Watson Institute for International & Public Affairs
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SAXENA CENTER FOR CONTEMPORARY SOUTH ASIA

Citizenship, Inequality, and Urban Governance in India: Findings from Bhavnagar

About the Project

The Citizenship, Inequality, and Urban Governance (CIUG) Project is a collaborative project of academics in India and at Brown University. The project aims to systematically collect data on urban India, focusing in particular on assessing the quality of basic services and how urban Indian citizens use their civil, political, and social rights in cities.

About the Saxena Center for Contemporary South Asia

Based at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University, the Saxena Center for Contemporary South Asia (CCSA) supports faculty, graduate, and undergraduate research, as well as teaching on the region, and is home to the South Asian Studies concentration. The Center promotes research, teaching, and public engagement on modern South Asia's key issues in an interdisciplinary framework and in a historically and culturally grounded manner.

Principal Investigators:

Patrick Heller, Brown University

Siddharth Swaminathan, Brown University

Ashutosh Varshney, Brown University

Lead Field Researcher:

Tarun Arora, Jindal Global University

Research Assistants:

Connor Staggs, Brown University

Bhanu Joshi, Brown University

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Executive Summary

Until India's independence, Bhavnagar was a small-size princely state. In 1948, it joined the undivided Bombay province. In 1960, when the Bombay province was split into Maharashtra and Gujarat, Bhavnagar became part of the newly created Gujarat state. Even after becoming a new state, Gujarat's eight municipal corporations, including Bhavnagar, continued to be, and still are, governed by the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act (1949).

According to the 2011 census, Bhavnagar city's population was 643,365. For a medium-sized city, it is quite industrialised. It has always been known for its diamond-polishing, salt making and ship breaking industries. It has a port, which has been involved in maritime trade for a long time.

The city can be divided into two parts: the richer part, which is also newer and has the shopping malls and hotels, and – as in much of urban India – the older part, which is denser. Nonetheless, the overall density is not such that urban expansion is forced to take a vertical form. The city is still expanding horizontally.

Speaking in terms of social groups, the city does not have many Adivasis. But it has a substantial Dalit presence. There is a huge OBC population in the city. OBC MLAs or MPs have often won assembly and parliamentary elections. The city also has a substantial Muslim population, but unlike several other cities of Gujarat, the Hindu-Muslim divide is not deep. During our research, the city's highest police official described Bhavnagar as "communally not hyper sensitive".

Well over half of Forward Castes are upper-middle or upper class, with only 3% in slums. By contrast, nearly 28% of the Other Backward Castes (OBCs) reside in slums, and only 11% in upper class housing. In terms of class, OBCs in the city are nearly as badly off as the Scheduled Castes (SCs).

As for citizen participation in voting, the lower classes vote more than the upper classes, Muslims more than the Hindus, OBCs more than the upper castes and the SCs. Beyond voting, civic participation generates the most important results. Consistent with other Gujarati cities, Bhavnagar citizens participate much more in identity-based organisations than in professional ones (NGOs, labor unions, professional organizations). Slum dwellers have the highest participation rates in organisations that are mostly religion- or caste-based.

On overall availability of public services, Bhavnagar does well, and is just behind Kochi and Vadodara, but well above Chennai, Hyderabad, Ahmedabad and Mumbai.

But the distribution of basic public services across social categories varies considerably. The Forward Castes enjoy the best services followed by OBCs and Dalits. The gap between OBCs and SCs is, however, not huge.

Though the Hindu-Muslim divide is not deep, Bhavnagar is also a city where Muslims get a lower level of service delivery. Some Muslims are substantial businessmen, but for all practical purposes, Muslims are split into two halves – slums and lower middle class. In cross-city terms, Bhavnagar's SCs and Muslims appear to be poorer than in other cities, but the poverty of OBCs is much more striking.

The most pronounced pattern of differentiated access to services emerges along class lines – i.e., by housing types. Shack dwellers are worst off in Bhavnagar, as in all cities, and as expected, the service delivery score increases gradually as we move up the class categories. However, in comparative terms, those living in informal shack settlements are doing better than those living in informal shacks in the other two Gujarati cities in our project. The level of service delivery in Bhavnagar's informal slum settlements is also much better, compared to all bigger cities in our study, though it is not as good as in the two other smaller cities, Kochi and Vadodara.

As elsewhere in Gujarat, water is only available for up to two hours a day in Bhavnagar. But, along with Hyderabad, Bhavnagar has the highest proportion of households having the source of water inside the house, including in the slums.

On sanitation, Bhavnagar is among the best performers across our cities. Though many more Muslims than Hindus have what we call compromised sanitation, only 5% of citizens overall do. On the quality of sanitation, the difference between upper castes and Dalits is the lowest among all cities.

Social life of the city is dominated by caste and religion. Most friendships are intra-caste and intra-religious, more the latter than the former and more so than in most other cities. And marriage outside caste and religion is essentially nonexistent.

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1. Overview of the Project

One of the greatest challenges that India faces in the 21st century is the governance of its cities. Primarily a rural nation thus far, India will be increasingly urban in the coming years and decades. Cities are, moreover, widely viewed as sites of innovation, opportunity and growth. But their full potential can only be achieved if they are well-governed. In any democracy, and especially in one as diverse as India's, the quality of governance is inextricably tied to whether and how citizens exercise their rights. A self-aware citizenry is more likely to produce better outcomes than an inert one.

With this understanding in mind, Brown University along with academic partners in India developed a research project exploring urban governance and citizenship. The project aims to gather systematic and robust data on the relationship between citizenship, basic services, and infrastructure delivery in cities across India.

Our first publications covered Bengaluru (Bertorelli et al. 2014; Heller et al. 2023). We have since conducted research in 14 other cities, including Kochi. In this report, we provide a comprehensive overview of our findings from Bhavnagar. Where appropriate, we compare our findings for Bhavnagar to six other cities that were included in the first wave of the project. These include four megacities - Mumbai, Hyderabad, Ahmedabad, and Chennai - and two smaller cities - Kochi and Vadodara. The findings are based on the joint team's extensive research, which included focus groups, key respondent interviews, and a large and comprehensive household survey. A report on all 14 cities can be found at CIUG-14Cities.

1.1 Why Study Citizenship and Basic Services

Citizenship rights are at the heart of modern democracy. The rights conferred upon citizens have both intrinsic and instrumental value. Citizens may value their rights as a recognition of their fundamental dignity as individuals. But citizenship also empowers individuals to organise, to exert voice, to demand accountability, and to make substantive claims on the state. This ideal of citizenship is, however, contravened by social and institutional realities. Persistent material and status inequality mean that citizens' actual, as opposed to legal, rights can be highly differentiated, with some groups or classes being much better positioned to use their rights. Institutional weaknesses mean that the law and government bureaucracies can treat citizens quite differently. A growing body of research has, moreover, shown that the quality of citizenship varies not only across countries but also across sub-national entities and cities (O'Donnell 2004; Baiocchi et al. 2011).

But what exactly does citizenship look like, and how can we assess it?

The classic theoretical statement on citizenship is Marshall's *Citizenship and Social Class*.[1] Marshall sought to divide citizenship into three components: civil, political, and social. The civil component referred to individual freedoms, such as the freedom of speech, religion, association, and the right to property, contracts and justice. The courts were the main institutions concerned with this aspect of citizenship. The political component of citizenship encompassed franchise as well as the right to run for office. The local governments and legislatures were the principal institutional arenas for these rights. The third, social, element of citizenship, was split by Marshall into two parts: (a) "the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security" and (b) "the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society" (Marshall 1992: 8). The so-called social services, especially (though not only) public provision of healthcare and education, were the institutions most closely associated with the third set of rights. This third aspect of citizenship, also called social citizenship, is tied to the rise of a welfare state.

It is noteworthy that Marshall conceptualised the problem of deprivation entirely in class terms. It was the economically poor, who had "the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security" and "the right to share to the full in the social heritage." If the state did not guarantee such rights and make allocations for them through state-financed health, housing, and education schemes, markets would not provide them. Indeed, left unchecked, markets would deprive the poor of full citizenship. Markets might be consistent with political and civil citizenship, but they were certainly in conflict with social citizenship.

The relative neglect of non-class forms of exclusion, which, as we shall see, play a big role in India, comes with some other limitations of the Marshallian model. Most notably, Marshall conflated *rights-as-status* with *rights-as-practice*. All citizens are presumed to have the basic rights and the capacity to exercise free will, associate as they choose and vote for who and what they prefer. Unlike Marshall, Somers (1993) has argued that this conventional treatment wrongly equates the status of citizenship (a *bundle of rights*) with the practice of citizenship (*a set of practices and relationships*). Formal rights matter, but formal rights must also be actionable. Somers goes on to argue that given the highly uneven rates of political participation and influence across social categories that persist in richer democracies (especially the United States), the notion of citizenship should always be viewed as contested. But in the context of democracies in developing countries, where inequalities can be even higher and access to rights is also often circumscribed by social position and low overall literacy, or compromised by the state's

[1] T. H, Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class*, [1992 (1950)]

institutional weaknesses, the problem can become even more serious (Heller, 2000; Mahajan, 1999; Fox, 1994).

Which communities of India, defined in non-class terms, experience truncated citizenship? Given what we know from existing studies, Dalits[2] (Scheduled Castes, or SCs), Adivasis[3] (Scheduled Tribes, or STs), Muslims and women are some of the obvious candidates for investigation. Also, relevant here is an Ambedkar idea. He used to call the village a cesspool for Dalits and viewed the city as a site of potential emancipation. **Is that true?** Are cities sites where achievement and ability matter more than the social origin? Or do caste inequalities and discrimination (as well as other social markers) persist in urban India, compromising citizenship? By definition, this question acquires significance in the study of citizenship in urban India.

We thus seek to go beyond Marshall and much of the contemporary literature on citizenship in two ways. First, Marshall's concentration is on class deprivation; we include non-class forms of deprivation – caste, religion and gender – as well. In the Indian context, these are important sources of social exclusion in their own right. Second, Marshall focuses on the legal availability of rights, not on how the legally enshrined rights are experienced on the ground. Our focus is less on the laws or rights in theory, more on the practices on the ground.

Echoing Somers (1993), as noted above, we argue that the formal nature of citizenship, rights-as-status or the legal codification of basic rights of citizenship, should be analytically distinguished from its efficacy (rights-as-practice), that is, the degree to which a citizen can effectively use their rights independently of their social position and without compromising their ability to speak and organise freely. There is no dispute as to the formal character of citizenship in India, at least with respect to basic civic and political rights. These are enshrined in the constitution, have been upheld by the courts and are the bread-and-butter of Indian democratic life. Social rights in the Marshallian sense – right to food and education, if not health - have only recently come into play as formal rights of citizenship, although the principle of being able to deploy civic and political rights to demand social rights has been well established for some time.

The effective dimension of citizenship is, in contrast, much less clear, and in fact, presents the central conceptual and empirical challenge of this study. How effectively do urban Indians use

[2] "Dalit" is the term now used to describe what were historically referred to as "untouchable" castes. The term "scheduled caste" is the bureaucratic category. Because most readers familiar with India will be used to seeing data presented using the bureaucratic term, we use SC in reporting data, but use Dalit elsehwere.

[3] "Adivasi" is the term used to describe populations in India that live outside the major religious groups, and that elsewhere would be designated as indigenous. They are originally concentrated in areas that are hilly or forest-based. The bureaucratic term for them is ST(Scheduled Tribes), but the political term is Adivasi. Because most readers familiar with India will be used to seeing data presented using the bureaucratic term, we use ST in reporting data, but use Adivasi elsehwere.

their rights to associate, vote, participate, and engage the state? There is certainly widespread recognition that India's citizenship is highly differentiated. Chatterjee's claim that the realm of civil society – the realm in which citizens use their rights – is largely the privileged domain of the middle classes and that the poor have only their electoral clout to work with has become a dominant argument in the literature (Chatterjee 2006). Is Chatterjee right? Do the poor exercise only political, not civil, rights?

We argue that effective citizenship means essentially two things. First, it means being able to effectively participate in public life. This cannot merely be confined to voting but means enjoying the freedom to engage in public activities, and mobilise and organise freely. Democratic citizenship can't just be about elections, but also how citizens experience their day-to-day lives between elections.

Second, effective citizenship means actually being able to claim and obtain public goods from the state. The welfare state in the Indian context remains poorly developed, yet the state does provide key services such as water, sanitation, housing and transport that are critical to building basic capabilities of citizens. The participatory and the substantive dimensions of effective citizenship stand in a potentially mutually reinforcing relationship to each other. More effective participatory citizenship can lead to better substantive provisioning of public services, which in turn enhances participatory capacity. A large body of research has documented the substantive impact of this demand-side of citizenship, linking more politically and civically engaged citizens with higher levels of welfare (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992; Esping-Anderson 1990; Putnam 1993, Baiocchi et al. 2011, Kruks-Wisner 2018).

In this report, we focus on basic services as a substantive goal and measure of effective citizenship for three reasons. First, either by law or by basic political pressure, all Indian cities are compelled to provide a modicum of basic services. In contrast to health and education, which are provided through a multiplicity of government agencies at different levels (local, state, central) and through different programs and allocations (e.g., specified subsidies or programs for specific groups), basic public services are generally provided by a single agency (municipal or state) and *in principle* on a universal basis. Second, access to basic services is critical to enhancing capabilities. Having clean and reliable water and sanitation, good transportation and decent housing are not only directly supportive of better health and education, but they also allow urban citizens to make the most of the opportunities in cities. Conversely, rationing access to these basic amenities is arguably one of the most important basic sources of urban inequality, as witnessed by the perverse developmental effects of slums. Third, compared to other social rights, basic services are relatively easy to measure. In earlier work on Bengaluru, we have established a statistical relationship between our measures of citizenship and service delivery (Bertorelli et al. 2017).

This report provides a descriptive analysis of service delivery and how it varies across social categories in Bhavnagar. The next section provides an introduction to Bhavnagar's history and governance, followed by a detailed description of how our data was collected. Later, we begin reporting on our findings.

2. Bhavnagar: Brief Historical Overview

Other than modern-day Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat had perhaps the highest number of princely states during India's British era (1757-1947). As is well known, all princely states were indirectly ruled. The prince was in charge of day-to-day administration and cultural matters, whereas sovereignty belonged to the British. Bhavnagar, a princely state, was no exception. It was a small-size Gujarati princely state, not as widely known as Baroda (now Vadodara), Jamnagar, or Rajkot.

After independence, like so many other princely states (all except three – Kashmir, Hyderabad and Junagadh), Bhavnagar readily accepted Delhi's sovereignty. In 1948, it joined the undivided Bombay province, which had both Marathi, Gujarati and Kannada speaking populations. In 1960, when the Bombay province was split into Maharashtra and Gujarat, Bhavnagar became part of the newly created Gujarat state. Even after its emergence as a new state, Gujarat's eight municipal corporations, including Bhavnagar, continued to be, and still are, governed by the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act (1949).

According to the 2011 census, Bhavnagar city's population was 643,365. For a medium-sized city, it is quite industrialised. It has always been known for its diamond-polishing, salt making and ship breaking industries. It has a port, which has been involved in maritime trade for a long time.

The city's electricity is supplied by Gujarat Urja Vikas, a public sector company, which was earlier the Gujarat Electricity Board. Like elsewhere in Gujarat, a water-deficit state, piped water comes to the city for roughly two hours a day, and its citizens must store water for various uses. The city can be divided into two parts: the richer part, which is also newer and has the shopping malls and hotels, and –as in much of urban India – the older part, which is denser. Nonetheless, the overall density is not such that urban expansion is forced to take a vertical form; the city is still expanding horizontally.

Speaking in terms of social groups, the city does not have many Adivasis. But it has a substantial Dalit presence. There is also a huge OBC population in the city, the Kolis being numerically the largest. Partly as a result, Koli MLAs or MPs have often been elected as political representatives

in assembly and parliamentary elections. Finally, the city has a substantial Muslim population, but unlike several other cities of Gujarat, the Hindu-Muslim divide is not deep. The city's highest police official described Bhavnagar as "communally not hyper sensitive". Muslims have a considerable presence in the city's business community.

With the prominent exception of electricity, supplied by the state government, most public services are provided by the municipal corporation, including sanitation, water, roads, traffic management, public health and primary education. Town planning is a municipal function, and the corporation collects property taxes as well, which is a big source of municipal revenue. The structure of local government is the same as in all municipal corporations in Gujarat. The municipal commissioner, appointed by the state government and normally an IAS officer, is the executive head. Next in line are the standing committees and then the general assembly.

The corporators are elected every five years, constituting the general assembly of the corporation. The members of the ruling party are put on the corporation's standing committee, whose approval for the city's project is necessary before it is submitted to the general assembly.

The elected corporators pick two mayors, each for a two and half year term. The mayor is thus not directly elected, and the mayoral powers are largely symbolic. The municipal commissioner holds the most powerful office of the corporation, including making and proposing the annual budget. Municipal commissioners also approve projects submitted by the elected corporators for their constituencies.

The biggest part of the municipal revenue consists of the property tax and the state's octroi compensation. Smaller, though substantial, revenues are provided by the education cess, the town planning cess and the vehicle tax. Two kinds of grants – from the central and state government respectively – provide further resources. Grants received from the state government often constitute a substantial part of the budget.

3. Methods and Data Collection

For every city studied in this project, we have followed the same nested research strategy. In each city we began with field visits by the team to conduct interviews with key respondents (city commissioners, corporators, heads of municipal departments, civil society activists). These primary materials were supplemented with secondary works dealing with the historical and contemporary accounts of urban governance in the selected cities. We also conducted 2-5 focus group discussions (FGDs) in each city, especially in shack settlements (shacks hereafter) and

informal slums (as opposed to what are in government terminology called slums).[4] We focused on shacks and informal slums because these are where the practice of citizenship and access to services are most compromised. Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were conducted in each city with different target groups. The group size in each FGD varied from 10 to 15 members. The FGDs were conducted with SC/ST women, Muslim women, and a mixed group of people, both male and female, typically from very low-income neighborhoods. We also felt it was important to hear directly from those who are the most marginalized in urban India. In each city, we conducted at least one focus group with Dalits and another with Muslims.[5]

The goal of the focus groups was twofold. The first was to collect qualitative data on how citizens access services, how they engage with politicians and the state, how communities are organized and how subaltern communities in particular understand their rights. The second was to use focus group responses to adapt and fine tune our survey instrument to actual conditions and practices in these communities. Depending on the size of the city, the sample ranged from 1,000 to 3,000 households. In Bhavnagar, we sampled 1,001 households.

Our design and sampling strategy enables us to generate a representative sample of households within a city stratified along caste, religion, and class dimensions. We elaborate on the methods we employed to create a sampling frame, select households, and respondents from within households (including the training process) in detail in Appendix 4. Before we present how the sample was drawn, we outline our measure of class as defined by housing types.

3.1 Measuring Class by Housing Type (HT)

Measuring class is a notoriously difficult proposition. There are definitional and measurement problems. Though we collected data on household assets, we decided that our Housing Type (HT) measure is the most reliable measure of class (See also Appendix 4 for additional details).

Conceptually, housing type conveys a very different material dimension of class than assets. Assets are, for the most part, procured on the market and directly reflect purchasing power — that is, income.[6] By contrast, access to housing in India is driven by market forces that are highly regulated and sometimes directly supplied by the state, and shaped by social networks. As such, in addition to disposable income, housing type will also reflect one's location in both formal and informal networks of distribution, including access through state patronage, inherited position,

[4] See footnote 22 for differences in how "slums" are defined.

[5] Since it is mostly women who are responsible for running the household and who are generally more aware than their male counterparts of the quality of public service delivery in their neighbourhoods, the team felt that it was important to take the views of women on public services.

[6] Household assets may also be easily under or over-reported by respondents, leading to a biased measure of relative wealth. Using a non-self-reported measure such as housing type helps to remove such concerns.

strategic networks etc. In this sense, "housing type" is a much noisier proxy for class but is also more likely to capture the actual dynamics of *class practices* in an Indian city. Another key advantage of our HT variable is that it was not self-reported. Instead, field surveyors, after receiving extensive field training, were asked to classify every household in every polling part we sampled into one of five HTs. We confirmed a very robust record across surveyors of assigning classification from the pilots conducted in every city. The classifications were as follows:

HT 1: Informal settlement (shack)
HT 2: Informal settlement (slum)
HT 3: Lower middle-class housing
HT 4: Middle-class housing
HT 5: Upper-class housing

Detailed descriptions of each housing type and pictures showing examples of each classification are presented in Appendix 5. It is important to comment here on HT1 and HT2. The census definition of slums is disaggregated into three types: designated, recognized and identified. These designations are bureaucratic and political, and they are also inevitably somewhat arbitrary.[7] This is because they depend on varying definitions and on how officials subjectively evaluate the overall nature of a neighbourhood. Critics (Bhan and Jana 2013) have pointed out that the census definition suffers from two problems. First, many small shack settlements are often simply not counted in the census either because they don't meet a size threshold or simply have not been recognized. Second, many shacks or very poorly constructed houses that are located in non-slum neighborhoods are not counted as part of the slum population even though they may otherwise meet all the criteria for being slum-like. To correct for this, our classifications are based on the *housing type itself*, not on the status of the neighbourhood in which it is located (slum or other). Also, because of the problem of unseen or unnotified settlements, we also created a booster sample of informal shack settlements. We classify both HT1 (shacks) and HT2 (slums) as "informal" to underscore the precarious and degraded nature of such housing but, to simplify, deploy the term "shacks" for HT1 and the term "informal slums" for HT2. We use the term "informal slum" so as not to confuse our category with the census categories of slums.

To reiterate, our categories of HT1 and HT2 refer to the *housing type*. They are both housing types that are clearly slum-like and categorized as such *whether or not* they are located in what

[7] "Under Section-3 of the Slum Area Improvement and Clearance Act, 1956, slums have been defined as mainly those residential areas where dwellings are in any respect unfit for human habitation by reasons of dilapidation, overcrowding, faulty arrangements and designs of such buildings, narrowness or faulty arrangement of streets, lack of ventilation, light, sanitation facilities or any combination of these factors which are detrimental to safety, health and morals." (Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner, India, Primary Census Abstract for Slum, 2011). See also footnote 19.

the census designates as a slum. We note two possible sources of difference between our classification system and that of the census. First, as already noted, between classifying the housing type rather than the neighbourhood and having a booster sample for shacks, we believe we are capturing many slum-like households that are not captured in the census. Second, and going in the opposite direction, our classification would not designate as slum-like (HT1 or HT2) the many houses that are of higher quality (HT3 and even HT4) but that are sometimes located in areas that have been designated as slums by the Census. An obvious example would be Old Delhi: the dense conditions and poor overall infrastructure have produced an official recognition as a slum, but many of the houses located there are of the same quality as houses in non-slum areas and more properly designated as lower middle class (HT3) or middle class (HT4).

3.2 Household Survey

Developing a representative sample in Indian cities is a major challenge. First, there are no reliable baseline sampling frames from which to draw a representative sample.[8] Second, the informal nature of many settlements in Indian cities poses the risk of under counting certain populations, most notably those who live in informal shack settlements or other impermanent settings.[9] Third, as with any sample, for groups that are only a small proportion of the total population (e.g. Adivasis) we run the risk of getting too few respondents for statistical analysis. To address these challenges, we developed a sampling strategy that stratifies the sampling frame based on Muslims and SC/STs, and generated an additional frame to include informal settlements using a spatial strategy.

3.3 Classifying and Sampling Polling Parts

To sample respondents for the survey, we first identified the Assembly Constituencies (ACs) in each city and obtained lists of all polling parts in the wards that fall within these ACs. We chose to work with polling parts because these are defined in all cities using the same methodology by the Election Commission of India. Furthermore, they can be geographically located through information and maps on the electoral list, or if not, a landmark within them can be identified, such as a polling station or a police station.

We stratified the list of ACs/wards and polling parts based on the population distribution of SC/STs and Muslims in order to ensure sufficient coverage of SC/STs and Muslims. For SC/STs this was done by using 2011 census data to identify wards with high SC/ST proportions. Religion

[8] It is common knowledge that urban voter lists which are most commonly used as sampling frames are riddled with errors of deletion and addition of urban constituents, which renders them unsuitable for sampling respondents directly.

[9] This is confounded by erratic and unstructured planning generally across urban centres, with inconsistent door and road numbering, area demarcation, etc.

is not reported at the ward level in the census, so we identified high proportion Muslim wards from key respondent interviews. Using a "proportion to size" approach, we then included a proportion of these high SC/ST and high Muslim wards in the overall set of wards from which we then randomly selected between 29-94 polling parts (city and sample-size dependent). Each polling part tends to have 300 to 350 households and around 1000 to 1400 constituents. In Bhavnagar, 34 polling parts were sampled this way.

3.4 Booster Sample

During the survey period, to boost the inclusion of citizens from lower socio-economic classes, we decided to add a series of booster polling parts to the sample (over and above the polling parts mentioned above). This was for all cities except Mumbai. We did this by identifying areas with larger proportions of informal settlements, particularly informal shacks, through local knowledge and by searching on Google Earth, particularly for visible blue tarp. The same process, as described below, was then applied except only informal shacks were sampled. An additional 10 polling parts were sampled in this way in Bhavnagar.

3.5 Listing Buildings in Sampled Polling Parts

For each polling part we used Google maps to pin the polling station location and created an area map of a 100 metre radius around this pin. Every structure - from informal shacks to buildings with multiple units, temples, malls, etc. - in the area covered by the base map was counted, listed and drawn onto the base map. Each *residential* building was assigned a housing type (HT) category. Other buildings or landmarks were listed as they were, such as a temple or a mall but not assigned a HT. For the full listing purpose, five categories of housing type were used: HT-1 (Informal shacks), HT-2 (Informal slums), HT-3 (Lower middle class), HT-4 (Middle class) and HT-5 (Upper class housing). This listing and categorization were done by a field team which literally walked through the entire area identified in the base maps and drew the buildings onto the base maps and assigned the housing type. The parameters used to decide on the housing type categories are outlined in Appendix 4 and for an example of the household listing for a polling part see Appendix 5.

3.6 Sampling Buildings and Households

Once the total number of buildings were counted, listed and given a housing type designation, a sampling interval was determined, and households were systematically sampled with a random start in each polling part. The skipping pattern -- to decide which building was to be selected -- was based on the skipping number, calculated using the total number of buildings in the area map of the city and the total number of households to be sampled from those buildings (one per building) in that area.

Once the building was selected, the interviewer had to achieve one interview from that building (i.e. one respondent from one household). If the building was a multi-story building or an apartment-like structure with multiple households, the interviewers had to follow the right-hand rule and select the block on their right side and to start from the top floor of that block or building. Once inside, the field team had to approach the apartment nearest to the place they entered and move clockwise.

In Bhavnagar we achieved a sample of 1,001 citizens across 34 polling parts (including 6 booster polling parts). The response rate to the survey was 89%, with 127 instances of refusals or doors locked on multiple visits.

3.7 Sampling Respondents

For each household, a single respondent who was 18 years or older and who had lived in the city for at least a year was randomly selected. If an interview could not be obtained after three visits, an alternative respondent was identified through a protocol for household selection aligned with our sampling criteria. The survey instrument was digitized and available in six languages: English, Hindi, Gujarati, Tamil, Telugu, and Malayalam. In all, the survey included 167 questions (though routing was applied where relevant so citizens would not necessarily answer all questions) and took on average 45-60 minutes. All interviews were conducted by enumerators with the appropriate language qualifications and were trained through workshops and pilots conducted by our field team. The enumerators in each city were trained in three rounds. The first round of training happened in January 2019 where city heads and managers were trained on the questionnaire and the field survey's nuances at a common location. They, in turn, trained their local field staff in their respective cities. The second round of training happened in early February 2019, where the project team travelled and trained the enumerators just before the pilot survey. The final round of training was done before the main survey commenced. Over 100 enumerators across seven cities were trained to conduct the listing and survey work.

4. Findings

4.1 Demography

Our survey collected demographic information on gender, education, religion, and caste groups. In addition, the survey enumerators were tasked with identifying the housing type of each respondent's dwelling. As reported above, dwellings were categorised as one of five types: informal shack settlements (HT1), informal slum settlements (HT2), lower middle class (HT3), middle class (HT4), and upper class (HT5). In the sample, informal shacks/slums were deliberately oversampled. This was done by including a "booster" sample which was in addition

to the original randomised sample. By oversampling the lower housing types, we have also increased the sample proportions for Dalits (SC), Adivasis (ST) and Muslims. The second row of data in Table 4.1 shows the raw figures from our sample which may have increased the proportions of SC/STs and Muslims. For instance, Muslims represent 14% of our sample compared to only 12% in the census. Similarly, Dalits represent 13% in our sample comprising only 6% of the population in the census, and Adivasis are 1.2% in our sample compared to 0.65% in the census (Table 4.1). The advantage of such oversampling is that it ensures sufficient representation for groups that in a purely random sample might be undercounted. For instance, had we sampled using the Census figures, we would have only interviewed about 60 Dalit households in Bhavnagar. Instead, we have 126 such households.

Our sample numbers for slums (HT1s and HT2s combined) from the house-listing data are the same as reported by the Census 2011 (10%), unlike in other cities (for instance, Vadodara) where Census 2011 underestimates slums.

One of the reasons for the different slum numbers is definitional. Fundamentally, the two national slum enumeration exercises by the Census of India and the National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) differ in their methods of identifying slum settlements. As briefly mentioned above, the Census of India enumerates three kinds of slums (1) notified slums, i.e. notified by a statute including Slum Acts, (2) recognised slums, i.e. which may not be notified by a statute or law but are otherwise recognised by state or local authorities, and (3) identified slums, which are compact areas with at least 300 residents or about 60-70 households in poorly built, congested tenements, in unhygienic environments, usually with inadequate infrastructure and lacking in proper sanitary and drinking water facilities. The last category of slums is "identified personally by the Charge Officer and inspected by an officer nominated by the District Census Officer ". Unlike the Census, the NSSO's count is more generous -- it counts both notified and non-notified slums but keeps the lower cut-off limit for non-notified slums at 20 or more households.

Our survey differs in that we are counting individual households that meet our definition of a slum and that, as such, we do not have a minimum threshold. Critically, the national surveys do not always count small clusters of households (below 60-70 households for Census definition, and below 20 for NSSO) as slums, nor do they count slum-like housing in areas not otherwise classified as slums. This makes us confident that our methodology captures households that the NSSO and the Census omit. It is also possible that our listing captures settlements that have cropped up since the last census date (2011). If that latter point is true, it would indicate that the overall percentage of shack areas has increased since 2011.

A general comment on slum enumeration is also necessary. Since definitions of slums (particularly identified slums) are anchored in subjective criteria, like dilapidation, overcrowding, and lack of ventilation, the absence of clear protocols to stratify households can lead to severe

undercounting. An NSSO official was quoted in the press saying, "The dividing line between 'narrow' and 'non-narrow' will be drawn differently by different survey officials, and the same is true for 'overcrowded', 'dilapidated', 'faulty', and so on". Also, Census 2011 enumerated 40,309 identified slums, which formed 37% of the total slums in India. While the Census' household cluster threshold for slums is thrice that of NSSO for one part of its definition, the Census projection was higher than the NSSO's projection. This mismatch could be attributed to the differing methodology discussed above . Still, it only goes towards our point about the need for a careful interpretation of the official slum data.

In Table 4.2, we present the caste distribution of our Bhavnagar sample comparatively. Compared to other cities, Bhavnagar has the highest proportion of upper (forward) castes.

Table 4.1: Census and Sample Compared

	Population			**Religion**				**SC/ST**		**Slum**
Variable	**City**	**M**	**F**	**Hindu**	**Muslim**	**Christian**	**Other**	**SC**	**ST**	**Slum**
Census 2011	593,368	52%	48%	85%	12%	3%	6%	0.7%	10%	593,368
Raw Sample	1,001	43%	57%	84%	14%	2%	13%	1.2%	39%	1,001
Weighted Sample	1,001	39%	61%	92%	5%	3%	6%	0.7%	10%	1,001

Table 4.2: Caste Proportions

City	**Forward Caste**	**OBC**	**SC**	**ST**	**Other**
Kochi	27%	60%	5%	2%	6%
Vadodara	56%	25%	17%	2%	0%
Bhavnagar	71%	22%	6%	1%	1%
Ahmedabad	39%	38%	9%	5%	9%
Chennai	13%	52%	22%	4%	10%
Hyderabad	7%	44%	22%	10%	16%
Mumbai	68%	6%	12%	4%	9%

When it comes to education (Table 4.3), only 2% of Bhavnagar respondents had no formal schooling. The highest proportion of our respondents are educated till the SSC/HSC level followed by schooling from 5-9 years. Those who are college graduates or above are 15% of the Bhavnagar sample. Table 4.4 presents the religious proportions of our sample comparatively. Muslim percentage of our Bhavnagar sample is the lowest across our cities.

Table 4.3: Education

No Schooling	**School: < 4 years**	**School: 5-9 years**	**School: SSC/HSC**	**College, but not graduated**	**College Graduate & Above**
2%	4%	24%	35%	15%	19%

Table 4.4: Religion proportions

City	Hindu	Muslim	Other
Kochi	49%	19%	32%[10]
Vadodara	88%	10%	3%
Bhavnagar	92%	5%	3%
Ahmedabad	77%	18%	5%
Chennai	87%	7%	7%
Hyderabad	68%	30%	2%
Kochi	49%	19%	32%
Mumbai	79%	15%	6%

4.2 Weighting

We have chosen to reweigh the sample data according to the respondents' housing type. From our previous work, we know that our housing type measure is the biggest predictor among all our socio-economic variables for levels of service delivery and citizenship. As a principle, weighting necessitates that there are reliable population margins for all categories of a variable upon which one seeks to adjust one's data[11]. Since we lack reliable population counts for OBCs and General/Forward Castes (the census only reports SC/ST), we need a more creative method of weighting. Given the relatively poor economic conditions of many individuals belonging to SC/ST groups, we expect that weighting along the housing type will reduce bias and make our sample more representative.

While the key purpose of weighting the estimates is to adjust for oversampling from HT1 households, we also use the same weights to ensure that the sample proportions for Dalits, Adivasis, and Muslims match the population proportions for each city.

We expect the housing type weights to also adjust proportions of Dalits, Adivasis, and Muslims in the weighted sample, because we expect a larger share of Dalits, Adivasis, and Muslims to be

[10] In our Kochi sample, 99% of those belonging to "Other" religious groups were Christians.
[11] Solon, Gary; Steven J. Haider, and Jeffrey M. Wooldridge. 2015. "What Are We Weighting For?," *Journal of Human Resources*, 50(2): 301-316.

located in informal housing. However, we need to be clear that the weights are expected to produce an accurate adjustment only if the difference between sample and population proportions of Dalits, Adivasis, and Muslims in our sample is entirely due to the HT1 oversampling (i.e., HT1 has a relatively higher concentration of Dalits, Adivasis, and Muslims). We expect the weights to be less precise if we cannot be certain if the differences in sample and population proportions of caste-community are from the other housing types in addition to HT1. To develop the weights by housing type, we used our own listing data. The listing data (as explained above) are based on a full inventory of all the households located in our geographically delineated sections of our randomly selected polling parts. The listing data does not include the booster sample of informal settlements. As reflected by the raw sample proportions in Table 4.1, the inclusion of the booster significantly increased the share of shacks and informal slums (HT1 and HT2). A more detailed note on our weighting strategy can be found in Appendix 1.

Given the debate on slums that we note earlier, we create an additional set of weights that use city-level slum household counts from the Primary Census Abstract (Census 2011, see footnote 15). These alternate census based weights serve both as a comparison to our listing weights as well as a robustness check. We use the latter here (only for Table 4.5) to examine how our sample adjustments align with the Census 2011 results, and use the listing weights for all other reported results.

4.3 Housing Types in Bhavnagar

In order to be consistent with other city reports, Table 4.5 exceptionally uses weights based on the census. As Table 4.5 shows, when we weight by census data, 7.6% of households in Ahmedabad live in informal settlements, shacks and slums combined (HT1 and HT2). Earlier in Table 4.1, we found a figure of 27% based on listing data weights for HT1 and HT2. Both of our weightings generate a higher figure than the census figure of 4.5% for 2011. The discrepancy between the listing and the census adjusted weights reflects what we believe in the systematic undercounting of informal settlements in census data.

As is true of cities worldwide, Indian cities are spatially segregated by class, caste and religion. There is an emerging literature in India on spatial segregation, but the spatial analysis is often limited by the lack of data at the local level. Our data was collected at the polling part level and we plan to conduct further research using this data on spatial inequality. Here we examine segregation based on housing type, which is our measure of class. Throughout the report, we break down all of our findings by class (housing types), caste and religious community, and when relevant, by gender, education and migration status. In this section, we look at the relationship between class, caste and religion. As Table 4.5 shows, 10.1% of households in Bhavnagar live in

informal settlements, shacks and slums combined (HT1 and HT2). This is much higher than the census figure of 5% for 2011. It is, however, lower than all other cities except Kochi (5.5%).

Table 4.5: Housing Type Distribution Across Cities - *Weighted Sample Data*

City	**HT1 Shacks**	**HT2 Slums**	**HT3 - Lower Middle-Class**	**HT4 - Upper Middle-Class**	**HT5 - Upper-Class**
Kochi	0.2% (4%)	1.2% (25%)	52.5% (37.9%)	13.0% (9.4%)	33.1% (24.0%)
Vadodara	2.3% (11.9%)	5.7% (30%)	40.8% (25.8%)	42.9% (27%)	8.3% (5.2%)
Ahmedabad	1.6% (9.3%)	6.0% (35.9%)	40.6% (24.1%)	45.4% (27.0%)	6.4% (3.8%)
Bhavnagar	3.2% (8.6%)	11.4% (30.5%)	39.5% (28.2%)	29.4% (21%)	16.5% (11.8%)
Chennai	9.4% (9.9%)	19.7% (20.8%)	41.6% (40.7%)	24.2% (23.7%)	5.1% (5.0%)
Hyderabad	7.9% (9.1%)	27.5% (31.6%)	41.6% (38.1%)	15.9% (14.5%)	7.3% (6.7%)
Mumbai	23.1%	39.5%	16.8%	17.9%	2.7%

Unweighted proportions in parentheses. The weights used in this table are derived from the census and do not list the data. See 14 Cities Report for full details.

4.4 Sample Composition: Relationships between Class (Housing Type), Caste and Religion

Our data from Bhavnagar reveal striking inequalities between caste and religious groups. The traditionally disadvantaged groups in India, such as the SCs and Muslims, have no presence at all in the highest housing type (upper class housing, HT5) (Table 4.6)

Let us now look at the caste patterns. SCs are the worst-off. OBCs are much more spread-out. Forward Castes are not present at all in the lowest housing type (informal shack settlements), and are the most highly concentrated group in the highest two housing categories. It can be said that caste concentrations in the various housing types follow traditional patterns of socioeconomic inequities. Looking at religion, we see that our Muslim sample is entirely concentrated in HT2 and HT3 housing. In contrast, Hindus are more spread out. This is to be expected, given the exceptional heterogeneity of the caste distribution discussed earlier.

Table 4.6: Distribution of caste and religious groups across housing types

Housing Type	**SC**	**OBC**	**Forward**	**Other**	**Hindu**	**Muslim**
HT1	0.3%	0.1%	0%	0%	0.1%	0%
HT2	30%	27%	3%	3%	8%	45%
HT3	23%	19%	7%	9%	8%	55%
HT4	46%	44%	67%	57%	64%	0%
HT5	0%	11%	23%	31%	19%	0%

We also examine socioeconomic disparities across our cities by measuring the relative proportion of certain groups that are located in "informal" housing - captured by the lowest two HTs in our survey (Table 4.7). By this measure, we see that the SCs in Bhavnagar are quite heavily located in informal housing, particularly slums. In general, SCs fare particularly poorly across our sampled cities, with the possible exceptions of Kochi and Vadodara.

In terms of religion, as Table 4.8 shows, 45% of Muslim households in Bhavnagar are located in the lowest housing categories (especially HT2). This figure is pretty close to Ahmedabad and Hyderabad, especially the latter. Only Mumbai has a higher proportion of Muslims in HT1 and HT2. Hindus are much less likely to be so clearly concentrated in the lowest two housing types.

Table 4.7: Proportion of Dalits/Adivasis in each city living in informal (HT1+HT2) housing

City	**Caste Group**	**HT1 - Shacks**	**HT 2 - Slums**	**Total (Informal)**
Bhavnagar	SC	0.3%	30%	31%
	ST[12]	1%	5%	6%
Ahmedabad	SC	1%	48%	49%
	ST	6%	38%	44%
Chennai	SC	8%	28%	36%
	ST	1%	9%	11%
Hyderabad	SC	2%	29%	31%
	ST	1%	22%	24%
Kochi	SC	0%	9%	9%
	ST	0%	10%	10%
Mumbai	SC	31%	38%	69%
	ST	40%	39%	79%
Vadodara	SC	1%	13%	14%
	ST	8%	39%	47%

We now present the same data, but this time we look at the caste and religious composition of different housing types. In other words, given that housing types are generally clustered together, just how diverse or homogenous are these settlements in terms of caste and religion? Conversely, how exclusionary might these types of settlements be?

[12] Note the small sample size (n = 12) for STs in Bhavnagar. While the SC percentages for Bhavnagar make a lot of sense, the ST percentages are not so relevant because of their small size. We list them here only for the sake of completion.

Table 4.8: Proportion of Hindus/Muslims in each city living in informal housing

City	Religion	HT1	HT2	Total (Informal)
Bhavnagar	Hindu	0%	8%	8%
Bhavnagar	Muslim	0%	45%	45%
Ahmedabad	Hindu	1%	25%	26%
Ahmedabad	Muslim	1%	38%	38%
Chennai	Hindu	2%	13%	15%
Chennai	Muslim	1%	6%	8%
Hyderabad	Hindu	2%	27%	29%
Hyderabad	Muslim	0%	41%	42%
Kochi	Hindu	0%	6%	6%
Kochi	Muslim	0%	6%	6%
Mumbai	Hindu	21%	39%	60%
Mumbai	Muslim	35%	38%	73%
Vadodara	Hindu	0.5%	12%	12%
Vadodara	Muslim	0.1%	25%	25%

In Table 4.9, we report the percentage of a caste or religious community, housing typewise. In parentheses we report how much that number deviates from that group's overall presence in the city. A negative number means that compared to their overall proportion in the city, they are under-represented in that housing type and a positive number means they are over-represented in that housing type. There is a high degree of caste segregation by housing type in Bhavnagar. The highest housing type (HT5) is composed almost exclusively of Forward Caste and OBCs. There are no STs, SCs, or Muslims in this housing category in Bhavnagar. The lowest two housing types are predominantly OBCs, albeit with a significant proportion of SC households and both castes are very significantly over-represented in these housing types. In contrast to other cities, OBCs in Bhavnagar form the majority of these lower housing types, including 53% of HT1 households and 60% of HT2 homes. This is the second-highest concentration of OBCs in these housing types in our cities, after only Kochi. We also note that in terms of caste, if not religion, HT3 housing is the most integrated housing type in the city, with all caste groups represented at close to their city-wide proportions.

When comparing Bhavnagar to the other cities in our project, we see how the disparities reflected in Bhavnagar differ somewhat from the norm. Comparing Table 4.9 above for Bhavnagar and Table 4.10 below for the seven cities, we find that Muslims are more heavily excluded from upper class housing (HT5) in Bhavnagar than they are in other cities. Similarly, SCs are somewhat more excluded from middle and upper class housing (HT4 and HT5) than in other cities. The

distribution of OBCs in Bhavnagar compared to other cities is also very striking. While they are generally well represented across the better housing types on average in our cities, in Bhavnagar they are significantly excluded from HT4 and HT5. And whereas OBCs are underrepresented by 18% in informal settlements in our cities, they are over-represented by 14% in Bhavnagar. OBCs are clearly much worse off in Bhavnagar than in other cities. Conversely, Forward Castes are far more dominant at the highest levels (HT4 and 5). Upper-class (HT5) housing in Bhavnagar is virtually synonymous with Forward caste enclaves.

Table 4.9: Composition of Housing Types by Religion and Caste (Bhavnagar)

Housing type	**HT1**	**HT2**	**HT3**	**HT4**	**HT5**
	Caste				
ST	35% (23%)	17% (5%)	12% (0%)	4% (-8%)	0% (-12%)
SC	53% (14.%)	60% (21%)	39% (0%)	16% (-23%)	13% (-26%)
OBC	0% (-47%)	21% (-26%)	48% (1%)	78% (31%)	87% (40%)
Forward	2% (1%)	1% (0%)	0% (-1%)	1% (0%)	0% (-1%)
Other	**Religion**				
	99% (15%)				
Hindu	1% (-13%)	22% (8%)	25% (11%)	0% (-14.%)	0% (-14.%)
Muslim	0% (-2%)	1% (-1%)	2% (0%)	3% (1%)	5% (3%)
Other	35% (23%)	17% (5%)	12% (0%)	4% (-8%)	0% (-12%)

Table 4.10: Group Ratios of Housing Representation (Full Sample)

Housing type	**HT1**	**HT2**	**HT3**	**HT4**	**HT5**
	Caste				
ST	2.32	0.87	0.82	0.75	0.93
SC	1.68	1.14	0.95	0.68	0.42
OBC	0.49	1.05	1.16	0.95	1.08
Forward	0.85	0.90	0.84	1.35	1.31
Other	1.48	0.96	1.12	0.69	0.73
	Religion				
Hindu	1.08	0.96	0.94	1.11	1.00
Muslim	0.71	1.26	1.26	0.57	0.50
Christian	0.89	0.84	1.02	0.84	2.21

Note: Green highlighted cells indicate the intensity of over-representation of each group. Red highlighted cells indicate the intensity of under-representation. Both are expressed as likelihood ratios.

4.5 Governance

4.5.1 Basic Issues in Governance

What do urban residents think municipal governments should be doing and how are they doing it? Across our seven cities (Figure 4.1), a plurality of citizens believe that the most important service the government should provide is water, including 32% in Bhavnagar. Education comes second in Bhavnagar (22%).

Figure 4.1: What is the most important service the government should provide?



In asking residents about how they access services, one of the most striking findings is that the citizens of Bhavnagar rely heavily on local corporators, which is the highest for the cities in our study, along with Kochi. As per Table 4.11, corporators are seen as being the most important for ensuring delivery of public services from providers (49%), with MLAs (3%) and MPs (1%) being far less visible. After corporators, citizens believe that the government offices (26%) and intermediaries (20%), are the most significant. It is notable that in all the mega cities, citizens depend more on "intermediaries" than on government officials to ensure that public services are provided. Meanwhile, in smaller cities like Bhavnagar, Vadodara and Kochi roughly 3/4 of citizens believe that either councillors or a government office is the key to getting services. In these smaller cities, direct access to the state through elected representatives or government officials is much more prevalent than in larger cities.

Table 4.11: Who do you think is most important in ensuring receiving public services from the provider?

	Kochi	Vadodara	Bhavnagar	Ahmedabad	Chennai	Hyderabad	Mumbai
Corporator	48%	19%	49%	33%	21%	13%	25%
Government Officials	28%	62%	26%	21%	13%	27%	14%
MLA	5%	5%	3%	9%	10%	12%	18%
MP	3%	3%	1%	7%	9%	16%	16%
Intermediaries	16%	11%	20%	30%	48%	32%	27%

There is a big debate in India about the role elected officials actually play in representing their constituencies. Popular and academic views fall into three camps: politicians are self-serving (clientelism), they are parochial and only really care about their communities (group patronage), or, in the democratic ideal, they do what is best for all their constituents (constituency service). Somewhat surprisingly, given the thrust of the academic literature and popular views about corrupt politicians, we found that citizens in most of our cities have a positive view of their elected corporators (they serve their constituency as a whole). In Bhavnagar, however, a majority of 52% describe their corporator as either more focused on their personal interests (22%) or only caring about a certain community (30%). The latter is the highest among all cities compared (Table 4.12A), though Chennai comes close. This would suggest that while citizens of Bhavnagar do rely on their corporators (as is also the case in Kochi) more than on intermediaries, those corporators are more group inclined and less all-serving than in other cities. It is best to infer that group-based patronage politics is more prevalent in Bhavnagar, especially when compared to other cities.

Table 4.12: Which of these statements, in your opinion, describes your Municipal Corporator?

	Kochi	Vadodara	Bhavnagar	Ahmedabad	Chennai	Hyderabad	Mumbai
Cares about all the people of their constituency	80%	56%	41%	54%	42%	66%	58%
Cares only about the well-being of certain communities in their constituency	10%	21%	30%	8%	16%	5%	4%
Cares mostly about their own interests	5%	11%	22%	22%	34%	25%	20%
Don't Know	4%	11%	5%	14%	8%	4%	15%
Refused to Answer	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	0%	3%

When we break down these views on corporators, we find that the class differences were very pronounced (Figure 4.12B). In informal shack settlements (HT1), only 26% had a favourable view of their corporator, which then jumps to 59% in the case of informal slum settlements (HT2).

We noticed this jump from HT1 to HT2 households in all of our project cities except Kochi and Chennai (Figure 4.12B). The pattern of increasingly favourable views of corporators as one moves up the class hierarchy holds across most cities. For Bhavnagar and Vadodara, there is no clear trend in the sense that as we move from HT1 to HT2 there is a sudden and large increase in the proportion of respondents having a favourable view of the corporator but it drops in the case of HT3 households in both Bhavnagar and Vadodara. The proportion of those with a favourable view further drops for those in HT4s and then increases again for upper classes in case of Bhavnagar. No clear conclusions about class bias of corporators are possible in Bhavnagar.

Figure 4.2: Responses to corporators being concerned for all people of their constituency



Though the Bhavnagar citizens think of the corporator to be the most important person to help in delivery of basic services from the respective provider, 71% report never visiting a corporator's office in the last 6 months, 15% visiting once and 9% visiting twice (Table 4.13). When asked about visiting a government office, we get roughly the same numbers. Given that citizens of Bhavnagar often do not get good services and must deal with service delivery problems - including a very low level of daily water, flooded streets and homes, and sewer blockages - it is surprising that they engage so little with their representatives and government officials.

Table 4.13: Number of visits to Councillor /corporator in the last 6 months

City	0	1	2	3
Kochi	62%	19%	15%	3%
Vadodara	75%	19%	5%	0%
Bhavnagar	71%	15%	9%	4%
Ahmedabad	69%	15%	11%	3%
Chennai	74%	17%	5%	2%
Hyderabad	64%	23%	11%	1%
Mumbai	91%	4%	3%	1%

But on this issue, class differences are noticeable. Around 88% of informal shack settlement households report not having visited their corporator in the past six months (Table 4.14). The upper classes (HT5) are slightly lower (77%). The middle classes, as well as those in Informal slum settlements (HT2), are much more likely to engage with their corporators. We find similar differences for visits to government officials. Moreover, the gap between informal shack settlements (HT1) and informal slum settlements (HT2) is the highest of any city. As Table 4.14 further shows, caste on the other hand does not seem to have much of an impact on how often citizens engage corporators or government officials. Finally, religion has a big impact. Hindus were far less likely to visit corporators (27%) than Muslims (52%), and this was the largest gap in all our cities. The same pattern exists for visiting government officials.

Table 4.14: Number of visits to corporator in the last 6 months - Bhavnagar

Group	0	1	2	3
HT1	88%	6%	6%	0%
HT2	68%	17%	12%	2%
HT3	47%	19%	25%	6%
HT4	74%	14%	6%	4%
HT5	77%	12%	8%	2%
Hindu	73%	14%	8%	8%
Muslim	48%	14%	26%	1%

4.6 Networks

In democracies where institutions are weak, citizens often take recourse to interpersonal networks to secure public goods. In more concrete terms, if you cannot have concerns and claims addressed through routine, rule-bound procedures, citizens will often use personal connections, be it a representative, a government official they know, or brokers of various kinds. As we have seen, councilors and government officials play an important role in Bhavnagar. But to what extent does

this reflect the kinds of interpersonal networks that people have? As this project has shown elsewhere, having networks can make a difference in how you engage the state (Heller et al., 2023). These networks vary in their composition and density depending on one's social or economic position.

By comparison with the other cities in our project, the citizens of Bhavnagar are highly connected to the state in interpersonal terms. We asked all respondents if someone in their household knows a government official, a politician (elected or unelected), a police officer, or any other person of influence (religious or community leader). Fully 73% of respondents reported knowing one of these key actors. This puts Bhavnagar at the top of our cities, followed by Hyderabad and Kochi. If we break down this figure by specific actors (Table 4.15), 26% of Bhavnagar residents know an elected official (MP/MLA or a Corporator), followed by a bureaucrat or a government officer (19%). Overall, Bhavnagar's citizens have strong connections to the state via both formal and informal networks.

Table 4.15: Proportion of households, by city, who know each of the persons of influence personally

	Kochi	**Vadodara**	**Ahmedabad**	**Bhavnagar**	**Chennai**	**Hyderabad**	**Mumbai**
Bureaucrats	15%	16%	14%	19%	11%	17%	18%
Police officer	15%	28%	7%	11%	12%	3%	18%
MP/MLA/Corporator	33%	28%	3%	26%	4%	19%	16%
Unelected politician	16%	24%	3%	8%	5%	3%	8%
Other local leader	19%	13%	5%	16%	5%	5%	3%
Other person of influence (Religious leader, community leader)	13%	11%	8%	17%	7%	3%	1%
None of the Above	25%	38%	60%	23%	43%	25%	54%
Don't Know	13%	7%	11%	19%	18%	31%	7%
Refused to answer	2%	0%	2%	3%	7%	2%	4%

When we disaggregate networks by class (housing type) the picture that emerges is of sharply uneven connections to the state (Table 4.16). In informal shack settlements (HT1), 36% of residents do not know any person of influence and only 1% know a government official (bureaucrat and police). This latter proportion rises for slum settlements (HT2) to 26% and is the highest for the city's upper class residents – 51% of whom know a government official. Also, only 10% of shack dwellers have ties to elected representatives (MP/MLA/Corporator), a number

which rises sharply for those in slum settlement (22%) and is again the highest for those in HT5 (32%). Residents in slum settlements (HT2) have strong connections across formal and informal networks. 22% of them know elected representatives, which is the second-highest after Kochi among our cities. 50% of them know an intermediary, a category that includes persons of influence, unelected politicians, or local leaders. These informal connections are critical in delivering services to urban residents, particularly the urban poor. In Bhavnagar, 24% of slum residents know of a person of influence such as a religious or community leader, a local leader (18%) or an unelected politician (8%). Each of these numbers is the highest for our project's cities. In Bhavnagar, the upper and upper-middle classes know many more persons of influence in formal networks – i.e., government officials and elected leaders. Those in slums (HT2) and lower middle class housing (HT3) know more intermediaries which is in line with evidence generated from scholarly literature that slums rely heavily on informal leaders for accessing public goods.[13]

Table 4.16: Proportion of citizens/households knowing persons of influence

Housing Type	**Bureaucrat/Police**	**MP/MLA/Councillor**	**Intermediary**
HT1	1%	10%	27%
HT2	26%	22%	50%
HT3	33%	27%	59%
HT4	23%	25%	36%
HT5	51%	32%	45%

Summary

While the citizens of Bhavnagar rely more on corporators than on other state actors to address their problems with services, a majority does not have a favourable view of them. The high dependence on councillors coupled with the view that they are more interested in serving themselves or their own community suggests the prevalence of patronage politics. Moreover, residents of informal shack settlements (HT1) have a far less favourable view of their corporators than those in slums (HT2), something we see in five out of our seven cities. The pattern of engagement has a class pattern, with those at the bottom (HT1) and those at the top (HT5) engaging the least with the state officials and offices.

[13] Auerbach, A. (2019). *Demanding Development: The Politics of Public Goods Provision in India's Urban Slums* (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

5. Citizenship

The idea of citizenship goes to the heart of democracy. How citizens understand their relationship to the state and, in our case, to the local municipal government, how they understand their relationship to each other, and how they use their rights of citizenship - civil, political, and social - are important parts of democratic practice. We break citizenship into two dimensions to develop a concrete understanding of this complex and dynamic phenomenon. The first has to do with basic attributes and beliefs about citizenship. What do citizens actually think it means? Second, what actual ability do citizens have to use their rights as citizens? We capture this by measuring, as best we can, if and how citizens exercise their rights. This is captured through the citizen participation index (CPI), which covers various aspects of participation. We begin with the attitudes.

To gain a general sense of what kinds of beliefs citizens hold about citizenship, we asked some direct and some less direct questions. We asked all of our respondents what they believe are the most important responsibilities of being citizens. The most common answer, across all cities, is voting, followed by respecting the law, treating others as equals and being involved in your community (Figure 5.1). In Bhavnagar, 50% responded voting was the most important and is the highest response in our cities. Only about 9% said "respecting each other as equals," which is the lowest in our cities.

Figure 5.1: What is the most important responsibility of a citizen of a democratic country India?



There is interesting variation across classes on how the democratic responsibilities of citizens are defined (Table 5.1). For Bhavnagar, it is notable that 30% of those in informal shack settlements

report that they "don't know" what the responsibilities of a citizen are, which is highest in our cities. Also, those who live in upper-class housing (HT4 and HT5) are roughly twice as likely to believe that citizenship is about respecting the law as those who live in middle and lower housing (HT1-3). On this question there is also some variation across caste categories particularly between Forward Caste and SC groups. In the case of 'respecting the law' and 'treating others as equals', proportionally larger percentages of respondents from the Forward Caste group report these to be the most important compared to SCs. In terms of religious communities, a higher percentage of Hindus (21%) than Muslims (11%) believe citizenship is mostly about "respecting the law" (Table 18). Overall, the clearest pattern is that elites (upper classes) and dominant groups (Hindus and higher castes) are much more likely to attach greater importance to respect for the law in their idea of citizenship.

Table 5.1: What is the most important responsibility of a citizen of a democratic country such as India?

	Hindu	**Muslim**	**Forward Caste**	**OBC**	**SC**	**ST**
Respecting the law	21%	11%	23%	18%	10%	21%
Treating others as equals	9%	6%	9%	8%	3%	9%
Being involved in your community	12%	11%	14%	10%	14%	12%
Voting	50%	57%	47%	57%	67%	50%

We also measured attitudes about citizenship by asking key questions that capture how citizens feel about classic issues of political and social liberties. On our first question about political liberalism, the citizens of Bhavnagar are the most conservative after Ahmedabad, followed by Vadodara, making Gujarati cities unique in holding these preferences (Table 5.2). As many as 82% say that their right to free speech should not include the right to criticise India.[14] Ahmedabad and Vadodara, the other two Gujarati cities, are also the only two other cities in our project where a majority supported this view. Hyderabad and Kochi rank dramatically lower, and Chennai and Mumbai substantially so.

Summary

In sum, citizens in Bhavnagar see their responsibilities largely in terms of voting (and not so much as respecting others as equals or in community engagement), and they think that people should not criticise the nation. On attitudes towards political and social liberties, a paradoxical picture emerges. On the definition of freedom of speech, their attitudes tend to be somewhat conservative. However, when it comes to social liberties (as gauged by attitudes toward marriage across caste

[14] Statistical Report by the State Election Commission, Gujarat. Pg. 169. Web: https://sec.gujarat.gov.in/images/6-Polling-Satus-1416.pdf accessed on 25/09/2020.

and communal lines), the citizens of Bhavnagar were found to be relatively more liberal compared to several other cities in our study.

Table 5.2: The Urban Indian - Conservative or Liberal? Those saying "yes" to

	There should be laws against inter-caste marriage	**There should be laws against inter-religion marriage**	**Not saying BMKJ should be punished**	**The right to free speech does not include the Right to criticize India**
Kochi	1%	1%	5%	22%
Vadodara	46%	46%	41%	76%
Bhavnagar	9%	13%	47%	82%
Ahmedabad	16%	22%	21%	88%
Chennai	10%	11%	19%	46%
Hyderabad	13%	14%	62%	20%
Mumbai	10%	9%	54%	42%

6. Participation

We now turn to our citizen participation index (CPI) and its component parts, which include (i) voting, (ii) non-voting political participation and (iii) civic participation. Each component included several questions for a total of 10 (see Appendix 2 for questions and how the index was constructed). Each score is reported on a scale of 0-1, with 0 indicating no participation and 1 indicating that the respondent participated in all 10 activities.

Table 6.1: Citizen Participation Index (CPI) by Sub-component

City	**CPI**	**Sub-components of CPI**		
		Voting	**Non-voting**	**Civic**
Kochi	0.395	0.761	0.13	0.275
Ahmedabad	0.319	0.660	0.087	0.195
Bhavnagar	0.397	0.764	0.098	0.318
Chennai	0.303	0.485	0.17	0.234
Hyderabad	0.35	0.581	0.135	0.316
Mumbai	0.214	0.296	0.071	0.266
Vadodara	0.422	0.793	0.144	0.327

Bhavnagar's overall score of 0.395 places it among the top of our surveyed cities (Table 6.1), slightly higher than Kochi but below Vadodara, which has the highest score. The difference between the least-engaged and the most active cities (Kochi, Bhavnagar, and Vadodara being at

the top) is significant. Notably, the difference is tied to city size, with all the large cities having much lower levels of citizen participation.

We now turn to the components of our citizen participation index: voting, non-voting, political, and civic.

6.1 Voting

Fully 89% of Bhavnagar citizens self-reported that they are registered to vote in state or national elections (Figure 6.1). While we have examined overall voter registration in three levels of elections, it is important to ask a follow-up question: whether respondents are registered to vote at the address where they currently reside. This is because India's voter registration laws only allow a person to register to vote at one address. Those who have moved from one city or state to another (crossing constituency boundaries) would need to update their voter registration to vote in a new constituency. Those who had not previously updated their registration would have to physically travel back to their last-registered constituency to vote, given the lack of "absentee" or mail-in ballots for most categories of voters in India. The difficulties of either traveling back to one's previous constituency or updating one's voter registration in a new area may pose participation barriers to those from poorer backgrounds. However, some do, in fact, travel back. In this case, perhaps a more accurate picture of electoral participation is given by the proportion of those who are actually registered at their current address, at least in Kochi. Comparing Figure 6.2 with Figure 6.3, it becomes clear that lower castes' registration pattern reflects that they are less likely to be registered at their current address.

Figure 6.1: Are you currently registered to vote in Union or State elections?



Figure 6.2: Voter Registration (in state or Union elections) by Caste - All cities



Figure 6.3: Are you registered to vote at your current address? (caste wise)



Class differences concerning voter registration at the current address exist, but are not huge (Table 6.2). In terms of religion, we found that Muslims were slightly more likely to indicate they are registered at their current address (89%) than Hindus (84%). With regard to caste, we noticed a substantial variation across different groups. 86% of Forward Caste respondents were registered, while only 72% of SCs were.

Table 6.2: Voter registration (at current address) by caste, class, and religion

	HT 1	HT 2	HT 3	HT 4	HT 5	Forward Caste	OBC	SC	ST	Hindu	Muslim	Other
Registration Rate	87%	85%	90%	82%	87%	86%	84%	72%	-	84%	89%	89%

Electoral participation in Bhavnagar, as reported by citizens, is above average for the cities in our project. Bhavnagar residents' participation in national elections was 73%, 79% in state elections, and 76% in the last municipal elections (Figure 6.4). Voting in Bhavnagar at all levels of elections is higher than all other cities, except for Vadodara. If we combine voting at all levels, we get a single index sub-component on voting (Table 6.1, col. 3). At the overall level, Bhavnagar has the second highest score (after Vadodara) when it comes to voting as a component of participation. The lowest score is recorded for Mumbai (0.296). When looking at this voting sub-component, religion has a substantive effect in Bhavnagar, with Hindus scoring 0.76 and Muslims at 0.84 (Figure 6.5). In Bhavnagar, this gap is corroborated by what we reported earlier – that Muslims were relatively more likely to be registered to vote. Taking both measures into account (registration and actual voting), Muslims clearly participate significantly more in electoral politics than the Hindus as far as Bhavnagar is concerned and this finding is in line with the findings for most other cities (Kochi and Ahmedabad being the only exceptions).

Figure 6.4: Self-reported voting in three levels of elections



Figure 6.5: Voting Sub-Index by Religion



Figure 6.6: Voting Sub-Index by Housing Type



When it comes to class (Figure 6.6), HT4 and HT5 households have the lowest voting sub-index scores, indicating that the rich are less likely to register and vote in Bhavnagar. The overall index shows a much higher propensity to register and vote among informal slums and lower middle

class settlements. As far as other cities are concerned, Ahmedabad records the highest variation across class categories. Mumbai has the lowest sub-index for all classes.

Figure 6.7: Voting Sub-Index by Caste



Summary

We can now summarize our findings on electoral participation. The patterns documented here provide mixed support for the common claim in the literature that the less privileged in India vote more than the privileged. On the one hand, our results found that people from lower class groups (HT2-3) do have higher voting participation index as compared with respondents from upper middle and upper-class respondents. On the other hand, contrary to the claim that people from lower castes participate more in voting, our results show that Forward and OBC caste groups participated more compared to SCs (Figure 6.7). Across other cities the pattern is more varied, but there is no evidence to support the conventional claim that electoral politics in urban areas are always dominated by the so-called slum vote banks. Moreover, in Bhavnagar there is a discernible difference across religious communities, with Muslims registering and voting in greater proportions than Hindus

6.2 Non-Voting Participation

There is more to politics than voting. Between elections, people organise and support political parties in varied ways. A well-known problem of representation in democracies is the fact that the rich and the more socially privileged often play a more proactive role in politics and are more likely to dominate political parties.

Let us begin with party membership. By this measure, citizens of Bhavnagar are not very politically engaged - we found only 2% of citizens are party members. Across castes (Table 6.3), Forward Castes are much more likely to be party members (3%) compared to Dalits, a category in which we found no party member. The breakdown by class is reported in Table 6.4. It is the upper-middle class that is most likely to join parties (3%), well above the lower middle class (1%), informal slum settlements (1%) and informal shack settlements (0%). When it comes to religion (Table 6.5), it is the Hindus (2%) who are more likely to join a political party compared to Muslims (0%) though, as we saw earlier, Muslims are more likely to vote.

Table 6.3: Membership of a political party by caste

Caste	**Vadodara**	**Ahmedabad**	**Bhavnagar**	**Chennai**	**Hyderabad**	**Kochi**	**Mumbai**
ST	1%	4%	0%	32%	2%	7%	10%
SC	0%	5%	0%	10%	4%	14%	6%
OBC	1%	7%	1%	7%	20%	18%	12%
Forward Caste	3%	3%	3%	28%	8%	10%	7%

Table 6.4: Membership of a political party by housing type

Housing Type	**Vadodara**	**Ahmedabad**	**Bhavnagar**	**Chennai**	**Hyderabad**	**Kochi**	**Mumbai**
HT1	0%	2%	0%	18%	10%	3%	5%
HT2	1%	4%	1%	12%	16%	13%	8%
HT3	2%	3%	1%	12%	9%	10%	3%
HT4	2%	6%	3%	11%	7%	13%	5%
HT5	1%	3%	1%	15%	2%	17%	5%

Table 6.5: Membership of a political party by religion

Religion	Vadodara	Ahmedabad	Bhavnagar	Chennai	Hyderabad	Kochi	Mumbai
Hindu	2%	4%	2%	13%	6%	14%	7%
Muslim	2%	7%	0%	4%	22%	12%	8%

The tables above also have cross-city data. While party membership is most often in double digits across social categories in Chennai, Kochi, and Hyderabad, in Bhavnagar it never surpasses 3% and remains in single digits in Vadodara, Ahmedabad and Mumbai. Party membership is very low across all social categories in Gujarat cities and Mumbai compared to other cities.

We can now turn to our index of non-electoral participation. It includes four questions covering political party membership, attendance at rallies, talking about politics with neighbours, and contributing time to a campaign. A score of "1" would mean that the respondent answered affirmatively to all 4 questions, with "0" indicating only negative responses. Our index (as reported in Table 6.1 at the beginning of this section) reveals that Bhavnagar's citizens are not very engaged in politics beyond voting and have the third lowest score (0.098) with only Ahmedabad and Mumbai recording lower scores. This means that, on average, respondents in Bhavnagar participate in one (or less) of these activities. This is compared to an average of 1.3 activities in Kochi, 1.4 in Vadodara and a high of 1.7 in Chennai.

Recall that only 2% of respondents in Bhavnagar are party members. By contrast, we found that 7% contributed time to election campaigns during elections, 10% participated in meetings or rallies organized by political parties between elections and 19% discussed supporting a candidate with friends, neighbours, or community members. Overall, only 24% reported being active in any of these categories of political participation.

When we break down non-electoral political participation by social category, informal shack settlements have a much lower score (0.04) than other classes (Figure 6.9). The most active are upper middle class (0.11) and the informal slum settlements (0.09). There is no clear pattern across all cities. In general, informal shack settlements (HT1) are less politically engaged, except for Hyderabad and Chennai, where they are the most engaged.

Figure 6.9: Non-Voting Sub-Index by Housing Type



Figure 6.10: Non-voting Participation (NVP) Sub-Index by Caste



When we look at the index by caste, OBCs are the most politically active in Bhavnagar outside of elections (0.11), but overall there is not much difference across caste (Figure 6.10).

When we look at non-voting political participation by religion (Figure 6.11), Muslims are slightly less active (0.07) than Hindus (0.10) in Bhavnagar. This is also the case in Vadodara, Chennai, and Kochi.

Figure 6.11: Non-voting Participation (NVP) Sub-Index by Religion



6.3 Civic participation

We now turn to the last sub-component of our CPI, civic participation. We want to distinguish civic participation especially from voting (but also from non-electoral political participation, such as political rallies). Voting is a once-in-five-year participation exercise. Civic participation, on the other hand, is more frequent -– for example, participation in the activities of associations, identity-based (caste, religion) or professional (trade associations, ward committees) is typically not once in five years. Civic participation can also demand much more time and energy than electoral participation and can sometimes mean dealing with the recalcitrant or even hostile officials. Even participative forums under a legal statute like the area sabha and ward committee face hurdles. In some cities, they are not formed, and in others, the participation is limited, further impeding active civic citizenship.

We measured civic participation by asking respondents a series of questions about their engagement in the local community and then created an index (see Appendix 6 for details). Among all our cities, Bhavnagar has the second highest score, 0.317. The score was eclipsed only by Vadodara, which scored 0.33. A score of "1" would mean that the respondent answered "yes"

to all three questions on civic participation, with a "0" indicating only "no" responses. A score of 0.33 - as in Vadodara - means that respondents answered "yes" to one of the three questions.

When we examine the civic participation sub-index across social categories, we find significant variation across cities (Figure 6.12). In Bhavnagar, SCs have the highest score (0.34), though there is relatively little variation between caste groups. For Vadodara and Mumbai, it is the Forward Castes which scored the highest.

Figure 6.12: Civic Participation Sub-Index by Caste



The class pattern is also worth noting (Figure 6.13). Informal shacks (HT1) in Bhavnagar have the lowest levels of civic participation compared to other class categories. However, when compared to the other cities, the score for informal shack settlements in Bhavnagar is the third highest, scoring lower than only Mumbai and Chennai, but that is by a very thin margin. The civic participation scores for the other housing types in Bhavnagar do not differ much. In terms of religion in Bhavnagar, there is no significant difference between Hindus and Muslims (Figure 6.14). The civic participation scores between Muslims and Hindus vary most substantially in Chennai and Hyderabad.

Figure 6.13: Civic Participation Sub-Index by Housing type



Figure 6.14: Civic Participation Sub-Index by Religion



To disentangle these findings about civic participation, we can look more closely at our question about belonging to civic organizations (Figure 6.15). If we look at the kinds of organisations that

citizens join, regional differences here are quite stark. In the four southern cities membership in professional associations prevails over membership in identity-based associations, such as caste and religion. The pattern is reversed in the three Gujarati cities, including Bhavnagar. This pattern finds confirmation in a second question we asked about associations. Going beyond organisational membership, we also asked which organisation in respondents' communities provides the most help in accessing services (Figure 6.16). In Bhavnagar, it is the identity-based organisations (29%) that provide more help to the citizens than civic/professional organisations (4%). The opposite pattern prevails in all the non-Gujarati cities except Mumbai.

Figure 6.15: Participation in Organisations and Associations



Figure 6.16: Which type of organization helps in providing public services?



6.4 The Citizen Participation Index (CPI)

We now turn to our citizen participation index (CPI). To recall, each of the three components – electoral, non-electoral political and civic participation – had several questions for a total of 10 (see Appendix 2 for questions and how the index was constructed). Each score is reported on a scale of 0-1, with 0 indicating no participation and 1 indicating that the respondent participated in all 10 activities (in the overall index). Bhavnagar's overall score of 0.397 places it second only to Vadodara (Figure 6.17). The difference between this and the lower-ranked cities (Mumbai, Chennai, and Hyderabad) is significant. It is notable that the difference is clearly tied to city size, with all the large cities having much lower levels of citizen participation.

Figure 6.17: Citizen Participation Index



The CPI scores do not vary substantially across Forward Castes, OBCs and SCs in Bhavnagar (Figure 6.18). When we examine the CPI across religion (Figure 6.19), in Bhavnagar Muslims have a higher overall CPI score than Hindus, but the difference is not large. This pattern of no substantive difference between Hindus and Muslims holds more or less for all cities, with the exception of Hyderabad, where Muslims display a considerably higher level of citizen participation than Hindus (Figure 6.19).

Finally, when it comes to the CPI and class differences, there is no clear trend (Figure 6.20). The class difference is quite sharp between informal shacks (0.357) and informal slums (0.415) in Bhavnagar. In fact, respondents from informal slums (HT2) have the highest level of participation compared to other housing types in the city. Informal shacks (HT1) have the lowest citizen participation (0.357). And upper-middle classes (HT4) have a higher CPI than even the upper class (HT5). This trend is very different from the other two Gujarat cities in our study, Vadodara and Ahmedabad, where there is increasing participation as one goes from HT1 to HT5.

Figure 6.18: Citizen Participation Index (CPI) by Caste



Figure 6.19: Citizen Participation Index by Religion



Figure 6.20: Citizen Participation Index (CPI) by Housing Type



Summary

We can now summarize our findings on citizen participation in Bhavnagar. First, In terms of electoral participation, they are much more likely to register to vote than those in other Indian cities and displayed one of the highest propensities to vote. However, when it comes to non-electoral political participation, the citizens of Bhavnagar are not as active as those in other cities in our project. As far involvement in civic life is concerned, the findings show that participation in Bhavnagar very strongly favours "traditional" or identity-based organisations over civic and professional organisations. Across all of our measures of citizen participation – voting, non-electoral and civic – we did not see a clear pattern in Bhavnagar between different communities, other than the fact that respondents in informal shack settlements (HT1) are much less involved than those from better-off class categories. On the other hand, the inhabitants of informal slum settlements (HT2) were the most mobilised subgroup in Bhavnagar. Few distinctions between Hindus and Muslims are apparent.

7. Services

In this section we examine the distribution of basic services in Bhavnagar. These include the quality of water, sanitation, electricity, roads, and waterlogging. All these services were carefully measured to capture the full range of conditions under which they are delivered. In the case of water, for example, we went well beyond the standard census measures to ask detailed questions

about daily supply and storage. Below we report all the specific services, but we begin with our overall Basic Service Delivery and Infrastructure Index (BSDII) scores. The index was constructed to provide a comprehensive measure of access to services (see Appendix 3 for full details). The index goes from 0 to 1, with a "0" meaning that a household gets no services and is often subject to flooding, to a perfect score of "1" which would mean round the clock availability of water and electricity, a flush toilet that is connected to a sewer line (or septic tank) and does not get clogged, and good roads and no flooding in the house or neighbourhood. On the index, Bhavnagar scores a 0.88, just behind Kochi and Vadodara, but well above Chennai, Hyderabad, Ahmedabad and Mumbai (Table 7.1).

As can be seen in Figures 7.1-7.3, the distribution of services across social categories varies considerably. Let us begin with the caste picture in Bhavnagar. The Forward Castes enjoy the best services followed by OBCs and Dalits. The gap between OBCs and SCs is however not huge. Other Gujarat cities differ. In Vadodara and Ahmedabad, OBCs roughly do as well as the Forward Castes (Figure 7.1). The most pronounced pattern of differentiated access to services, however, emerges along class lines – i.e., by housing types.

Table 7.1: Basic Service Delivery and Infrastructure Index (BDSII)

Kochi	0.904
Vadodara	0.907
Bhavnagar	0.880
Ahmedabad	0.855
Chennai	0.743
Hyderabad	0.814
Mumbai	0.715

Replicating the pattern in other cities (except Vadodara), Bhavnagar is also a city, along with Ahmedabad, where Muslims get a lower level of service delivery. The Hindu-Muslim gap in Bhavnagar -- 0.79 for Muslims compared to 0.88 for Hindus -- is in fact the highest in our cities (Figure 7.2).

Figure 7.1: Basic Service Delivery and Infrastructure Index (BSDII) by Caste



Figure 7.2: Basic Service Delivery and Infrastructure Index (BSDII) by Religion



As is clear from Figure 7.3, shack dwellers are worst off in Bhavnagar, as in all cities, and as expected, the service delivery score increases gradually as we move up the class categories. However, in comparative terms, those living in informal shack settlements (HT1) in Bhavnagar (with an index score of 0.637) are doing better than those living in informal shacks (HT1) in the other two cities in Gujarat (0.319 in Ahmedabad and 0.466 in Vadodara). The level of service delivery in Bhavnagar's informal slum settlements (HT2) is in fact much better than that of HT2s in all the bigger cities in our study (but not as good as in the two other smaller cities, Kochi and

Vadodara). Overall, the class gradient within Bhavnagar is quite steep, meaning that service delivery is highly differentiated across classes. Since housing types are highly clustered, there is also clearly a spatial dynamic at work. Where you live, and specifically what settlement type you live in (informal, designated slum, planned settlement, government housing etc), has a huge impact on access to services.

The BSDII, as in the case with all indexes, lumps many indicators together and can flatten differences which lie beneath it. As such, it is important to look at the distribution of specific services which the following sections do.

Figure 7.3: Basic Service Delivery and Infrastructure Index (BSDII) by Housing Type



7.1 Water

The delivery of water is most often reported as a simple binary - either you have access to piped water or you do not. But water delivery systems in Indian cities are complex, fragmented and provide highly variable quality of delivery. From our focus groups in informal settlements, we found that many households spend a significant amount of time securing water, either waiting for pipes to flow, collecting and carrying water from public sources (community borewells, tanker trucks) and storing water. Much of this work, it should be noted, falls on women, and often young girls. To develop an accurate picture of the differentiated quality of access to water, we measured water delivery by type of access (piped, borewell etc), location (in or outside of premises), duration of supply and storage systems.

As we saw earlier, the largest proportion of respondents reported water as the most important service to be provided by the government among the range of services. Ninety percent of

households in Bhavnagar have piped water, 96% of which are inside their premises and the balance being outside of the premises. In fact, Bhavnagar has the highest proportion of households in this study, along with Hyderabad, where the source of water is inside the premises (Table 7.2).

Table 7.2: Main source of water- All cities

	Kochi	Vadodara	Bhavnagar	Ahmedabad	Chennai	Hyderabad	Mumbai
Tap (Piped)	67%	95%	90%	88%	40%	98%	96%
Well	3%	0%	0%	0%	4%	0%	1%
Hand pump	0%	0%	1%	0%	18%	0%	1%
Borewell	27%	2%	9%	10%	27%	1%	1%
Other source	3%	3%	0%	2%	12%	1%	1%
Location of the source- All cities							
Inside Premises	93%	87%	96%	87%	74%	96%	76%
Outside Premises	7%	13%	5%	13%	26%	4%	24%

Though access is fairly comprehensive, the quality of water delivery is poor. Fully 90% of the city receives water for only 0-2 hours a day. This is also the case for some other cities – Ahmedabad, Hyderabad and Vadodara. In Kochi, Chennai and Mumbai, a majority of households have much better service hours (Figure 7.4).

Figure 7.4: Hours of Water Supply per Day



We can now look at how water is distributed across social categories (Table 7.3). With respect to water, housing type is the category that has the most effect. Informal settlements in Bhavnagar (HT1) are particularly badly off when it comes to water. Only 57% of HT1 households get tap

water, and only 36% get water from inside their premises (Table 7.3). Those numbers rise very sharply in slums (HT2,) with 95% of households receiving tap water and 80% inside premises. When one combines the figures for tap water with borewells, the lower middle classes (HT3) do just as well and the upper classes (HT 4 and 5) are provisioned at 100%.

Table 7.3: Source of Water by Housing Type

Source of Water	**HT 1**	**HT 2**	**HT 3**	**HT 4**	**HT 5**
Borewell	2%	2%	5%	9%	14%
Hand pump	13%	1%	5%	1%	0%
Tap (Piped)	57%	95%	90%	91%	86%
Well	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Other source	28%	2%	1%	0%	1%
Location of water source					
Inside premises	36%	80%	83%	99%	99%
Outside premises	64%	20%	17%	1%	1%

Figure 7.5: Hours of Water per day by Housing Type in Kochi



Although slum households have better water access than shack households, water access in both housing types is limited to one hour a day for about 42% of households (Figure 7.5). Hours of water access improve significantly in lower middle class households and above

For those with limited daily access, storage becomes essential (Table 7.4). As we note above, when water services are generally measured in India, as for example in the census, questions are limited to the type of delivery and whether it is in or outside the premises. Yet, water storage is

key to ensuring easy access to water when delivery is so limited. So, as part of our survey, we also measured the quality of storage. 97% of households in Bhavnagar have storage, and of those about 67% have a system that requires minimal labour, namely a large drum with a motorised pump - the highest in our cities (Table 7.4). All others depend on manual storage, including 50% who rely on small, movable containers. During our Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), respondents confirmed that they relied on storage. **"***We are a family of 11 and we share one tap between all of us. We get water for 2 hours and we store water in a tank"*[15]**.** Having to use buckets for water storage is about as clear and tangible a measure of poverty and precarity as one can imagine. It is notable that the range is from a high of 51% of households in Mumbai to a low of 6% in Kochi.

Table 7.4: Water Storage

	Kochi	**Vadodara**	**Bhavnagar**	**Ahmedabad**	**Chennai**	**Hyderabad**	**Mumbai**
Percentage requiring water storage	91%	96%	97%	79%	90%	93%	67%
Movable containers (small sized)	6%	18%	50%	22%	24%	26%	51%
Drum (medium sized)	10%	26%	10%	45%	43%	37%	49%
Large Tank/Drum without motorized pump	30%	39%	42%	21%	17%	30%	8%
Large Tank/Drum with motorized pump	51%	46%	67%	24%	23%	26%	8%
Other	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%

To summarize, Bhavnagar (along with Vadodara) has the highest percentage (90%) of respondents with water supply, though for only 0-2 hours a day. Bhavnagar has the highest proportion of respondents (33%) receiving water supply for less than an hour for the entire day. Additionally, Bhavnagar has the highest percentage of respondents depending on secondary water storage (97%), a need which arises because of the poor water supply provision in the city. It is a well-known fact that Gujarat is one of the most water scarce states in the country, and the state's topographical, hydrological, climactic, and soil conditions result in large regional variations in the availability of water, leaving most of Gujarat's districts with water deficits (Tortajada 2014). That being said, there are differences between housing types in Bhavnagar. While slums do comparatively well in terms of tap water in the premises, shacks are much worse off and both slums and shacks, as one may expect, have much more limited daily supply than middle- and upper-class households.

[15] Focus group discussion with Dalit women respondents in Bhavnagar on 20th August 2018.

7.2 Sanitation

In terms of sanitation, Bhavnagar fares better than most other cities in our study. 88% of the city has flush toilets connected to a piped sewer, which is the highest among the seven cities that we surveyed (Figure 7.6). Another 6% have it connected to a septic tank. Only 5% rely on a flush toilet which leads to an open drain. In sum, only 5% of households rely on highly inconvenient or open drainage, which taken together we classify as "compromised sanitation" systems[16] (open defecation, public latrine, open pit latrine, flush/pour latrine not connected to a sewer line i.e. waste flowing into ground or into water body through covered drain or uncovered drain). On this overall measure of sanitation, Bhavnagar ranks among the top performers with only 5% of citizens having compromised sanitation. Only Kochi, Hyderabad and Vadodara have lower percentages (Figure 7.7).

Figure 7.6: Household toilet facility in sampled cities



[16] We make use of the WHO-UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme guidelines for Water and Sanitation for Sustainable Development Goals in defining compromised and good sanitation. Good sanitation are those facilities which can be serviced (de-sludged like septic tanks or covered or ventilated pit latrines) for proper treatment of wastewater. Improved sanitation facilities are those designed to hygienically separate excreta from human contact which makes open defecation, public latrine, open pit latrine, flush/pour latrine not connected to a sewer line i.e. waste flowing into ground or into water body through covered drain or uncovered drain all - unimproved or compromised sanitation. For more read (Page 8, 16) Progress on drinking water, sanitation and hygiene: 2017 update and SDG baselines. Geneva: World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 2017. Licence: CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO.

Figure 7.7: Quality of Sanitation by City



Table 7.5: Toilet Facility by Housing Type - Bhavnagar

	HT 1	HT 2	HT 3	HT 4	HT 5
Piped Sewer	47%	75%	79%	90%	95%
Septic Tank	5%	6%	3%	8%	3%
Other System not connected to sewer	0%	15%	18%	2%	2%
Ventilated or Covered Pit	8%	3%	0%	0%	0%
Open Pit	2%	NA	0%	0%	0%
Public Latrine	11%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Open Defecation	28%	1%	0%	0%	0%

Table 7.6: Sanitation by Caste

Caste Group	Good Sanitation	Compromised Sanitation
Forward	98%	2%
OBC	91%	9%
SC	93%	7%
ST	94%	6%
Other	99%	1%

Though sanitation overall is quite good, it is uneven across classes (Table 7.5). In Bhavnagar, in informal shacks (H1), close to half of households have a flush toilet connected to a piped sewer (47%) but a substantial number of citizens also depend either on open defecation (28%) or a

public toilet (11%). Only 2% of Forward castes in Bhavnagar have compromised sanitation, compared to 9% for OBCs, 7% for SC and 6% for Adivasis (Table 7.6). Of note, however, is the fact that Bhavnagar is the only city where OBCs have more compromised sanitation than Dalits, although the difference is marginal.

Table 7.7: Quality of sanitation in Sample Cities by Housing Type (lowest 3 HTs only)

City	Housing Type	Good Sanitation	Compromised Sanitation
Kochi	HT 1	59%	41%
Kochi	HT 2	89%	11%
Kochi	HT 3	99%	1%
Vadodara	HT 1	28%	72%
Vadodara	HT 2	94%	6%
Vadodara	HT 3	98%	2%
Bhavnagar	HT 1	51%	50%
Bhavnagar	HT 2	81%	19%
Bhavnagar	HT 3	82%	18%
Ahmedabad	HT 1	6%	85%
Ahmedabad	HT 2	57%	43%
Ahmedabad	HT 3	97%	3%
Chennai	HT 1	6%	94%
Chennai	HT 2	39%	60%
Chennai	HT 3	94%	6%
Hyderabad	HT 1	2%	82%
Hyderabad	HT 2	91%	7%
Hyderabad	HT 3	99%	0%
Mumbai	HT 1	1%	98%
Mumbai	HT 2	5%	94%
Mumbai	HT 3	99%	1%

This pattern is worse for HT1 in other big cities with 98% of households in Mumbai, 94% Chennai and 85% in Ahmedabad having compromised sanitation, whereas that proportion for HT1s in Bhavnagar is 50% (Table 7.7). Bhavnagar's sanitation for HT1s is the second best in our cities (after Kochi -- 41%). As was the pattern with water, access to sanitation improves dramatically in informal slum dwellings (HT2). In Bhavnagar, only 4% of informal slum residents (HT2) rely on out-of-premises sanitation, and the level of compromised sanitation drops remarkably to 19% from 50% for HT1 households. Informal slum settlements (HT2) in other cities also do better in accessing sanitation, with the dramatic exceptions of Mumbai and Chennai where 94% and 60% respectively have compromised sanitation.

Table 7.8: Difference between Forward Castes and Dalits in sanitation quality (percentage points)

City	**Difference**
Kochi	3%
Vadodara	12%
Bhavnagar	3%
Ahmedabad	12%
Chennai	16%
Hyderabad	3%
Mumbai	15%

To put these findings in comparative perspective, we report the difference between Forward castes and Dalits in terms of good sanitation. Along with Kochi and Hyderabad, in Bhavnagar the difference is minimal (0.03) (Table 7.8). These three have the lowest difference. If caste is not the basis of differential access to good sanitation in Bhavnagar, religion is. Nineteen percent of Muslims compared with 5% Hindus having compromised sanitation (Table 7.9). This fifteen percentage point difference between Hindus and Muslims in terms of sanitation is the highest among the seven cities.

Finally, we turn to the problem of flooding. Not surprisingly, informal settlement households in Bhavnagar are very vulnerable to flooding. 89% of informal shack settlements (HT1) report that their street gets flooded during monsoon and 91% report that their house 'always' gets flooded (Table 7.10). There is again a dramatic improvement as one moves from informal shack settlements to informal slums where only 45% report flooded streets and 4% report flooded homes.

Table 7.9: Sanitation by Religion

City Name	Religion	Good Sanitation	Compromised Sanitation	Other/DK/Refused
Kochi	Hindu	99%	1%	-
Kochi	Muslim	99%	1%	-
Vadodara	Hindu	98%	2%	0%
Vadodara	Muslim	99%	1%	-
Bhavnagar	Hindu	95%	5%	-
Bhavnagar	Muslim	81%	19%	-
Ahmedabad	Hindu	88%	12%	0%
Ahmedabad	Muslim	82%	18%	-
Chennai	Hindu	85%	15%	0%
Chennai	Muslim	93%	7%	
Hyderabad	Hindu	95%	4%	1%
Hyderabad	Muslim	96%	3%	2%
Mumbai	Hindu	24%	76%	1%
Mumbai	Muslim	14%	85%	0%

Table 7.10: Flooding during Monsoon - Road and Ground Floor

Floods during monsoon		HT 1	HT 2	HT 3	HT 4	HT 5
Road	Yes	89%	33%	18%	17%	8%
Road	No	11%	66%	82%	14%	92%
Ground Floor	Yes	91%	48%	28%	25%	13%
Ground Floor	Never	8%	52%	72%	75%	87%

When we compare these numbers to other cities, we find that the condition of informal settlements in Bhavnagar and the other two Gujarat cities is far worse than any other city except Kochi, where 89% of the respondents in informal settlements complained of roads getting water logged during monsoon (Figure 7.8). This was confirmed to us in a focus group discussion in Bhavnagar. The respondents complained of flooding every monsoon, including water entering their homes. [17]

The differences by caste are also very marked in Bhavnagar. When it comes to water logging of the roads during monsoon, OBCs (47%) are actually worse off than Dalits (31%) (Table 7.11). Dalits along with Forward castes reported the lowest percentage of roads getting water-logged during Monsoon. The difference between Hindus and Muslims is also substantial, with 45% of Muslims reporting water logging of the road during monsoons compared to only 35% of Hindus.

[17] FGD in Tilak Nagar, Bhavnagar on 27th August 2018.

Figure 7.8: Flooding of roads in all cities by Housing type



Table 7.11: Does the road in front of your house get water-logged during monsoon?

	Hindus	**Muslims**	**Forward Caste**	**OBC**	**SC**
Yes	35%	45%	31%	47%	31%
No	65%	55%	69%	53%	63%

Summary

Reviewing these patterns of differentiation across social categories of access to basic services, three broad findings can be highlighted. First, class matters quite a bit. Though informal slums (HT2) do relatively well, informal shack settlements (HT1) in Bhavnagar are systematically deprived. Second, as measured by our overall index of service (BSDII), there is certainly a gap between Muslims and Hindus and the gap is noticeable. Third, a notable finding is that whereas there is a significant gap between SCs and Forward Castes in terms of access to good sanitation in our other cities, that gap is more or less negligible in Bhavnagar.

8. Mechanisms of Social Inequality

We know that there is a lot of inequality in Indian cities, including pronounced patterns of spatial exclusion. As we have seen in the previous section, the level of services that households get varies across social categories. To try and get a better sense of what might be driving such

outcomes, this final section explores issues of discrimination, how citizens might use personal networks to access the state and the degree to which social ties might reproduce social categories

8.1 Discrimination

We asked respondents a series of questions designed to measure discrimination. Specifically, we asked respondents to tell us how they thought the police and government officials treated people based on income, caste, religion, gender, and language. We then asked if respondents felt that any of these categories got better treatment in their neighbourhoods or at the broader city level. Though the absolute numbers are not high (something that is true of questions about discrimination in the U.S. as well), the range is considerable.

Figure 8.1: Respondents Reporting Neighbourhood-level Discrimination by Type



Reported rates of neighbourhood-level discrimination in Bhavnagar are low (Figure 8.1). These are, respectively: 1% for income, 3% for caste, 2% for religion, 1% for language, and 1% for gender. Bhavnagar respondents indicated the lowest proportions for discrimination at the neighbourhood level alongside Kochi. In the other cities, the figures on caste and religious discrimination at the neighbourhood level rose up to 16%. Hyderabad (16%), Chennai (14%) and Vadodara (15%) reported the greatest neighbourhood discrimination based on caste. Vadodara (18%), Hyderabad (13%) and Chennai (12%) also reported the highest neighbourhood-level religious discrimination. When we asked the same question *at the city level* (Figure 8.2), the levels of reported discrimination in some categories rose slightly. In Bhavnagar, 3% report discrimination on the basis of caste, religion and gender. Other large cities also reported larger numbers at the city level than at the neighbourhood level.

Figure 8.2: Respondents Reporting City-level Discrimination by Type



Table 8.1: Citizen perception of discrimination by the police in their city (Percentage)

Options	Kochi	Vadodara	Bhavnagar	Ahmedabad	Chennai	Hyderabad	Mumbai
Rich Treated Better	8%	25%	29%	23%	38%	10%	35%
Poor treated better	1%	1%	0%	2%	4%	1%	2%
Both treated the same (Rich and Poor)	87%	71%	63%	60%	49%	86%	57%
Upper caste person treated better	2%	17%	17%	16%	24%	5%	33%
Dalit treated better	1%	1%	1%	2%	2%	1%	2%
Both treated the same (Upper caste and Dalit)	93%	77%	73%	66%	64%	91%	59%
Hindu treated better	0%	10%	10%	6%	10%	3%	23%
Non-Hindu treated better	0%	1%	1%	1%	2%	1%	2%
Both treated the same (Hindu and Non-Hindu)	95%	82%	82%	76%	77%	93%	69%
Man Treated better	0%	8%	5%	3%	5%	2%	14%
Woman treated better	8%	12%	18%	6%	10%	5%	24%
Both treated the same (Man and Women)	89%	75%	71%	75%	75%	91%	56%
Person who speaks local language Treated better	3%	14%	17%	10%	13%	6%	36%
Person who does not speak the local language treated better	0%	3%	3%	2%	4%	1%	2%
Both treated the same (one who speaks local language and the one who does not)	93%	75%	71%	72%	73%	90%	56%

8.2 Social ties

To what extent are the lives of urban Indians marked by "strong ties" (that is, ties defined by primary identities) and to what extent are they defined by "weak ties" (social connections that go beyond one's caste or religious community)? It is generally assumed that cities nurture a plurality of ties, giving individuals opportunities to engage with and develop social ties to those beyond their immediate identity group. We tried to gauge these questions by asking specifically how many friends they had outside their caste/community and how often someone in their family had married outside their caste/community.

Almost half of our respondents (47%) in Bhavnagar report having no friends from a different caste (Table 8.2), which is third highest across our cities. In general, Gujarati cities have the highest proportions of no friendships across the religious boundaries. 31% of our Bhavnagar respondents do not have friends from a different religion, which is lower than most cities (Table 8.3).

Table 8.2: How many of your friends are from a different caste?

City	0	1	2	3	4	5
Kochi	35%	24%	20%	6%	2%	2%
Vadodara	57%	23%	8%	1%	0%	0%
Bhavnagar	47%	29%	12%	2%	0%	0%
Ahmedabad	67%	14%	8%	2%	0%	0%
Chennai	25%	21%	21%	4%	0%	0%
Hyderabad	43%	5%	11%	4%	0%	0%
Mumbai	35%	10%	9%	8%	1%	3%

Table 8.3: How many of your friends are from a different religion?

City	0	1	2	3	4	5
Kochi	44%	22%	12%	3%	2%	2%
Vadodara	57%	29%	10%	3%	0%	0%
Bhavnagar	31%	21%	29%	7%	1%	0%
Ahmedabad	64%	13%	10%	4%	1%	0%
Chennai	20%	14%	15%	2%	0%	0%
Hyderabad	41%	6%	11%	4%	0%	0%
Mumbai	39%	7%	7%	4%	1%	1%

Differences across social classes are very revealing. As we see in Table 8.4, it is among the upper classes (HT5) that individuals are most likely to have friends outside their own caste in Bhavnagar, with only 24% reporting having no friends outside their caste. On the other hand,

those in informal shack settlements (HT1) are the least likely to have friends outside their caste, with 40% reporting having no friends outside their caste

Table 8.4: How many of your friends are from a different caste?

	0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
HT1	40%	21%	26%	2%	0%	0%
HT2	33%	21%	27%	7%	1%	0%
HT3	31%	12%	26%	8%	0%	0%
HT4	33%	22%	28%	8%	0%	0%
HT5	24%	24%	36%	5%	3%	0%
Forward Caste	30%	23%	31%	8%	1%	0%
OBC	32%	21%	25%	6%	1%	0%
SC	48%	11%	20%	8%	1%	5%
ST	40%	21%	26%	2%	0%	0%

Table 8.5: How many of your friends are from a different religion?

	0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
HT1	70%	26%	2%	0%	0%	0%
HT2	50%	33%	13%	1%	0%	0%
HT3	40%	30%	13%	2%	0%	0%
HT4	48%	26%	18%	1%	0%	0%
HT5	45%	35%	8%	4%	0%	0%
Hindu	49%	27%	15%	2%	0%	0%
Muslim	28%	45%	16%	2%	0%	0%

In Bhavnagar, it seems that marriage outside of one's caste or religion is extremely rare. Not a single respondent (out of 1,001 surveyed households in the city) reported that a family member had married outside of their own caste or religion (Table 8.6). Our focus group discussions made it clear that even among the poorer communities, marriage outside of one's caste is severely frowned upon. If a son wants to marry outside of his caste, the opinion is divided between either dissuading the son against it or being helpless in this situation. According to our focus-group respondents, **'***society will not accept it*'[18]. Attitudes against inter-religious marriage are also very strict. Indeed, the general opinion is vehemently against it. *"Girls should not marry [into a] Muslim family, and if she insists, then she is not our daughter"***.** While none of our cities (except for Chennai) reported widespread out-group marriages, Bhavnagar is striking in that no households report any such unions.

[18] This and the quote below are from our FGD in Tilak Nagar, August 27, 2018.

Table 8.6: Within your family has anyone married outside caste/Religion?

City	Outside Caste	Outside Religion
Kochi	3%	1%
Vadodara	4%	4%
Bhavnagar	0%	0%
Ahmedabad	4%	2%
Chennai	13%	10%
Hyderabad	7%	6%
Mumbai	5%	4%

Summary

We find that while overall levels of reported discrimination are relatively low in Bhavnagar compared to other cities, there are some exceptions. To the extent that there is discrimination, it is seen as largely benefitting those having higher incomes and less so for those from higher caste groups.

With regard to social ties, the citizens of Bhavnagar are quite inward-looking in terms of caste, largely sticking to their own. But, compared to caste, they are even less likely to have a close friend from outside their own religion. When it comes to familial ties, marriage outside of one's caste or religion is a bigger taboo in Bhavnagar than in any other city in our project.

Compared to our other cities, Bhavnagar is the second-lowest when it comes to reported city-level discrimination in cities and has the lowest reported rate of neighbourhood-level discrimination along with Kochi. Those residing in informal shacks (HT1) are the most likely to report discrimination.

9. Conclusion

Bhavnagar, a medium-sized and fairly industrialised city of Gujarat, has a fair share of upper castes, OBCs, Dalits and Muslims, but it has very few Adivasis. Well over half of Forward Castes are upper-middle or upper class, with only 3% in slums. By contrast, nearly 28% of OBCs reside in slums, and only 11% in upper class housing. In terms of class, OBCs in the city are nearly as badly off as the SCs. As for Muslims, they are split into two halves – slums and lower middle class. In cross-city terms, Bhavnagar's SCs and Muslims appear to be poorer than in other cities, but the poverty of OBCs is a great deal more striking.

As in several other cities, Bhavnagar citizens believe water provision is the municipal government's most important responsibility. Unlike the larger cities and much like other smaller cities, however, Bhavnagar relies more on corporators and direct access to government offices,

compared to the intermediaries, for securing public services, including water. But more than most cities in the project, in which a majority of citizens believe that the corporators work for all constituents, close to a majority of Bhavnagar does not think so. Bhavnagar's corporators appear to be more patronage-based. Bhavnagar's citizens also have widespread interpersonal connections with the local state and the density of these networks is next only to Hyderabad and Kochi. Slums appear to be heavily connected, too.

What, according to the residents of Bhavnagar, is the most important responsibility of citizens, as opposed to governments)? Bhavnagar is no different from other cities in thinking that voting is the most important citizen activity, followed by respecting the law. Compared to the other classes, the belief about voting is the highest among slum dwellers, whereas the upper classes rank above others in believing that respecting the law is important. Treating each other as equals gets the lowest score in Bhavnagar and is also the lowest among all our cities.

As for the actual voting, the lower classes vote more than the upper classes, Muslims more than the Hindus, OBCs more than the upper castes and the SCs. Beyond voting, civic participation generates the most important results. Consistent with other Gujarati cities but unlike those outside Gujarat in our study, Bhavnagar citizens participate much more in identity-based organisations than in professional ones. Slum dwellers have the highest participation rates in organisations that are mostly religion- or caste-based.

Let us now turn to public services. As elsewhere in Gujarat, water is only available for up to two hours a day in Bhavnagar. But, along with Hyderabad, Bhavnagar has the highest proportion of households having the source of water inside the house, including in the slums. On sanitation too, Bhavnagar is among the best performers. Though many more Muslims than Hindus have what we call compromised sanitation, only 5% of citizens overall do. On the quality of sanitation, the difference between upper castes and Dalits is the lowest among all cities.

The final set of conclusions is about discrimination and social ties among citizens. Compared to other cities, the levels of reported discrimination are low in Bhavnagar, but the belief also is that when discrimination does occur, it favours the rich. As for the social life of the city, caste and religion dominate to a remarkable degree. Most friendships are intra-caste and intra-religious, more the latter than the former and more so than in most other cities. And marriage outside caste and religion is essentially nonexistent.

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