

The distribution for religion is a bit more complicated. Muslims cluster in the middle three housing types, whereas the distribution for Hindus is more spread out, likely due to caste differences. Still, we find significantly higher percentages of Hindus than Muslims occupying the most privileged housing types (HT4 and 5). Notably, there are very few Muslims living in HT5.

Table 4.8: Proportion of Hindus/Muslims in each city living in informal housing

City	Religion	HT1	HT2	Total (Informal)	Muslims and Hindus Gap
Kochi	Hindu	0%	6%	6%	
	Muslim	0%	6%	6%	equal
	Christian	0%	4%	4%	
Mumbai	Hindu	21%	39%	60%	
	Muslim	35%	38%	73%	+ 13 Muslim
Ahmedabad	Hindu	1%	25%	26%	
	Muslim	1%	38%	38%	+ 12 Muslim
Bhavnagar	Hindu	0%	8%	8%	
	Muslim	0%	45%	45%	+ 37 Muslim
Chennai	Hindu	2%	13%	15%	
	Muslim	1%	6%	8%	+ 7 Hindu
Hyderabad	Hindu	2%	27%	29%	
	Muslim	0%	41%	42%	+ 13 Muslim
Vadodara	Hindu	0.5%	12%	12%	
	Muslim	0.1%	25%	25%	+ 13 Muslim

When we compare Ahmedabad to our other cities, we find that Ahmedabad has a relatively high concentration of SC/STs living in informal settlements (i.e. shacks and slums). As per Table 4.7, close to half of SC/STs are concentrated in informal housing in Ahmedabad, a figure surpassed only by Mumbai and, in the case of STs, Vadodara. When we turn to religion, we find there to be 12 percentage point discrepancy between the likelihood of Hindus and Muslims to reside in informal housing – an appreciable gap, but not the largest in our sample (Table 4.8).

We now present the same data, but this time we look at the *caste and religious composition of different housing types*. In other words, given that housing types are generally clustered together, just how diverse or homogenous are these settlements in terms of caste and religion? Conversely, how exclusionary might these types of settlements be? In Table 4.9, we report the percentage of a given housing type that are from a specific caste or religion.

Table 4.9: Composition of Housing Types by Caste and Religion in Ahmedabad

Housing type	HT1	HT2	HT3	HT4	HT5
	Caste				
ST	29%	8%	6%	4%	4%
SC	5%	19%	12%	7%	2%
OBC	17%	47%	34%	43%	13%
Forward	18%	26%	48%	47%	82%
Other	31%	12%	18%	7%	7%
	Religion				
Hindu	86%	73%	70%	79%	90%
Muslim	14%	26%	29%	14%	4%
Other	0%	1%	1%	7%	6%

Note: Green highlighted cells indicate the intensity of over-representation of each group. Red highlighted cells indicate the intensity of under-representation. Both are expressed as likelihood ratios. The numbers reported in this table are weighted proportions (using listing-based weights).

The percentages of each social category are given in the first column. The first thing to note is that informal settlements (i.e., clubbing together HT 1 and HT 2) in Ahmedabad are very diverse. Keeping in mind that we have four times as many FCs+OBCs (2,087) than we do SCs+STs (551), if we add the raw numbers for HT1 and HT2, we obtain the following percentages: 11% STs, 14% SCs, 36% OBCs, 22% FCs. In other words, every single social category (including Muslims)

represents at least 10% of the population of informal settlements.[16] In contrast, higher-level housing is very exclusionary. Forward castes dominate HT5 housing at 81.5% (despite being only 5% of the population), and SCs are virtually invisible at 1.9% of the HT5 population. HT4 and HT3 housing - the middle class - is also overwhelmingly OBC and FC, a combined 89% and 82%, respectively, above their percentage of the general population (combined 77%). Muslims have a very small presence in HT5 housing (3.5%) but a much more significant presence in HT4 housing at 14%. This undoubtedly reflects the significant historical role that the Muslim small business and trading community has played in the city's economic development.

When we put these findings into comparative perspective, it becomes clear that the caste and religious composition of settlements in Ahmedabad more or less reflects the overall urban pattern in India. Thus, for our seven cities, we find that, on average, informal settlements are highly diverse, as is lower middle-class housing (Table 4.10). In Ahmedabad, HT4 and HT5 are much more exclusive, dominated by OBC and FCs. Muslims have a significant presence in all housing types except HT5.

Table 4.10: Group Ratios of Housing Representation

Housing type	HT1	HT2	HT3	HT4	HT5
	Caste				
ST	2.32	0.87	0.82	0.75	0.93
SC	1.68	1.14	0.95	0.68	0.42
OBC	0.49	1.05	1.16	0.95	1.08
Forward	0.85	0.90	0.84	1.35	1.31
Other	1.48	0.96	1.12	0.69	0.73
	Religion				
Hindu	1.08	0.96	0.94	1.11	1.00
Muslim	0.71	1.26	1.26	0.57	0.50
Christian	0.89	0.84	1.02	0.84	2.21

Note: Green highlighted cells indicate the intensity of over-representation of each group. Red highlighted cells indicate the intensity of under-representation. Both are expressed as likelihood ratios.

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[16] We should note that 31% of those in HT1s did not report their religion or caste ("other") and that this is much higher than for other HTs. But this does not take away from the fact that every major social category in Ahmedabad has a significant presence in informal settlements, including forward castes.

4.5 Governance

4.5.1 Basic Issues of Governance

Before exploring citizenship and service delivery in Ahmedabad, it is important first to establish the nature of governance in the city. What specifically do urban residents think municipal governments should be doing and how are they doing it? We began by asking our respondents what the most important services that municipal governments should be providing are. Across our seven cities, a plurality of citizens believe that the most important service government should provide is water, including 25.9% in Ahmedabad. Clean air comes a close second in Ahmedabad (20.8%). This may reflect the fact that Ahmedabad has grown rapidly and is now one of the most polluted cities in India[17] (Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1: What is the most important service the government should provide?

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
[17] The WHO Global Ambient Air Quality Database compiles the database on pollution levels across the world. According to the 2018 (latest) database, 14 Indian cities figure in the list of world's 20 most polluted cities in terms of particulate matter PM2.5 levels. Ahmedabad ranks at 87 in the list of top 500 cities. See: https://www.who.int/airpollution/data/cities/en/ (accessed 11/04/2020).

In asking residents a series of questions about how they access services, one of the most striking findings is that the citizens of Ahmedabad rely heavily on local politicians.[18] As per Table 4.11, corporators are seen as being the most important for delivering public services (33%), with MLAs (9%) and MPs (7%) being far less visible. Across all our cities, corporators are the most important for citizens (excepting Hyderabad and Chennai), with Ahmedabad in the middle of the range. What stands out for Ahmedabad is that for help with services, 30% of citizens also reported going through an intermediary,[19] which while less than the corporator, is more than the government official (21%). It is notable that citizens depend more on "intermediaries" than on government officials to access services in all the megacities. This suggests that municipal governments' institutional surface area - that is direct access to the state through elected representatives or government officials - is much stronger in smaller cities compared to larger cities.

Table 4.11: Who do you think is most important to ensure neighborhood receives public services?

	Kochi	Vadodara	Bhavnagar	Ahmedabad	Chennai	Hyderabad	Mumbai
Corporator	48%	19%	49%	33%	21%	13%	25%
Government Officials	28%	62%	26%	21%	13%	27%	14%
MLA	5%	5%	3%	9%	10%	12%	18%
MP	3%	3%	1%	7%	9%	16%	16%
Intermediaries	16%	11%	20%	30%	48%	32%	27%

There is a big debate in India about what role elected officials play in representing their constituencies. Popular and academic views fall into three camps: politicians are self-serving(clientelism), they are parochial and only really care about their communities (group patronage), or, in the democratic ideal, they do what is best for all their constituents (constituency service) Somewhat surprisingly given the thrust of the academic literature and popular views about

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[18] One corporator described his role: "People come to me with complaints about drainage, flooding, bad roads, living difficulties on footpaths, dirty water in pipes, municipal doctors taking too much time dealing with their sick family members or ignoring them,municipal school teachers not doing their jobs. I take these complaints to the relevant office and try to get the problem resolved". But such corporators are hardly the norm in Ahmedabad, as reflected by the heavy reliance on intermediaries. In focus groups we often heard that some corporators show up "only during elections".

[19] We define "intermediaries" to include a range of individuals. This includes a local political leader and is someone who is politically active but is currently not elected. It can also include people who were once elected but currently they are not (Ex-MLA, Ex-MP, Ex-corporator etc.) and local party workers. It also comprises informal middlemen and "other persons of influence" in the local community who help to procure basic services.

corrupt politicians, we found that citizens have a positive view of their elected representatives, especially municipal corporators across our cities. In Ahmedabad, a majority, 54.2%, describe their corporator as caring about all their constituents' well-being, with only 22% saying they are more focused on their personal interests and only 8.2% saying they only care about a certain community (Table 4.12). These views held up across religion (with Muslims, in fact, having a slightly more favorable view of corporators) but not across caste. Though 56% of Forward Castes (FCs) and 59% of OBCs had a favourable view of corporators, only 48.8% of Dalits and 39.1% of Adivasis had a favorable view.

Table 4.12: Which of these statements, in your opinion, describes your Municipal Corporator?

	Kochi	Vadodara	Bhavnagar	Ahmedabad	Chennai	Hyderabad	Mumbai
Cares about all people of their constituency	80%	56%	41%	54%	42%	66%	58%
Cares only about certain communities of constituency	10%	21%	30%	8%	16%	5%	4%
Is concerned with their own interests	5%	11%	22%	22%	34%	25%	20%
Don't Know	4%	11%	5%	14%	8%	4%	15%
Refused to Answer	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	0%	3%

The class differences were even more pronounced in Ahmedabad. In informal settlements only 35.5% had a favorable view of their corporator, but fully 71% of upper-class respondents had a favorable view. It should be noted that 36% of those in informal settlements responded that they "did not have an opinion" (compared to 6.9% in the upper class), suggesting much less familiarity with the work of their corporators than for other classes. This pattern of increasingly favorable views of corporators as one moves up the class hierarchy holds across all of our cases, except Kochi and Chennai, where there is little difference across classes (Figure 4.2).

The pattern of increasingly favourable views of corporators as one moves up the class hierarchy holds across most cities, including Ahmedabad (Figure 4.2). For Bhavnagar and Vadodara, there is no clear trend in the sense that as we move from HT1 to HT2 there is a sudden and large increase in the proportion of respondents having a favorable view of the corporator but it drops in the case of HT3 households in both Bhavnagar and Vadodara. The proportion of those with a favorable view further drops for those in HT4s and then increases again for upper classes in case of Bhavnagar.

Figure 4.2: Responses to corporators being concerned for all people of their constituency

Though citizens say their neighborhoods rely most on their corporators to resolve service problems, 69% report never visiting a corporator's office in the last 6 months, 15% have visited once and 11% have visited twice. When asked about visiting a government office, we get almost the same numbers. Given that as we shall see, citizens of Ahmedabad often do not get good services and often have to deal with service delivery problems - including a very low level of daily water, flooded streets and homes, and sewer blockages - it is surprising that they engage so little with their representatives and government officials. There is, moreover, a large class effect at work here. Fully 90% of informal settlement households report not having visited their corporator (Table 4.13). The upper classes are even higher (93%), but this is hardly surprising given the networks through which they resolve issues (Bertorelli et al 2017). All the middle classes and those in slums, are much more likely to engage with their corporator. We find similar differences for visits to government officials. Moreover, the gap between informal settlements and slums is the highest of any city. On the other hand, Caste does not seem to have much of an impact on how often citizens engage corporators or government officials. Finally, religion has a big impact. Muslims were far more likely to visit corporators (42.9%) than Hindus (29.3%) and this was the

largest gap in all our cities except for Bhavnagar. The same pattern exists for visiting government officials. Whether this is because Muslims are just less likely to think it is worth going to the state for help or because they live in areas where the state is just harder to engage is impossible to tell, but the pattern of lower direct engagement is clear.

Table 4.13: Number of visits to corporator in the last 6 months- All cities

City	0	1	2	3
Kochi	62%	19%	15%	3%
Vadodara	75%	19%	5%	0%
Bhavnagar	71%	15%	9%	4%
Ahmedabad	69%	15%	11%	3%
Chennai	74%	17%	5%	2%
Hyderabad	64%	23%	11%	1%
Mumbai	91%	4%	3%	1%

To summarize then, while the citizens of Ahmedabad rely more on corporators than other state actors to address their problems with services and generally have a favorable view of the work they do, they also rely heavily on "intermediaries." Moreover, residents of informal settlements (shacks and slums) have a very different view and experience of the local state. They don't have as favorable a view of corporators as the middle and upper classes and are far less likely to actually engage with their corporators directly. Overall then, access to the state is highly uneven, especially across housing types and to a lesser degree for Muslims. In democracies where institutions are weak, citizens often have recourse to interpersonal networks to secure public goods. In more concrete terms, if you cannot have concerns and claims addressed through routine, rule-bound procedures, citizens will often have recourse to personal connections, be it a representative, a government official or brokers of various kinds. As we have seen, elected officials play an important role in Ahmedabad, but so do intermediaries. But to what extent does this reflect the kinds of interpersonal networks that people have? As this project has shown elsewhere, having networks can make a difference in how you engage the state (Bertorelli et al. 2017). These networks vary in their composition and density depending on one's social or economic position. Here we do not provide an analysis of this dynamic, just a description of such networks.

Table 4.14: Respondents or households contacted MLA or Corporator to address a problem.

City	Electricity Supply	Water Supply	Sanitation
Kochi	0%	29%	26%
Ahmedabad	1%	2%	2%
Bhavnagar	0%	4%	8%
Chennai	2%	2%	2%
Hyderabad	2%	2%	3%
Mumbai	1%	8%	10%
Vadodara	0	4%	2%

Table 4.15: Councillor helped in receiving the following services

City	BPL Card	Voter Card	Caste Certificate	Aadhar Card
Kochi	8%	10%	5%	13%
Ahmedabad	29%	16%	22%	14%
Bhavnagar	9%	3%	5%	4%
Chennai	15%	25%	15%	25%
Hyderabad	42%	39%	43%	38%
Mumbai	71%	28%	41%	34%
Vadodara	16%	4%	18%	3%

By comparison with the other cities in our project, the citizens of Ahmedabad are quite disconnected from the state in interpersonal terms. We asked all respondents if someone in their household knows a government official, a politician (elected or unelected), a police officer or anyone else of influence (religious or community leader). Only 39 % of respondents reported knowing any of these key actors. This was by far the lowest of any city, with the next lowest being Chennai at 44%. When this figure is broken down, an even more startling finding emerges (Table 4.14). In Ahmedabad, 14% of respondents know a government official, followed by 8% who know a religious or community leader, but only 3% reported knowing an elected official. This last figure is the lowest level recorded for any city, with only Chennai in the single digits (4%) and the other large cities reporting much higher numbers - 16% in Mumbai and 19% in Hyderabad. When we disaggregate networks by class (housing type), the picture that emerges is of sharply uneven

connections to the state. In informal settlements, only 6% of residents know a government official. That number rises sharply for slums (22%) and lower middle class (25%) before tapering off. This may reflect the fact that many government employees live in HT3 housing (Table 4.15).

The pattern with elected representatives is flatter, with almost no one claiming to know politicians. But if the lower classes do not know elected representatives, they are more likely to know informal leaders. In slums, 16% of households know an intermediary (combining "other person of influence" with "unelected politician" and "other local leader"). They are, in fact, just as connected to unofficial representatives as HT4s (17%). That slums rely heavily on informal leaders is in line with the existing literature (Auerbach 2019).

5. Citizenship

The idea of citizenship goes to the heart of democracy. How citizens understand their relation to the state, and in our case, the local municipal government, and how they understand their relationship to each other and use their rights of citizenship - civil, political and social - are what defines democratic practice. To develop a concrete understanding of this complex and dynamic phenomenon, we break citizenship down into two dimensions. The first has to do with basic attributes and beliefs about citizenship. What do citizens actually think it means? Second, what actual ability do citizens have to use their rights as citizens? We capture this by measuring as best we can if and how citizens exercise their rights. This is captured through the citizen participation index (CPI) presented below. We begin with attitudes.

To gain a general sense of what kind of beliefs citizens hold about citizenship, we asked some direct and some less direct questions. We asked all of our respondents what they believe are the most important responsibilities of being citizens. The most common answer is voting, followed by respecting the law, treating others as equals, and being involved in your community (Figure 5.1).[20] In Ahmedabad, 47% responded voting was the most important. All three cities in Gujarat, in fact, have the highest levels of equating citizenship with voting. Only 10% of Ahmedabad respondents

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[20] This survey item generated relatively high non response rates in Hyderabad and Mumbai. For Hyderabad, the high rate of "Don't Know" responses was clustered almost entirely among SC and ST households. In Mumbai, respondents either refused to answer the question or answered "Don't Know" at high rates among most housing types, castes, and religions. The relatively high Don't Know/nonresponse rate was also true for other ranked-choice questions among our Mumbai subsample. Even when adjusting the data by excluding 'Don't knows/Refused to answers' from this question, our original statement still holds.

said "respecting each other as equals", which is the lowest in our sample, aside from Bhavnagar (9%). In other words, Ahmedabadis (and Gujaratis) are more likely to see citizenship in terms of their relation to the state (voting and respecting the law) than in terms of their horizontal relations to other citizens.

Figure 5.1: What is the most important responsibility of a citizen of a democratic country such as India?

There is interesting variation across classes on how citizenship is defined. Among those living in shacks, 17% reported that they believe being involved in the community is the most important responsibility of a citizen, but that number declines linearly across classes and in the upper classes (HT5) is only 8%. We see a similar pattern in other cities. This suggests that the poor have a stronger sense of community involvement than the rich.

On this question about the responsibilities of citizenship, we found no significant differences across caste. Religion also had little impact, with the exception of a slightly higher percentage of Muslims (13.8%) than Hindus (9.8%) who believe citizenship is mostly about "treating others as equals" (Table 5.1). We also measured attitudes about citizenship by asking key questions that capture how citizens feel about classic issues of political and social liberties. On our first question about political liberalism, the citizens of Ahmedabad are the most illiberal of all our cities (Table 5.2).

Table 5.1: What is the most important responsibility of a citizen of a democratic country such as India?

	Hindu	**Muslim**	**Forward Caste**	**OBC**	**SC**	**ST**
Respecting the law	17%	14%	13%	19%	14%	17%
Treating others as equals	10%	14%	10%	10%	10%	10%
Being involved in your community	10%	12%	9%	13%	9%	11%
Voting	48%	45%	51%	36%	47%	42%

An astonishing 88.4% say that their right to free speech should *not* include the right to criticize India. This no doubt reflects the nationalism of the BJP, which has dominated the political scene in Ahmedabad for 15 years, winning the corporation since 2005 and having a 50.8 vote share in the last election held in 2015.[21] This is underscored by the fact that our two other Gujarati cities - Bhavnagar and Vadodara - are the only two other cities where a majority supported this view. Somewhat surprisingly, there was little difference between Muslims (87%) and Hindus (89%) on this question. There were small differences across class, but notably, the lower middle class was the most illiberal (94%) while the upper-middle class was the most liberal (87%). Dalits and Adivasis were more unified on this question (83% for both groups) than were OBCs and Forward Castes (89% and 88%, respectively). On our second question about political liberalism, fully 21% of citizens in Ahmedabad felt people should be punished for not saying "Bharat Mata Ki Jai" at public gatherings (Table 5.2). This is a much smaller percentage than some other cities and much higher than Kochi (5%).

Table 5.2: Conservative or Liberal? Those saying "yes" to...

	There should be laws against inter-caste marriage	**There should be laws against inter-religion marriage**	**Not saying BMKJ should be punished**	**The right to free speech does not include the Right to criticize India**
Kochi	1%	1%	5%	22%
Vadodara	46%	46%	41%	76%
Bhavnagar	9%	13%	47%	82%
Ahmedabad	16%	22%	21%	88%
Chennai	10%	11%	19%	46%
Hyderabad	13%	14%	62%	20%
Mumbai	10%	9%	54%	42%

If there is some ambiguity about political liberalism in Ahmedabad (a lot of people think you should not criticize India, but few think you should be punished for not saying Bharat Matta Ki

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[21] See: https://sec.gujarat.gov.in/images/6-Polling-Satus-1416.pdf (accessed 11/04/2020).

Jai), there is little doubt that it is socially illiberal. However, among all cities, Ahmedabad has the 2nd highest percentage of respondents who believed there should be laws against inter-caste marriage (16%). An even higher percentage of respondents felt there should be laws against inter-communal marriage (22%). On these measures, Ahmedabad was surpassed only by Vadodara (generally viewed as religiously very conservative).

In sum, attitudes about citizenship in Ahmedabad tend to be somewhat conservative. Citizens see their responsibilities largely in terms of voting (not respecting others or community engagement), they think people should not criticize the nation and a comparatively high number believe the state should prohibit inter-caste and inter-community marriage. To some extent, this may well be a state-level phenomenon and may reflect the dominance of the BJP in state and local politics. We now turn to our analysis of the capacity to exercise one's rights. The capacity for citizenship is captured in our citizenship participation index (CPI), which looks at how people actually use their rights to engage in public life. We specifically measured electoral participation, non-electoral political participation (getting involved in politics) and civic participation (getting involved in ward committees and non-governmental organizations). Each of these three dimensions of citizen capacity was captured through a series of questions that we report as component indexes. The overall index (CPI), in turn, combines all three.

6. Participation

We now turn to our CPI index and its components, including voting, non-voting political participation and civic participation. Each component had several questions for a total of 10 (see Appendix 2 for questions and how the index was constructed). Each score is reported on a scale of 0-1, with 0 indicating no participation and 1 indicating that the respondent participated in all 10 activities (in the overall index). Ahmedabad's overall score of 0.32 places it only above Mumbai and Chennai (Table 6.1).

The difference between these and the most active cities (Kochi, Bhavnagar and Vadodara being at the top) is significant. It is notable that the difference is clearly tied to city size, with all the large cities having much lower levels of citizen participation. As we shall see below, Ahmedabad's comparatively lower level of political participation is not because of electoral participation but rather because it scores very poorly on non-electoral participation and civic participation.

Table 6.1: Citizen Participation Index (CPI) by Sub-component

City	CPI	Sub-components of CPI		
		Voting	Non-voting	Civic
Kochi	0.395	0.761	0.13	0.275
Ahmedabad	0.319	0.660	0.087	0.195
Bhavnagar	0.397	0.764	0.098	0.318
Chennai	0.303	0.485	0.17	0.234
Hyderabad	0.35	0.581	0.135	0.316
Mumbai	0.214	0.296	0.071	0.266
Vadodara	0.422	0.793	0.144	0.327

6.1 Voting

The first important finding is that only 74% of Ahmedabadi's are registered to vote at their current state or union elections. This is higher than other large cities (though not as high as Kochi) but well below small cities (Figure 6.1). We find that those who migrated to the city (at any point in time) have much lower registration rates than city natives. Moreover, a much greater relative proportion of migrants who were not registered to vote *did not even try to register* when compared to native residents. Disaggregating into all available categories for residency status (ranging from 1-10 years), we see that there is a clear positive relationship between the number of years spent living in the city and the likelihood of being registered to vote.[22]

When it comes to voter registration in Ahmedabad, there are very pronounced differences across castes. OBCs are clearly the most engaged in voting, with 80% registered to vote at their current address, compared to 71% for forward castes and only 57% of Dalits. Somewhat surprisingly, Adivasis are registered at a higher rate (75%) than forward castes. A large point difference in voter registration between OBC and Dalit marks a dramatic degree of political marginalization of Dalits. A similar large gap exists in Kochi between Forward castes/OBCs and SCs/STs (Figure 6.2).

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[22] A Janaagraha study indicates low voter registration might be linked with the voter list management system. Compared with Hyderabad, Mumbai, Chennai and Bengaluru, Ahmedabad has the lowest proportion of Booth Level Officer (BLO) contact details (gate-keepers of voter registration) available to the general public. For more read: Janaagraha (2017). *Voter List Management: Booth Level Officer and Landscaping Study in 21 Cities in India*. Available: http://janaagraha.org/files/Janaagraha_BLO_Study_2017.pdf (accessed 18.06.2020).

Figure 6.1: Are you currently registered to vote in Union or State elections?

Figure 6.2: Voter Registration (in state or Union elections) by Caste - All cities

Figure 6.3: Are you registered to vote at your current address?

The class picture is even more extreme. Only 35% of shack households are registered to vote. The number increases to 58% for slums, 55% for lower-middle-class households, and it then jumps to 78% for upper-middle-class and 84% for upper-class households. Hindus were more likely to be registered (71%) than Muslims (62%). (Table 6.2)

Table 6.2: Voter registration (at current address) by caste, class, and religion

HT 1	HT 2	HT 3	HT 4	HT 5	Forward Caste	OBC	SC	ST	Hindu	Muslim	Other
35%	58%	55%	78%	84%	65%	54%	78%	65%	71%	62%	95%

We return to the overall citizen participation index at the end of this section, but to make sense of the index, it is important to examine each component carefully. We begin by reporting voting patterns. Electoral participation in Ahmedabad overall is about average for the cities in our sample. Participation through voting in the last national elections was 63%, it was 67% in state elections, and 66% in the last municipal elections. (Note: what we are capturing here is actual, self-reported voter participation, not the percentage of those who are registered to vote). As Figure 6.4 shows, voting in Ahmedabad's municipal elections is higher than in other large cities (Mumbai, Chennai

and Hyderabad) but much lower than in small or medium-sized cities (Kochi, Bhavnagar and Vadodara).

If we combine voting at all levels, we get a single index sub-component on voting (reported in Table 6.3). Ahmedabad is in the middle of the pack at 0.66, higher than the other large cities (Chennai, Hyderabad, Mumbai), but lower than Kochi, Bhavnagar and Vadodara. When looking at this voting sub-component, religion has only a minor effect, with Hindus scoring 0.66 and Muslims at 62 (Figure 6.5). But in Ahmedabad, this small gap is more significant when we recall that Muslims are much less likely to be registered to vote. Taking both measures into account (registration and actual voting), Muslims clearly participate significantly less in electoral politics than Hindus. This is all the more noteworthy given that in all other cities except Kochi, Muslims, in fact, are more likely to vote than Hindus.

Class has a sharper effect on electoral participation, with informal shack settlements having the lowest score (0.38) followed by slums and lower middle class households (0.54), followed by a big climb to 0.73 for the middle-class and 0.81 for upper-class households. None of our other cities has such a steep gradient in the class propensity to vote (Figure 6.6). In Ahmedabad, there is an evident and sharp phenomenon of lower classes under- participating in elections.

Figure 6.4: Self-reported voting in three levels of elections

Figure 6.5: Voting Sub-Index by Religion

Figure 6.6: Voting Sub-Index by Housing Type

The pattern is replicated somewhat with regard to caste, with Dalits scoring much lower (0.50) than OBCs (0.73), though STs and forward castes are in the middle at 0.62. It is notable that in all cities except Hyderabad, OBCs are the most electorally active caste (Figure 6.7).

Figure 6.7: Voting Sub-Index by Caste

Figure 6.8: Voting Sub-Index by Education

Finally, we look at education and gender. Not having any schooling has a big downward effect (0.37) in Ahmedabad, but it jumps to 0.71 for the next educational category of "minimal schooling" (up to 4 years) and then follows no discernable pattern (Figure 6.8). Remarkably, those with no schooling have very low scores in all four megacities but participate in elections well above the average in all the smaller cities. We saw no relationship between gender and electoral participation.

We can now summarize our findings on electoral participation. The patterns documented here run counter to two commonly held assumptions in the literature. First, contrary to the much-heralded claim that the poor and lower castes vote more in India than the rich and the higher castes, and claims that slums serve as "votebanks" that sway elections, quite the opposite is true for Ahmedabad and larger cities in general (Figure 8). That is, we find that on average, those living

in middle and upper-class areas (HT 3-5) in Ahmedabad are much more likely to vote than those in informal settlements (shacks and slums). Across other cities the pattern is more varied, but there is no evidence to support the conventional claim that the so-called slum vote banks dominate electoral politics in urban areas. Second, in Ahmedabad there is a discernible difference across religious communities, with Hindus registering and voting in great proportions than Muslims. Ahmedabad is an outlier in this respect. Finally, caste matters, but mostly because OBCs are clearly the most electorally active caste in Ahmedabad, a pattern replicated in most cities.

6.2 Non-Voting Participation

There is more to politics than voting. Between elections, people organize and support political parties in varied ways. A well-known problem of representation in democracies is the fact that the rich and the more socially privileged often play a more proactive role in politics and are more likely to dominate political parties. Before turning to our index, we look at one key measure, which is party membership.

Table 6.3: Membership of a political party by caste

Caste	Ahmedabad	Bhavnagar	Chennai	Hyderabad	Kochi	Mumbai	Vadodara
ST	4%	–	32%	2%	7%	9%	1%
SC	5%	0%	10%	4%	14%	6%	0%
OBC	7%	1%	7%	20%	18%	10%	1%
Forward Caste	3%	3%	28%	8%	10%	5%	3%

In Ahmedabad, only 5% of citizens are party members. Only Bhavnagar and Vadodara had lower party membership (suggesting this might be a Gujarat effect). On the overall measure of non-electoral political participation, Ahmedabad is well below the average and ranks second to last (ahead only of Mumbai). When we examine party membership across social categories, some clear patterns emerge. First, across castes (Table 6.3) OBCs are much more likely to be party members (7%) than Dalits and Adivasis (5%) and forward castes (3%). Second, it is the upper-middle class (Table 21b) that is most likely to join parties (6%), well above the lower middle class (3%), slums (4%) and informal settlements (2%). Going against this pattern of subordinate groups being less

likely to join parties, in Ahmedabad we find that Muslims are almost twice as likely to join parties (7%) as Hindus (4%).

Table 6.4: Membership of a political party by housing type

Housing Type	Ahmedabad	Bhavnagar	Chennai	Hyderabad	Kochi	Mumbai	Vadodara
HT1	2%	0%	18%	10%	3%	5%	0%
HT2	4%	1%	12%	16%	13%	8%	1%
HT3	3%	1%	12%	9%	11%	3%	2%
HT4	6%	3%	11%	7%	13%	5%	2%
HT5	3%	1%	15%	2%	17%	5%	1%

Table 6.5: Membership of a political party by religion

Religion	Ahmedabad	Bhavnagar	Chennai	Hyderabad	Kochi	Mumbai	Vadodara
Hindu	4%	2%	13%	6%	14%	5%	2%
Muslim	7%	0%	4%	22%	12%	7%	2%

We now turn to our index of non-voting electoral participation. It includes four questions covering political party membership, attendance at rallies, talking about politics with neighbors, and contributing time to a campaign. A score of "1" would mean that the respondent answered affirmatively to all 4 questions, with "0" indicating only negative responses. Our index reveals that Ahmedabadis are not very politically engaged and have the lowest score of any city except Mumbai, at 0.087 (see Figure 6.9). Recall that only 4.7% of respondents are party members. Similarly, only about 11% contribute time to election campaigns during elections. About 8.5% participate in meetings or rallies organized by political parties between elections. About 9% discuss supporting a candidate with friends, neighbors, or community members. The index value of non-voting political participation (0.087) indicates that only between 8 and 9 percent of Ahmedabadis on average get involved in politics beyond voting.

Figure 6.9: Non-Voting Sub-Index by Housing Type

Figure 6.10: Non-voting Participation (NVP) Sub-Index by Caste

Figure 6.11: Non-voting Participation (NVP) Sub-Index by Religion

When we look at the index by class, we find that in Ahmedabad shacks have a much lower score (0.053) than other classes, but that the most active are slums (0.089) and the upper middle class (0.091) (Figure 6.11). There are no clear patterns in other cities, but in general those living in shacks are less politically engaged, except for Hyderabad and Chennai where, somewhat surprisingly, they are the most engaged. When we look at the index by caste, it is clear that in Ahmedabad OBCs are by far the most politically active outside elections (0.123) with Adivasis the least active (0.060). OBCs are generally quite active in all cities, but in Kochi and Chennai, lower castes (SC/ST) are more active than OBCs (Figure 6.12). Finally, when we examine non-voting participation by religion, we find a striking pattern of Muslims with a much higher score than Hindus, 0.117 vs. 0.082 (Figure 6.13). We can only speculate here, but the fact that Ahmedabad has been dominated by the BJP - a party that has been hostile to Muslims - may have spurred political activity by Muslims.

6.3 Civic participation

We now turn to the last sub-component of our CPI index. We measured civic participation by asking respondents a series of questions about their engagement in the local community and then

created an index (see [Appendix](#) 2 for details). Among all our cities, Ahmedabad has the lowest score - 0.19 - compared to a high of 0.33 for Vadodara. A score of "1" would mean that the respondent answered positively to all three measures of civic participation, with "0" indicating only negative responses (see Table 6.6). A score of 0.33, as in Vadodara, means that on average, respondents had one positive answer. The difference then between Ahmedabad and Vadodara is very significant.

When we examine the civic index across social categories, we find significant variation. In Ahmedabad, OBCs have the highest score (0.20) and Dalits the lowest (0.16) (Figure 6.12). The difference is small but notable, all the more so because we find the reverse pattern in most other cities, where Dalits always have higher scores than in Ahmedabad and often higher than OBCs. In terms of religion, Hindus in Ahmedabad (0.196) are slightly more civically active than Muslims (0.185), (Figure 6.13). The class pattern on this measure is less clear (Figure 6.14). In comparative terms, the shacks and slums in Ahmedabad are quite low in terms of civic participation. There is a general upward gradient- going from 0.20 in slums to 0.24 in the upper classes. However, civic participation among HT2 is significantly less, the lowest level of civic participation of any of our cities. Finally, Hindus at 0.196 are only slightly more civically active than Muslims at 0.185 in Ahmedabad (Figure 6.14). This is the pattern across other cities, except Mumbai and Hyderabad where Muslims are more active.

Figure 6.12: Civic Participation Sub-Index by Caste

Figure 6.13: Civic Participation Sub-Index by Housing type

Figure 6.14: Civic Participation Sub-Index by Religion

To disentangle these findings about civic participation, we look more closely at the question about belonging to civic organizations. We group these into two clusters and classify religious, cultural and caste associations as "Identity-based" and co-ops, unions, RWAs (resident welfare associations) and NGOs as "Civic/Professional". A total of 43% of our respondents in Ahmedabad reported participation in a civil society organization, which puts the city in the middle of the pack. Most notably, 26% of respondents reported participating in Identity-based associations compared to only 17% in Civic/Professional associations (Figure 6.15). The comparison with other cities reveals a very clear regional pattern. Not only do the three Gujarati cities (Ahmedabad, Bhavnagar and Vadodara) have the highest absolute levels of participation in Identity-based associations, but they are the only cities where residents participate more in these than in the Civic/Professional ones. This pattern finds confirmation in a second question we asked about associations (Figure 5.16). Going beyond members, we also asked what organization in one's community provides the most help in accessing services. Ahmedabadis rely heavily on religious, caste or cultural organizations (30%) and much less so on Civic/Professional organizations (13%). The opposite pattern prevails in all the non-Gujarati cities. Clearly, religious, cultural and caste organizations play a much more significant role in urban Gujaratis' lives than elsewhere in India.

Figure 6.15: Participation in Organisations and Associations

Figure 6.16: Which type of organization helps in providing public services?

6.4 The Citizen Participation Index

Having discussed political and civic participation, we can now draw the larger picture. As reported at the beginning of this section, the CPI combines all our measures of political participation (voting and non-voting) and civic participation in a single index (Figure 6.17). All told, this measure includes the ten different questions discussed above that capture the multidimensionality of citizenship practices. Scaled from 0-1, a score of zero would mean that citizens responded negatively to all ten questions (they did not vote nor participate in political or any civic activities) and a score of one would mean they did all of these things. On the overall index, Ahmedabad scores 0.318, which is the second lowest, higher than only Mumbai (0.214). The two highest performers are the other Gujarati cities of Vadodara (0.422) and Bhavnagar (0.397), with Kochi a close third (0.394). Notably, larger cities score lower than small cities.

Citizen participation varies significantly across caste in Ahmedabad. OBCs in Ahmedabad have the highest participation (0.353) and Dalits the lowest (0.249) (Figure 6.18). This is the largest

point difference between OBC and Dalits of any city. Forward castes have relatively low citizenship participation (0.298). Somewhat surprisingly, STs are in the middle (0.294). When we examine the citizenship index across religion in Ahmedabad, there is no difference between Hindus and Muslims. This is a pattern that holds more or less for all cities, except for Hyderabad, where Muslims display a significantly higher level of citizenship than Hindus and Kochi where the pattern is reversed and Hindus are more active (Figure 6.19). When it comes to the citizenship participation index, the class differences are even sharper and more continuous. Shack informal settlements have the least citizenship participation (0.218), the slums slightly higher (0.266), climbing to 0.37 in the upper classes (Figure 6.20). This is the steepest slope of any city except Vadodara.

Figure 6.17: Citizen Participation Index

Figure 6.18: Citizen Participation Index (CPI) by Caste

Figure 6.19: Citizen Participation Index by Religion

Figure 6.20: Citizen Participation Index (CPI) by Housing Type

We can now summarize our findings for citizenship in Ahmedabad. First, when it comes to general attitudes about citizenship, Ahmedabadis are quite conservative and even quite illiberal. In terms of electoral participation, their propensity to register and to vote is about average. However, when it comes to non-electoral political participation, that is, getting involved in party politics, we find that Ahmedabadi's are not very active. They are more likely to be involved in civic life, though the profile of participation very strongly favors identity-based organizations over professional or civic organizations.

Across all of our measures of citizenship participation - voting, non-electoral and civic - there is a persistent pattern of lower classes in Ahmedabad being much less involved than the upper classes. Indeed, the inhabitants of informal settlements - both shacks and slums - are the least mobilized of any city in our sample except for Mumbai. We also found a large participation gap between the very active OBCs and SCs that are not very engaged. As a key informant put it, this may reflect how, unlike neighboring Maharashtra, Dalits have never been very mobilized in Gujarat. Any signs of Dalit assertion, if they exist, are very recent. Finally, it is important to highlight that Muslim

participation in all its forms beyond voting is roughly equal to that of Hindus. Given the virtual total exclusion of Muslims from the BJP, this is very telling. It perhaps means that Muslims are very involved with non-BJP parties. Drawing larger lessons is complicated by the range of measures and the variance across social categories. But if we were to generalize by comparing to other cities, we would say that, to paraphrase the political scientist Schattschneider[23], in Ahmedabad, the heavenly chorus of democracy has a distinct upper-class accent with some strong OBC notes.

7. Services

In this section, we examine the distribution of basic services in Ahmedabad. These include the quality of water, sanitation, electricity, roads and the extent to which households are subject to flooding. All of these services were carefully measured to capture the full range of conditions under which they are delivered. In the case of water, we went well beyond the standard census measures to ask detailed questions about daily supply and storage. Below we report all the specific services, but we begin with our overall Basic Services and Delivery Index (BSDI). The index was carefully constructed to provide a comprehensive measure of access to services (see Appendix 3 for full details). The index goes from 0 to 1, with a "0" meaning that a household gets no services and is often subject to flooding, to a perfect score of "1" which would mean continuous 24/7 delivery of water and electricity, a flush toilet that is connected to a sewer line (or septic tank) and does not get clogged, and good roads and no flooding in the house or neighborhood. On the index, Ahmedabad scores 0.85, just behind Kochi, Vadodara and Bhavnagar, but well above Chennai, Hyderabad, and Mumbai (Table 7.1). Of the large cities in our sample, Ahmedabad has the highest level of services.

Table 7.1: Basic Service Delivery and Infrastructure Index (BDSII)

Kochi	0.904
Vadodara	0.907
Bhavnagar	0.880
Ahmedabad	0.855
Chennai	0.743
Hyderabad	0.814
Mumbai	0.715

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[23] See Schattschneider (1960).

Figure 7.1: Basic Service Delivery and Infrastructure Index (BSDII) by Caste

Figure 7.2: Basic Service Delivery and Infrastructure Index (BSDII) by Religion

As shown in Figures 7.1-7.2, the distribution of services across social categories varies significantly. The caste picture in Ahmedabad is unusual. Ahmedabad is the only city where OBCs do better than forward castes in terms of the index (though marginally so). But it is also the city that along with Chennai, has the biggest gap between OBCs and Dalits (0.865 vs. 0.809), a gap that basically does not exist (or goes in the opposite direction in Hyderabad) in all other six cities (Figure 7.3). Ahmedabad, along with Bhavnagar and Hyderabad, is a city where Muslims clearly receive a lower level of service delivery (Figure 7.2). The gap in Ahmedabad - 0.80 for Muslims compared to 0.86 for Hindus - is quite significant and similar to the OBC-SC gap (Figure 7.1).

Figure 7.3: Basic Service Delivery and Infrastructure Index (BSDII) by Housing Type

However, the most pronounced pattern of differentiated access to services emerges along class lines, or as proxied in our survey, by housing types. As is clear from Figure 7.4, shack dwellers are worse off in Ahmedabad than any other city and by a significant margin. Indeed, the level of service delivery at 0.32 is abysmally low. Slums are better off at 0.75 but still well below the various middle classes. The level of service delivery in Ahmedabad's slums is much lower than in the smaller cities but slightly better than in Chennai and Mumbai. Taking the weighted average (considering relative proportion of HT1/HT2s in each city) the BSDII gap in Ahmedabad between HT1+HT2s and HT3s is 0.171, the second-highest of any city, surpassed only by Mumbai at 0.273. Overall, the class gradient is quite steep, meaning that service delivery is highly

differentiated across classes in Ahmedabad. Since housing types are highly clustered, there is also clearly a spatial dynamic at work. In other words, where you live, and specifically what settlement type you live in (informal, designated slum, planned settlement, government housing etc.), has a huge impact on access to services.

The BSDII index, as in the case with all indexes, lumps many indicators together and can flatten differences. It is as such essential to look at the distribution of specific services.

7.1 Water

As we saw earlier, water is the number one concern of residents of Ahmedabad. Water delivery is most often reported as a simple binary - either you have access to piped water or you don't. But water delivery systems in Indian cities are complex, fragmented and provide highly variable quality of delivery. From our focus groups in informal settlements we moreover found that many households spend a significant amount of time securing water, either waiting for pipes to flow, collecting and carrying water from public sources (community borewells, tanker trucks) and storing water. Much of this work it should be noted falls on women, and often young girls. To develop as accurate a picture as possible of the differentiated quality of access to water, we measured water delivery by type of access (piped, borewell etc), location (in or outside of premises), duration of supply and storage systems.

Table 7.2: Main source of water- All cities

	Kochi	Vadodara	Bhavnagar	Ahmedabad	Chennai	Hyderabad	Mumbai
Tap (Piped)	67%	95%	90%	88%	40%	98%	96%
Well	3%	0%	0%	0%	4%	0%	1%
Hand pump	0%	0%	1%	0%	18%	0%	1%
Borewell	27%	2%	9%	10%	27%	1%	1%
Other source	3%	3%	0%	2%	12%	1%	1%
Location of the source- All cities							
Inside Premises	93%	87%	96%	87%	74%	96%	76%
Outside Premises	7%	13%	5%	13%	26%	4%	24%

The vast majority of households in Ahmedabad get their water either from piped delivery or borewells. Fully 88.4% of households in Ahmedabad have piped water, 87.71% of which are inside

their premises and the balance being outside of the premises. This places Ahmedabad at the lower end of the rankings, below Hyderabad and the smaller cities, but higher than Chennai and Mumbai (Table 7.2).

Though access is fairly comprehensive, the quality of water delivery is poor. A little more than three-quarters of the city receives water for only 0-2 hours a day. This is also the case for some other cities – Bhavnagar, Hyderabad and Vadodara. But in Kochi, Chennai and Mumbai a majority of households have much better service hours (Figure 7.4).

Figure 7.4: Hours of Water Supply per Day

We can now look at how water is distributed across social categories. We specifically look at religion, caste, education, gender and housing type. Housing type is the category that has the most effect. Shack settlements in Ahmedabad (HT1) are particularly deprived when it comes to water. Only 28% of HT1 households get piped water and fully 89% get water from outside their premises (Table 24). And of those who do get piped water in HT1s, a majority have it for two hours a day or less (Table 7.3). What is most striking is that access to piped water improves dramatically when one moves from HT1 to HT2, with 92% of HT2 households having access to piped water and only 21% of those getting it from outside their premises (Table 7.4). Access to piped water actually drops to 88.3% and 71.3% for HT4 and HT5. This may seem odd until one recalls that because

piped water in India can be unreliable, better-off households will often dig borewells. Informal settlements also rely on borewells (27.4%). Still, whereas the borewells of the rich are meant to substitute for piped water that is not available 24/7, the borewells of the poor are substitutes for not having the option of piped water at all. Borewells in informal settlements are almost always community borewells.

Table 7.3: Source of Water by Housing Type in Ahmedabad

Source of Water	HT 1	HT 2	HT 3	HT 4	HT 5
Borewell	27%	5%	5%	11%	29%
Hand pump	9%	1%	0%	NA	NA
Tap (Piped)	28%	92%	94%	88%	71%
Well	1%	NA	0%	NA	NA
Other source	35%	3%	1%	1%	NA
Location of water source					
Inside premises	11%	78%	84%	93%	90%
Outside premises	89%	22%	16%	7%	10%

Table 7.4: Hours of Water Availability by Housing Type

Hours	HT 1	HT 2	HT 3	HT 4	HT 5
0*	7%	NA	NA	NA	NA
0 - 2	49%	12%	14%	3%	3%
0-4	38%	81%	78%	87%	77%
24	6%	5%	8%	9%	20%

* "0" means there is some identifiable water source, but that on the average day there is no actual availability.

As becomes clear in Table 7.5 informal shack settlements (HT1) are sites of high exclusion in Ahmedabad compared to other cities. With only 28% of shacks receiving piped water, informal settlements in Ahmedabad are worse off than in all other cities where with the exception of Chennai, every other city is above 50% of shacks receiving piped water. The picture for slums (HT2) is quite different. By and large, slums (HT2) in Ahmedabad receive average water service, with the percentage receiving tap water in the middle of the range (Table 7.6). Religion and caste do not appear to play much of a role in differentiating access to water. If 89.6% of Hindus get piped water and only 82.9% of Muslims do, the difference is largely accounted for by borewells.

The caste picture is confusing, with a higher percentage of Dalits (92.7%) getting piped water than forward castes (82.3%) and OBCs (90.7%) until one realizes that OBCs and FCs have a high usage of borewells. For those with limited daily access (which is the vast majority in urban India), storage becomes essential. When water services are generally measured in India, as for example in the census, questions are limited to the type of delivery and whether it is in or outside the premises. Yet, water storage is key to ensuring easy access to water when delivery is so limited. So, as part of our survey, we also measured the quality of storage (Table 27). Fully 79% of households in Ahmedabad utilize water storage, and of those, only 24% have a system that requires minimal labor, namely a large drum (often placed on the roof of the house) with a motorized pump. Many others depend on manual storage, including 22% who rely on small, movable containers. Having to use buckets for water storage is about as clear and tangible a measure of poverty and precarity as one can imagine.

Table 7.5: Percentage of HT1 and HT2 Households with Piped water by City

City	HT1	HT 2
Ahmedabad	28%	92%
Bhavnagar	57%	95%
Chennai	33%	45%
Hyderabad	54%	99%
Kochi	95%	71%
Mumbai	90%	98%
Vadodara	61%	95%

Table 7.6: Water Storage

	Kochi	Vadodara	Bhavnagar	Ahmedabad	Chennai	Hyderabad	Mumbai
Percentage requiring water storage	91%	96%	97%	79%	90%	93%	67%
Movable containers (small sized)	6%	18%	50%	22%	24%	26%	51%
Drum (medium sized)	10%	26%	10%	45%	43%	37%	49%
Large Tank/Drum non-motorized pump	30%	39%	42%	21%	17%	30%	8%
Large Tank/Drum with motorized pump	51%	46%	67%	24%	23%	26%	8%
Other	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%

7.2 Sanitation

Urban sanitation in India is highly fragmented and varies significantly in quality. In Ahmedabad 75% of households have flush toilets connected to piped sewerage and 12% have them connected to a septic tank (Figure 7.5). Of the balance, 7% rely on a flush toilet that goes to open drains, 4% rely on a public toilet and 1% on open defecation. In sum, 13% of households rely on highly inconvenient or open drainage, which taken together can be classified as "compromised sanitation" systems[24] (open defecation, public latrine, open pit latrine, flush/pour latrine not connected to a sewer line i.e. waste flowing into the ground or water body through a covered drain or uncovered drain.). On this overall measure of poor sanitation, Ahmedabad ranks third to last, with 13% of citizens having compromised sanitation (Figure 7.6).

Figure 7.5: Household toilet facility in sampled cities

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
[24] We make use of the WHO-UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme guidelines for Water and Sanitation for Sustainable Development Goals in defining compromised and good sanitation. Good sanitation are those facilities which can be serviced (desludged like septic tanks or covered or ventilated pit latrines) for proper treatment of wastewater. Improved sanitation facilities are those designed to hygienically separate excreta from human contact which makes open defecation, public latrine, open pit latrine, flush/pour latrine not connected to a sewer line i.e. waste flowing into ground or into water body through covered drain or uncovered drain all - unimproved or compromised sanitation. For more read (Page 8, 16) Progress on drinking water, sanitation and hygiene: 2017 update and SDG baselines. Geneva: World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 2017. Licence: CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO.

The pattern of uneven delivery across classes is repeated for sanitation. In Ahmedabad's informal shacks (H1), the vast majority of households depend either on open defecation (42%) or a public toilet (40%). Overall, 85% of HT1 households in Ahmedabad have compromised sanitation, though this is surpassed by Chennai at 945 and Mumba at 98% (Table 7.7). Sanitation service does improve in slums (HT2). In Ahmedabad, only 18% of slum residents rely on out-of-premises sanitation, though the level of compromised sanitation remains high at 41%. Slums in other cities also do better in accessing sanitation, with the dramatic exceptions of Mumbai and Chennai, where 94% and 60% of households still depend on compromised sanitation, respectively.

Figure 7.6: Quality of Sanitation by City

If access to sanitation improves as we move from HT1 to HT2, the quality of sanitation is still a problem. Even when there are sewer lines, they often get blocked. Ahmedabad ranks second amongst our cities when it comes to sewer line blockage (Table 7.8). A majority of HT2 (54%) and HT3 (51%) households report that their sewer lines get blocked. This compares to only 33% and 11% in H4 and H5 households, respectively. The severity of the problem is reflected in the fact that 20% of households in HT2 and HT3 report that a sewerage blockage occurs more than once a month. The proportion of HT2 and HT3 households reporting blockages is the highest of

any of our cities, so even when sewerage systems are in place in lower-income neighbourhoods, they are clearly of very poor quality both in absolute and comparative terms. Blockages, it should be noted, pose both an obvious health risk as raw sewage can overflow into water drainage systems, houses or streets, but also puts an additional burden on households to pay for servicing.

Table 7.7: Quality of sanitation in Sample Cities by Housing Type (lowest 3 HTs only)

City	Housing Type	Good Sanitation	Compromised Sanitation	Other
Ahmedabad	HT 1	6%	85%	9%
Ahmedabad	HT 2	57%	43%	0%
Ahmedabad	HT 3	97%	3%	0%
Bhavnagar	HT 1	51%	50%	0%
Bhavnagar	HT 2	81%	19%	0%
Bhavnagar	HT 3	82%	18%	0%
Chennai	HT 1	6%	94%	0%
Chennai	HT 2	39%	60%	0%
Chennai	HT 3	94%	6%	0%
Hyderabad	HT 1	2%	82%	15%
Hyderabad	HT 2	91%	7%	2%
Hyderabad	HT 3	99%	0%	1%
Kochi	HT 1	59%	41%	0%
Kochi	HT 2	89%	11%	0%
Kochi	HT 3	99%	1%	0%
Mumbai	HT 1	1%	98%	1%
Mumbai	HT 2	5%	94%	0%
Mumbai	HT 3	99%	1%	0%
Vadodara	HT 1	28%	72%	0%
Vadodara	HT 2	94%	6%	0%
Vadodara	HT 3	98%	2%	0%

Table 7.8: Blockage of sewer line-All cities

City	Sewer line blockage	Percent chronic blockage at least once per month
Ahmedabad	39%	45%
Bhavnagar	29%	18%
Vadodara	15%	7%
Chennai	37%	36%
Hyderabad	43%	29%
Kochi	4%	8%
Mumbai	20%	30%

The quality of sanitation also varies significantly across caste (Tables 7.9). Only 9% of forward castes in Ahmedabad have compromised sanitation, compared to 12% for OBCs, 21% for SCs, and 23% for Adivasis. Though SCs are in absolute terms worse off in Mumbai and Chennai, nowhere is the gap so large between forward castes and Dalits as in Ahmedabad.

Table 7.9: Sanitation by Caste - Ahmedabad

Caste Group	Good Sanitation	Compromised Sanitation
Forward	91%	9%
OBC	88%	12%
SC	79%	21%
ST	76%	23%
Other	91%	9%

Religion appears to affect access to sanitation in Ahmedabad, with Muslims having a slightly lower quality of access to good sanitation than Hindus. It is interesting that this varies across our cities, with Muslims faring better in Chennai, Hyderabad, and Vadodara, but much worse in Mumbai (Table 7.10).

Finally, we turn to the problem of flooding, which is a perennial problem in India. Poor drainage infrastructure, housing built on floodplains and poorly constructed houses mean that rains often translate into flooding of streets and households. Not surprisingly, informal settlements in Ahmedabad are very vulnerable to flooding. Fully 72% of informal shack households (HT1) report that their street gets flooded during monsoon, and 73% report that their house gets flooded (Table 7.11). Again, there is a dramatic improvement as one moves into slums, where only 46% report

flooded streets and 41% report flooded homes. When we compare these numbers to other cities, we find that the informal settlements in Ahmedabad and Vadodara are far worse than any other city except Hyderabad.

Table 7.10: Sanitation by Religion

City	Religion	Good Sanitation	Compromised Sanitation	Other/DK/Refused
Kochi	Hindu	99%	1%	-
Kochi	Muslim	99%	1%	-
Vadodara	Hindu	98%	2%	0%
Vadodara	Muslim	99%	1%	-
Bhavnagar	Hindu	95%	5%	-
Bhavnagar	Muslim	81%	19%	-
Ahmedabad	Hindu	88%	12%	0%
Ahmedabad	Muslim	82%	18%	-
Chennai	Hindu	85%	15%	0%
Chennai	Muslim	93%	7%	
Hyderabad	Hindu	95%	4%	1%
Hyderabad	Muslim	96%	3%	2%
Mumbai	Hindu	24%	76%	1%
Mumbai	Muslim	14%	85%	0%

Table 7.11: Flooding during Monsoon - Road and Ground floor in Kochi

Floods during monsoon		HT 1	HT 2	HT 3	HT 4	HT 5
Road	Yes	72%	46%	47%	34%	22%
Road	No	27%	54%	53%	66%	78%
Ground Floor	Yes	73%	41%	42%	29%	23%
Ground Floor	Never	26%	58%	58%	71%	77%

The differences by caste are also very marked. OBCs are actually better off than forward castes, with only 31.9% reporting street flooding compared to 40.2% for FCs. SCs and STs report far higher numbers for street flooding at 50% and 47% respectively (Table 7.12). The same pattern is true for houses flooding often, with OBCs at 6.4% and forward castes at 10.9%, but with an astonishing 41% of SCs and 38% of STs reported that their houses "always" get flooded during the rainy season (Table 7.13). As shown in these same tables, Muslims in Ahmedabad are also much more likely to experience flooding of their streets (52%) than Hindus (35%) as well as of their homes (45%) compared to Hindus (32%).

Table 7.12: Does the road in front of your house get flooded during the monsoon? (Ahmedabad)

	Hindus	Muslims	Forward Caste	OBC	SC	ST
Yes	35%	52%	40%	32%	50%	47%
No	64%	47%	59%	68%	49%	52%

Table 7.13: Does the ground floor of your house get flooded during the monsoon? (Ahmedabad)

	Hindus	Muslims	Forward Caste	OBC	SC	ST
No	67%	55%	64%	69%	58%	61%
Yes	32%	45%	36%	31%	41%	38%

Reviewing these patterns of differentiation across social categories of access to basic services, we can highlight four broad findings. With respect to our overall index of services (BSDII), class matters a lot. Though slums do relatively well, informal settlements in Ahmedabad are systematically deprived. Caste matters with Dalits and especially Advisasis getting lower services, but it does not matter as much as class. Second, in Ahmedabad, what is truly striking is that OBCs do as well as forward castes and even better in some services. Third, as measured by our overall index of service (BSDII), there is a gap between Muslims and Hindus. It is not as large as for class or caste, but it is among the larger gaps in our cities. When we look more closely at water, sanitation and flooding, however, the gaps do not seem that significant. Despite well-known patterns of segregation and indeed ghettoization of Muslims, when it comes to service access Muslims are only slightly below Hindus. Finally, sanitation does not quite fit the pattern of other services. Here caste matters a lot and fits the classic caste hierarchy pattern. It is remarkable that the oldest and most symbolically violent marker of caste distinction - distance from excrement - perseveres in cities.

8. Mechanisms of Social Inequality

We know that there is a lot of inequality in Indian cities, including pronounced patterns of spatial exclusion.[25] As we have seen in the previous section, the level of services that households get varies across social categories. So far, we have only shown that there are correlations, that is if you

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[25] For more, see: Bharathi et al (2018), Heller and Mukhopadhyay (2015), and Singh et al. (2019).

live in an HT1 or HT2 you are less likely to get quality services or that if you are Dalit you are less likely to get quality sanitation. In this section, we are interested in exploring mechanisms that might explain these outcomes. Inequality does not just happen. It is created through specific practices through which groups hoard resources or exclude other groups from accessing resources. We specifically look at discrimination between groups and by state actors, how citizens might use personal networks to access the state and the degree to which social ties might reproduce social categories.

8.1 Discrimination

We asked a series of questions designed to measure discrimination. Specifically, we asked respondents to tell us how they thought the police and government officials treated people based on income, caste, religion, gender and language. We then asked if respondents felt that any of these groups got better treatment in their neighborhoods and at the city level.

Though the absolute numbers are not high (something that is true of much of the survey literature on discrimination), the range is significant. The questions that solicited the highest reports of discrimination were those about the police (Table 8.1). In Ahmedabad, 23% believe a rich person will be treated better by the police. The high was 38% in Chennai and the low 8% in Kochi. Similarly, 16% believe an upper caste person would be treated better by the police, compared to a high of 33% in Mumbai and a low of 2% in Kochi. Only 6.1% said a Hindu would be treated better, compared to 0% in Kochi and 22.6% in Mumbai. It is also notable that 10% said that the police would treat a local language speaker better. The high was 36% for Mumbai (which has a strong nativist movement) and the low was 2% in Kochi. We did not find significant reporting of discrimination based on gender[26].

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[26] The question asked whether citizens felt a man or woman would be treated better by the police. This pertains to direct engagement with police but does not capture the nuance of dealing with gender-based issues which is perhaps why no difference was found here.

Table 8.1: Citizen perception of discrimination by the police in their city (Percentage)

Options	Kochi	Vadodara	Bhavnagar	Ahmedabad	Chennai	Hyderabad	Mumbai
Rich Treated Better	8%	25%	29%	23%	38%	10%	35%
Poor treated better	1%	1%	0%	2%	4%	1%	2%
Both treated the same (Rich and Poor)	87%	71%	63%	60%	49%	86%	57%
Upper caste person treated better	2%	17%	17%	16%	24%	5%	33%
Dalit treated better	1%	1%	1%	2%	2%	1%	2%
Both treated the same (Upper caste and Dalit)	93%	77%	73%	66%	64%	91%	59%
Hindu treated better	0%	10%	10%	6%	10%	3%	23%
Non-Hindu treated better	0%	1%	1%	1%	2%	1%	2%
Both treated the same (Hindu and Non-Hindu)	95%	82%	82%	76%	77%	93%	69%
Man Treated better	0%	8%	5%	3%	5%	2%	14%
Woman treated better	8%	12%	18%	6%	10%	5%	24%
Both treated the same (Man and Women)	89%	75%	71%	75%	75%	91%	56%
Person who speaks local language Treated better	3%	14%	17%	10%	13%	6%	36%
Person who does not speak the local language treated better	0%	3%	3%	2%	4%	1%	2%
Both treated the same (one who speaks local language and the one who does not)	93%	75%	71%	72%	73%	90%	56%

When we asked this same question about treatment by government officials, we got essentially the same responses, with the rich getting the best treatment, followed by upper castes and Hindus. In our FGDs, some Muslims did report discrimination in government offices. "We went there to take my niece's form for studying. It was in Govind Pura. Hindus were standing ahead and we were behind. They pushed us further behind and said Hindus will come first."

When asked more generally if they believed there was discrimination based on class, religion, caste, language and gender *at the neighborhood level* (Figure 8.1), the positive response rate was very low, about 7% for income, 7.8% for caste, 7.5% for religion, and 6.4% for language. Other cities had similar numbers, though some figures on caste and religious discrimination at the neighborhood level did rise to about 13-15%. In Hyderabad (15.6%), Chennai (13.5%) and Vadodara (15%), greater neighbourhood discrimination was reported on the basis of caste. Vadodara (18%), Hyderabad (13%) and Chennai (11.8%) reported discrimination in neighbourhood on the basis of religion.

When we asked the same question *at the city level* and across all cities , the reported discrimination level rose (Figure 8.2). In Ahmedabad, 11% report discrimination on the basis of caste, 11% on the bais of income and 13% on the basis of religion. Other large cities report similar numbers, but it is interesting to note that Bhavnagar and Kochi have very low numbers across the board.

Figure 8.1: Respondents Reporting Neighbourhood-level Discrimination by Type

Figure 8.2: Respondents Reporting City-level Discrimination by Type

8.2 Social ties

To what degree are social categories simply being reproduced by social ties? To what extent are the lives of urban Indians marked by strong ties (that is, ties defined by primary identities) and to what extent are they defined by weak ties (social connections that go beyond one's community)? It is generally assumed that cities nurture a variety of associational ties, giving individuals opportunities to engage with and develop social ties to those beyond their immediate identity groups. We tried to gauge these questions by asking our respondents about their social ties, specifically how many friends they had outside their caste/community and how often someone in their family married outside their caste/community.

By these measures, Ahmedabad is not very pluralistic. Over two thirds of our respondents (67%) report not having any close friends from a different caste and 65% report they don't have a close friend from outside their religion (Tables 8.2 and 8.3). These are by far the highest reported levels of social endogamy of any city. Ahmedabadis live comparatively segregated social lives.

Differences across social classes are very revealing. As we see in Table 8.4, it is in slums that individuals are most likely to have friends outside their own caste and in informal settlements that this is least likely. Slums do bring together a wide cross-section of Indian society and the sheer density of lived conditions makes the kind of social endogamy practiced in more privileged neighborhoods impractical. Shacks in contrast are often created through land invasions of highly internally networked groups. The informal settlements of Juhapura are an example of this. Their subsequent exclusion and marginalization makes developing broader associational ties almost impossible.

Table 8.2: How many of your friends are from a different caste?

CITY Name	0	1	2	3	4	5
Kochi	35%	24%	20%	6%	2%	2%
Vadodara	57%	23%	8%	1%	0%	0%
Bhavnagar	47%	29%	12%	2%	0%	0%
Ahmedabad	67%	14%	8%	2%	0%	0%
Chennai	25%	21%	21%	4%	0%	0%
Hyderabad	43%	5%	11%	4%	0%	0%
Mumbai	35%	10%	9%	8%	1%	3%

Table 8.3: How many of your friends are from a different religion?

City	0	1	2	3	4	5
Kochi	44%	22%	12%	3%	2%	2%
Vadodara	57%	29%	10%	3%	0%	0%
Bhavnagar	31%	21%	29%	7%	1%	0%
Ahmedabad	64%	13%	10%	4%	1%	0%
Chennai	20%	14%	15%	2%	0%	0%
Hyderabad	41%	6%	11%	4%	0%	0%
Mumbai	39%	7%	7%	4%	1%	1%

Table 8.4: How many of your friends are from a different caste? - Ahmedabad

	0	1	2	3	4	5
HT1	0.85765	0.1032	0.01068	0.00712	NA	NA
HT2	0.59649	0.12558	0.09049	0.04709	0.00646	0.00277
HT3	0.6121	0.17744	0.08941	0.03576	0.011	0.00413
HT4	0.65764	0.133	0.11576	0.0468	0.00985	0.00493
HT5	0.78261	0.06087	0.07826	0.02609	NA	0.01739

As table 8.5 shows, marriage outside caste remains rare (5%) and even more so out of religion (2%). Our focus group discussions made it clear that, even among the poorer communities, marriage outside one's caste is not preferred, but it can be tolerated. And the erring daughter or son can be accepted back in the family, especially when grandchildren are born. No such toleration is possible for inter-religious marriage. Such marriages are largely unheard of, and public opinion is largely opposed to them. "They eat beef, we worship cows," said one focus group participant. On this measure, Ahmedabad is no different than other cities. Indeed, outside of Chennai, we find very little evidence for inter-caste or inter-religious marriages.

Table 8.5: Within your family has anyone married outside caste/Religion?

City	Outside Caste	Outside Religion
Kochi	3%	1%
Vadodara	4%	4%
Bhavnagar	0%	0%
Ahmedabad	4%	2%
Chennai	13%	10%
Hyderabad	7%	6%
Mumbai	5%	4%

To summarize this section, we find that while overall levels of reported discrimination are low, there are some clear patterns. To the extent that there is a sense of discrimination, it is seen as largely benefiting those with higher incomes and less so for those of a higher caste or particular religion. There is also a strong sense that to the extent that there is discrimination, it operates more at the city level than in neighborhoods. Those in the slums are the most likely to report discrimination. Compared to other cities, Ahmedabad is more or less in the middle of the pack when it comes to reported levels of discrimination. When we explored residents' personal networks, we found that very few in Ahmedabad know elected officials and that the city is quite unique in this respect. In fact, residents were far more likely to know informal leaders, a pattern that was especially strong among the lower classes.

Finally, when it comes to social ties, Ahmedbadis are quite parochial, largely sticking to their own castes and religious communities. They also do not tend to marry outside of their caste or community, but this seems to characterize all of our cities - conventional tropes of modern urban life notwithstanding.

9. Conclusion

This report has drawn on a unique and highly representative and robust survey to document service delivery and citizenship in Ahmedabad. This city is widely considered one of India's most economically dynamic cities, home to many Indian corporates and global multinationals. It has also enjoyed comparatively good governance, at least in terms of having a degree of self-governance that sets cities in Gujarat and Maharashtra apart from other Indian cities. And for the past two decades or so, it has been ruled by the same party at the city and state level. Yet, despite these favorable conditions, Ahmedabad is a city marked by significant exclusions and a high degree of inequality across class, caste and religion, when it comes to accessing basic services. It is also a city in which political participation is dominated by OBCs and upper classes and where citizenship - as measured by our index of participation - is quite weak and very unequally distributed.

The overall level of basic service delivery in Ahmedabad is about average for our sample of cities, but it is highly unequal. Those living in informal settlements (shacks and slums) and who constitute 27% of the population have much lower levels of service delivery than their middle and upper class counterparts. Many do not have piped water and most of those who do have to work hard to store water. Many have compromised sanitation, including a large number who do not even have toilets within their households. Informal settlements are much more prone to flooding in their street and their home.

Overall, as measured by our index of basic services, the gap between informal settlements and middle and upper class households is dramatic. Shack dwellers are worse off in Ahmedabad than any other city and by a significant margin. Slums are better off but still well below the various middle classes. The level of service delivery in Ahmedabad's slums is much lower than in the smaller cities, but slightly better than in Chennai and Mumbai. Overall, the class gradient is quite steep, meaning that service delivery is highly differentiated across classes in Ahmedabad. Since housing types are highly clustered, we can conclude that where you live, and specifically what settlement type you live in (informal, designated slum, planned settlement, government housing, etc.), has a huge impact on access to services.

The relationship between caste and well-being in Ahmedabad is unusual. Ahmedabad is the only city where OBCs do marginally better than forward castes in terms of the basic services index. But it is also the city that along with Chennai, has the biggest gap between OBCs and Dalits, which

basically does not exist (or goes in the opposite direction in Hyderabad) in all other six cities (figure 18). Ahmedabad, along with Bhavnagar and Hyderabad, is a city where Muslims clearly receive a lower level of service delivery. The gap in Ahmedabad - 0.80 for Muslims compared to 0.86 for Hindus - is quite significant and similar to the OBC-SC gap.

To a significant degree, the inequities in access to service delivery reflect spatial inequalities. Different settlements are served at different levels. Moreover, settlement types are correlated with caste and religion. Informal settlements (HT1 and HT2) are disproportionately populated by Muslims and SC/STs, though these settlements are home to significant numbers of all social categories. Middle and upper-middle class areas are predominantly OBC/FC and the most privileged neighborhoods (HT5) are upper caste enclaves.

Following the literature on democracy and citizenship, we would expect that urban citizens would use their rights to demand and secure basic services. This does not appear to be the case in Ahmedabad. Ahmedabadis believe that their local representatives (corporators) play an important role in providing services and generally view them positively. But they rely heavily on intermediaries which points to a shortfall in effective representation. Moreover, Ahmedabadis have a fairly narrow and conservative view of citizenship. Ahmebadis see their responsibilities largely in voting (and not so much in terms of respecting others or community engagement) and think people should not criticize the nation. There is also clearly a limited sense of solidarity in the city. A comparatively high percentage of Ahmebadis believe that the state should prohibit inter-caste and inter-community marriage. This itself might reflect the fact that most Ahmebadi's live socially segregated lives, with few social ties outside their primary category (caste or religion). We also found that Ahmedabadis rely more on religious, caste or cultural organizations (30%) than on professional/civic organizations (13%). The city is clearly not the site of emancipation that Ambedkar hoped for.

Though Ahmedebadis are average voters, they don't participate much or engage civically. Upper classes are much more politically active, from registering to vote, to voting, to getting involved in party politics. In contrast, informal settlements (shacks and slums) in Ahmedabad have the lowest levels of participation of any city except Mumbai. In terms of caste, OBCs participate the most and SCs have the lowest levels of participation of any city (tied with Mumbai). Muslims participate significantly less in electoral politics than Hindus. However, they are more active in non-electoral politics, in part possibly to compensate for their relative marginalization from the electoral arena.

To summarize our findings, our data paints a very clear picture of urban differentiation in Ahmedabad. Basic services are very unevenly distributed across social categories of class, caste and religion. This pattern is mirrored in our analysis of citizen participation. Upper classes and OBC are much more active than lower classes and SC/STs, and Muslims are marginalized compared to Hindus. The uneven delivery of basic services has severe developmental consequences, both on the city's economic potential and its residents' well-being. Low and highly uneven levels of citizen participation undermine the quality of democracy and the intrinsic value of citizenship. And if the comparative literature on citizenship is correct, then low and uneven citizenship is also detrimental to good governance.

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